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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the definition of prejudicial 
publicity by federal, state and local judges in the state of Okla-
homa. The primary objective is to determine which of the three news 
dimensions utilized as variables contributes the most to predisposing 
a juror to find a defendant guilty in the mirids of presiding judges. 
I wish to express my deeply felt appreciation to my major 
adviser, Dr. Walter J. Ward, for his guidance and constructive 
criticism offered not only throughout this study, but throughout 
my time in the Master's program. Appreciation is also expressed to 
my committee chairman, Dr. William R. Steng, who first planted the 
seed for this study in my mind. Without the invaluable assistance 
of these men, this study would not have been possible. 
An anonymous note of thanks is offered to the thirty judges who 
freely gave of their time:to participate in this study. Their open-
ness and candor not only made the experiment go smoothly, but offered 
an invaluable time of learning for me. 
Finally, special gratitude is expressed to my wife Carolyn, for 
her understanding and encouragement during my time in the Master's 
program and for her sacrificial efforts in the typing and preparation 
of this manuscript. 
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Fair trial versus free press. Whenever the author hears that 
question posed, he is reminded of the lifeboat example frequently used 
in discussing fine points of law or ethics. If you have room for only 
one more person in the lifeboat and two are drowning, how do you 
decide which one to save? The issue of prejudicial publicity is often 
framed in a similar manner with the implication clearly being that we 
must choose between a free press as guaranteed under the First Amend-
ment or a fair trial as insured by the Sixth Amendment. The author 
does not agree with such an assessment. Our society can offer fair 
trials to the accused, as well as keeping the press free from shackles. 
To restate the analogy, it is possible for the boatsman to save both 
people, if he swims bravely and well. 
However, to look back in history is to find the pages of trial law 
scattered with incidents that now outrage us by the conduct of the 
press--the mob atmosphere in the trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann, the 
"Roman carnival" in the trial of Samuel Sheppard. In retrospect, it is 
easy to dismiss these examples of press misconduct; why be concerned 
about trials that took place years ago? The author's concern stems 
from his belief in the foundations of our Constitutional system, that 
when injustice is done to one, injustice is done to all. Whether or 
not Hauptmann or Sheppard were innocent is not germane to the question 
of injustice. Although the author believes there is substantial evi-
dence that they were, the question is did the press act in such an 
irresponsible manner that they overstepped the bounds of the First 
Amendment and entered the territory of the Sixth Amendment? The 
author's conclusion is that they did, and these defendants' Constitu-
tional rights were infringed. 
2 
After many hours of study, it is the author's contention that the 
injustice occurred because the press tried to assume the role of the 
judiciary. Such role switching occurs when the matter of pre-trial 
publicity is analyzed in terms of "either-or-ishness," that somehow the 
public must choose between a free press or a fair trial for the accused. 
Thus, it is the goal of this study to find ways for both the press 
and the judiciary to live within their Constitutionally protected 
spheres, and in peace with one another, to allow both to be inside the 
lifeboat of freedom. Justice Stanley Reed put it well when he stated 
in Pennekamp vs. Florida: "A free press is not to be preferred to an 
independent. judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. 
Neither has primacy over the other. 111 
To be able to find ways to live together, we must be able to de-
fine clearly and precisely what is prejudicial publicity. Are there 
definite news dimensions that when disseminated produce prejudice 
against the defenda~t? Our search begins in Chapter II with a review 
of the relevant Supreme Court decisions on prejudicial publicity. 
Does the case law that has built up on the topic yield clues to the 
probl~m? We will see that it does. Chapter III is concerned with a 
review of the research literature on the topic. From these past 
studies, we will be able to get a better scientific grasp of the 
3 
problem. Chapter IV presents the methodology we will use in our exper-
iments. Chapter V presents the findings made after a complete scien-
tific analysis of the data. It suggests some rather specific answers 
to the question of what is prejudicial publicity. Chapter VI presents 
recommendations to the press and the judiciary as a result of the 
findings presented. 
A final word of caution. As we analyze this problem, we must be 
careful to remember that in reality, we are not dealing with hypotheti-
cal people. We can effect, for better or worse, real people like our-
selves, who can be severely hurt if we fail in our mission to bring 
about a more responsible press. It's not just the Hauptmann's or the 
Sheppard's either; it is the people who are involved in minor skir-
mishes with the law who can be most deeply affected by an irresponsible 
press. 
FOOTNOTES 
1walter Wyatt, Reporter of Decisions, United States Reports, 
Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court, Vol. 328, October Term 1946 
(Washington, 1947), p. 332. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FREE PRESS-
FAIR TRIAL DOCTRINE 
Introduction 
There is no single law that defines the relationship between the 
press and the courts over the matter of fair trial. Instead we have 
a body of common law that has evolved through the process of judicial 
review. 
Common law is "judge made" rather than codified. As such, it 
insures continuity in the administration of justice. It binds the 
present with the past through the application of the principle of 
"stare decisis et non quieta movere," which means "stand by past deci-
sions and do not disturb things at rest. 111 Therefore, our common law 
system operates on the basis of precedent, in arbitrating controver-
sies at hand. 
Judicial review is the essence of "stare decisis." It seeks to 
assess actions of lower courts in relation to what is specified in the 
Constitution, and how the courts have interpreted it in the past. 
Henry Abraham describes it as "the careful, painstaking reflection of 
an issue in terms of its conflict with the basic law--the Constitution, 
and its past history. 112 Thus in a very real sense the Constitution is 
what the Supreme Court says it is, for without its review, the Consti-
tution becomes an outdated and stagnant document. 
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Historically the relationship between the American press and the 
courts has been a hostile one. We should expect this, for the press 
is to view itself as the public's watchdog against governmental intru-
sion. Thus it is inevitable that they are drawn into conflict which 
can only be settled in the nation's highest court through an interpre-
tation of the Constitution. 
The First Amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of the people to 
peaceably asse,ble, and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances. 
The intent of the founding fathers was to eliminate the tyranny that 
had developed in Great Britain over the exercise of free expression. 
They wanted to seal forever the ability of a legislative body to die-
6 
tate to its citizenry what could and could not be published. 
In their opinion America had to give individuals the fullest 
amount of freedom possible, to eliminate this abuse. Benjamin Franklin 
in commenting on this wrote: "By the liberty of the press I mean an 
unreserved, discretionary power for every man to publish his thoughts 
on any subject, in any manner. 114 
But did this mean an absolute restriction against government in-
trusion? No single answer can be given to that question, but as we 
shall see in our review of the cases, the courts have held that only 
the most serious of situations can give ground for restrictions on the 
press. Justice Hugo Black wrote concerning the First Amendment: "It 
must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, 
read in the context of a liberty-loving society will allow. 115 
Yet often this "absolutist view" of free expression clashes with 
the Sixth .Amendment guarantee of fair trial. It states: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ..• and be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in gis favor, and to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense. 
Its historical basis is found in the abuses of the English judi-
cial system that began with the formation of the Star Chamber in 1487. 
The founding fathers did not want defendants to be allowed to rot in 
prison for years while awaiting trial. Such trials would not be done 
in secret but rather in the open where the light of public scrutiny 
could review them. Trials were not to be inquisitions but rather 
rational events conducted in an impartial atmosphere. 
But the greatest significance concerning the Sixth Amendment was 
that it was a jury of an individual's peers and not a judge who ulti-
mately decided the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Justice Byron 
7 
White has written: "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by 
a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or 
eccentric judge."7 
Thus the essential conflict between free press and fair trial is 
over the interpretation of these two amendments, which in their original 
form are written as absolutes. "Congress shall make no law," no fetters 
to a free and independent press. "In all criminal prosecutions ••• a 
speedy and fair trial by an impartial jury," the accused is given a 
pledge that he is innocent in all cases until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt by an impartial jury. The balancing of these two 
absolutes is the basis for the rest of the discussion in this thesis. 
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However, we must state that the conflicts between these two rights 
has not always been on the basis of a discussion of lofty Constitutional 
principles. Much of the hostility between the press and the courts in 
the free press-fair trial debate has not been because the press has 
been vigilant in seeing that the defendant has his day in court. 
Rather, it has been because the press has acted irresponsibly: being 
inaccurate and loose with the facts, acting as an unofficial prosecutor 
and seeking to profit from the grief of others. 
This summation should not be looked upon as exhaustive. These 
cases are simply the landmark ones; there have been many more. But 
this will offer a review of the developing trends in judicial thought 
and provide a framework for discussion of specific free press-fair trial 
issues. 
A Review of Cases 
Patterson vs. Colorado (205 U.S. 454 - 1907) 
Thomas Patterson had published a number of cartoons criticizing 
the justices of the Colorado Supreme Court during a case brought 
against the governor of th_e state. In actuality, the case was a 
Republican scheme to unseat the Democratic governor, so a Republican 
governor could be seated. 8 
The Colorado court enjoined Patterson from further publication 
on the basis that it was not only impeding the trial, but that such 
criticism of members of the judiciary was improper. Patterson ignored 
the injunction and continued to publish. He was therefore cited for 
contempt. 
His appeal to the u. S. Supreme Court was based on the First 
9 
Amendment claim against prior restraints, and further that the Four-
teenth Amendment extended such protection to state citizens. 
In overturning the lower court contempt citation, Associate Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that while one could not claim protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in state proceedings, the First Amend-
ment clearly denied restraints by state courts. The implications of 
this were that contempt proceedings against the press were deemed as 
local matters. Justice Holmes wrote: "What constitutes contempt, as 
well as the time during which it is committed, is a matter of local 
law. 119 This would become a crucial issue in future contempt cases. 
Bridges vs. California 
Times Mirror et al vs. Superior Court 
(314 u. s. 252 - 1941) 
In 1937 and 1938 the Los Angeles Times had published a number of 
editorials concerning a landmark labor case that was in progress. The 
case concerned assaults on non-union truck drivers by union "goons." 
In each case the editorials attacked what they considered to be the 
"weak" sentences that were to be given to those convicted. 
The most scathing of the editorials was printed on May 5, 1938, 
entitled "Probation for Gorillas." It stated in part: 
Two members of Dave Beck's wrecking crew, entertainment committee, 
goon squad or gorillas having been convicted in Superior Court of 
assaulting non-union truck drivers have asked for probation. Slug-
gers for pay, like murderers for profit, are in a slightly differ-
ent category from ordinary criminals. It will teach no lesson to 
other thugs to put these men on good behavior. If Beck's thugs, 
however, are made to realize that they face San Quentin when they 
are caught~0it will tend to make their disreputable occupation 
unpopular. 
The Superior Court of the State of California enjoined it from 
10 
further publication until the trial was over, despite the fact that no 
jury was involved in this case. The Times refused to be bound by the 
order, and was cited for contempt. 
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the injunctions 
were declared unconstitutional in a five to four decision. The majori-
ty opinion utilized the "clear and present danger" test established in 
Schenck vs. United States (249 U.S. 47 - 1919). The test enunciated 
by Justice Holmes stated: 
The, question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances, and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils 
that Congre11 has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity 
and degree. 
Schenck had been convicted in a federal court of violating the 
Espionage Act of 1917 in attempting to convince men to evade the draft. 
He had been distributing literature to young men outside conscription 
centers. The court affirmed his conviction, citing the fact that 
distribution of such literature at such a close proximity to draft 
12 centers did constitute a clear and present danger. 
Several points should be noted about the "clear and present danger" 
test. First is the usage of words. Are they used in a manner to 
incite the public or malign individuals? In the case of the Los 
Angeles Times, did its editorials incite public opinion against the 
trial judge to decide the case on the basis of the printed word, rather 
than on courtroom testimony? Did it prejudice the case of the defen-
dants by forcing the judge to take action that he did not believe would 
be prudent? 
Second, the "clear and present danger" test asks if the words 
bring about a substantial evil, and in particular, abridge the action 
11 
of Congress. Once again in this case, the substantial evil that would 
need to be proved was, did the editorials force the judge to take a 
position contrary to the Constitution and the actions of Congress in 
the area of civil liberties? 
Finally, the matter of proximity. In Schenck, proximity was the 
key issue. The court believed that someone passing out anti-draft 
material outside a conscription center was too close to allow the re-
ceiver of that information to make an intelligent judgment as to 
whether or not he wished to evade the draft. 13 Here the court had to 
determine whether the Times's editorials were of close enough proximity 
to the case as to represent a "clear and present danger" to the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial. 
Justice Black believed the Constitutional intent was for an un-
fettered press. He used these points as an outline in the majority 
opinion. 14 However, he felt that the use of the term "clear and present 
danger" was too broad and substituted for it the term "reasonable ten-
dency." Therefore, it was a matter of determining whether or not the 
editorials had a "reasonable tendency" to interfere with the conduct of 
a defendant's trial under the guarantees laid down by the Sixth Amend-
ment. 15 
First, as to the tendency of the words to abridge the defendant's 
rights, he chided the California Superior Court for trying to establish 
a standard when the legislature had not considered the matter. He 
wrote: "The legislature of California has not appraised a particular 
kind of situation and found a specific danger sufficiently imminent to 
justify a restriction on a particular utterance. 1116 Thus, if the 
legislature had not decided what was a reasonable tendency, or danger, 
12 
the courts had no right to make such a decision. 
The key to this decision, though, was what the court went on to 
say concerning the use of words. Referring to the First Amendment, 
Justice Black wrote: "The only conclusion supported by history is that 
the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to 
give liberty of the press the broadest scope that could be countenanced 
in an orderly society. 1117 Therefore, only the most dangerous use of 
words could cause·the courts to even consider restraint. To this 
Justice Felix Frankfurter in his dissent replied that the court was 
setting up an "absolutist view" of the First Amendment. 18 That phrase 
would be used for many years to come. 
As to any substantial tendency for evil that the editorials may 
have created, the court stated that such evil had not been proven 
sufficiently to justify restraint. Black quoted Justice Louis Brandeis 
in a previous decision where he stated that the court had never deter-
mined "how remote the danger may be, and yet be deemed present. 1119 The 
court determined that these editorials were not of sufficient danger to 
justify establishing such a standa.rd in this case. 
In fact the court went on to state that in controversies of this 
nature the silencing of the press could create an even more substantial 
danger. Press freedom was needed to clear the air. "It is therefore 
the controversies that command most interest that the decisions below 
(state) would remove from the arena of public discussion. 1120 
Finally as to proximity, the court set the tone for future deci-
sions when it stated that the idea of shielding jurors from all public 
expression is impossible •. Such exposure when balanced against the 
implications of restraint cannot justify such a view. Justice Black 
13 
concluded: "An endless series of moratoria on public discussion, even 
if each were very short, could hardly be dismissed as an insignificant 
abridgement of freedom and expression. ,i2 1 However, he left the door 
open a "crack." Black contended that a restraint could be justified 
when the bulk of the press criticism was aimed toward jurors who are 
inexperienced and vulnerable for such criticism could result in alter-
ing their judicial actions to avoid further attacks from the media. 22 
But judges, as in this case, could not resorttocontempt proceedings to 
protect themselves from such criticism. 
The importance of this decision was three-fold. First, it set 
down the premise that prior restraints for any reason are inherently 
detrimental. Such restraints can only be justified under the most 
serious of circumstances. 
Second, it began the concept that jurors cannot be put into a 
vacuum. While they may be exposed to some publicity that would tend 
to prejudice their views, such prejudice is short-lived, and its 
overall $ffects on them are overstated. 
Third, it revised the balancing test used to determine the 
constitutionality of expression. The prior test of "clear and present 
danger" became a matter of a "reasonable tendency." This change 
fostered a more rational approach to the problem of First vs. Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
Pennekamp vs. Florida (328 U.S. 331 - 1946) 
The Miami Herald had published a series of editorials and cartoons 
having to do with a gambling case that was in the process of trial. 
It criticized local judges in general for going out of their way to 
favor criminal defendants by allowing technicalities to delay swift 
. t· 23 convic ion. 
One of these editorials stated: 
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If technicalities are to be the order and a way for the criminally 
charged either to avoid justice altogether or serve to delay prose-
cution, then it behooves our courts and the 12ijal profession to 
cut away the dead wood and the enta!Jglements. 
Once again as in Times Mirror, the judge ordered the paper to 
cease publication of such matter until the trial was completed. The 
Herald refused to abide by the order and was cited for contempt for 
creating a "clear and present danger." It appealed the order to the 
Supreme Court on the defense that the editorials could not present a 
"clear and present danger," for they were broad in their application, 
and that there was no jury involved in the deliberation of the case. 25 
The Supreme Court by an eight to zero opinion overturned the con-
tempt citation. Justice Stanley Reed wrote the majority opinion in 
which he outlined the role that a socially responsible press can play 
in society. First, the press and the courts had to see their proper 
function in society, that both have equally important interests. 
Freedom of the press is not an end in itself, but a means to an 
end in a free society •... The independence of the judiciary is 
no less a means to the end of a free society, and the proper func-
tioning of the ~udi~~ary puts the freedom of the press in its 
proper perspective. 
Thus their roles are such that one cannot overstep the bounds of 
another. To have a trial by newspaper is just as much an evil as having 
a hanging judge presiding over the case. This was a new and fresh 
approach to press and court relations. 
Reed stated that the independence of the judiciary is assured only 
when it can function without pressure from outside forces. These forces 
may be the press, or special interest groups. Nevertheless, such out-
side influence destroys our accusatorial system of justice. 
But it should not be looked upon as an either-or proposition, as. 
some justices had done in the past. "A free press is not to be pre-
ferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a 
free press •... Neither has primacy over the other. 1127 This is so 
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much in line with libertarian and social responsibility thought, the ten-
der balance that the press and government are engaged in maintaining. 
In summing up his opinion, he stated that while the press often 
uses the intense public interest in a trial to justify its involvement, 
such involvement without responsibility can turn the press into a weapon 
of injustice. "Without such a lively sense of responsibility, a free 
press may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice. 1128 
Such responsibility involves getting the facts of a case right, 
added Justice Wiley Rutledge in a concurring opinion. "One can have no 
respect for a newspaper which is careless with the facts and with 
insinuation founded in its carelessness. 1129 
Thus the evolving doctrine of free press-fair trial began to take 
shape. Restraining the press from trial coverage constituted a gross 
abridgement of freedom, but such coverage needed to be accurate and 
responsible. The press had to see itself in its proper role, not as 
prosecutor, nor defender, but as an observer, to see that the accused 
received a fair and impartial trial by his peers. 
Craig vs. Harney (331 U.S. 367 - 1948) 
Should the press speak out when injustice has been do~e? In this 
Texas case the newspaper was reporting on improprieties involving a 
judge who had forced a verdict from a jury. The case concerned owner-
ship of a business building in Corpus Christi. Three times the jury 
ignored the judge's direction in this civil suit, but finally capitu-
lated, and stated on the record that it had acted under coercion and 
against its conscience. 
The newspaper in reporting this used such terms as "gross mis-
carriage of justice. 1130 In-its zealousness it launched a severe 
personal attack on the judge himself. One such editorial stated in 
part: 
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Browning's (trial judge) behavior and attitude has brought down 
the wrath of public opinion on his head, properly so. Emotions 
have been aggravated. American people simply don't like t~1 idea 
of such goings on ..•• That was the travesty of justice. 
For this they were cited for contempt, once again based on the "clear 
and present danger" test. 
The Supreme Court by a six to three decision reversed the order 
of the Texas court, and added to the free press-fair trial doctrine a 
new element: a trial is a public event. Justice William O. Douglas 
in the majority opinion stated: "A trial is a public event. 
What transpires in the courtroom is public property. 1132 
Thus judges could no longer treat their courtrooms as a private 
feifdom. What went on within those august chambers belonged to all 
the people, including the press. 
Therefore, such things as restraining orders and contempt cita-
tions could not be used as weapons of censorship. "There is no special 
prerequisite of the judiciary which enables it •.• to suppress, edit 
or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it. 1133 Theim-
pact of this part of the opinion was enormous. It would be cited as 
the basis for a renewed media presence in the courtroom, including 
television. 
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But what of the press's reporting, and in particular, its errors 
in reporting a controversial case? Once again, the court's response 
represented a new approach: 
Inaccuracies in reporting are commonplace ..•. A plan of report-
ing on a case could be so designed and executed as to poison the 
public mind .••. But it takes more imagination than we possess to 
find in this rather sketchy and one-sided case any3~mminent or 
serious threat to a judge of reasonable fortitude. 
Thus the responsibility theory of Pennekamp was modified. While the 
press should make every effort to report the facts of a trial in an 
accurate fashion, occasional errors of a non-malignant nature cannot be 
used against the press in an effort to censure its efforts. 
Thus the implications of Craig still are being felt today. It 
struck a new chord for the free press and insured that the events of 
the court could never be shrouded behind the veil of judicial secrecy. 
Baltimore Radio Show vs. State (193 MD 300 -
1949; 338 U. S. 912 - 1950 - Certiorari Denied) 
This case is important, not on the basis of what the high court 
said, but rather what it refused to say. The Superior Court of the 
State of Maryland in 1939 issued an order prohibiting the photographing 
.of prisoners without their consent, prior to the conclusion of their 
trials. The motivation was to protect the accused from undue publicity 
before or during the course of his tria1.35 
In 1948 a Baltimore radio station WITH carried numerous stories 
concerning the brutal Brill murder case. This coverage had included 
several interviews with the accused Eugene H. James. The trial judge 
cited the Baltimore Radio Show Inc., the Baltimore Broadcasting Corpora-
tion, and James P. Connelly, a broadcaster for WITH, for contempt, using 
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as his basis the 1939 prohibition against photographing the defendant. 
Thus this became one of the first contempt cases having to do with 
murder. 
Upon appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, the citation was 
overruled. The Maryland court reinforced the already growing doctrine 
of fair trial, stating once again that trials cannot be conducted in a 
vacuum. ·11Trials cannot be held in a vacuum, hermetically sealed against 
rumor and report. If a mere disclosure of the general nature of the 
evidence relied on would vitiate a subsequent trial, few verdicts could 
t d 1136 s an • 
Thus what Justice Black began in Times Mirror was expanded. Jurors 
cannot be protected from every single report and rumor concerning an 
aspect of the trial they are deciding. The critical importance of this 
principle will be seen in the later decisions where·so-called "preju-
dicial publicity" became a factor in overturning convictions, and 
granting new trials. 
The Attorney General of the State of Maryland sought to appeal the 
Maryland high court's ruling. The Supreme Court refused to grant an 
appeal, even on the basis of certiorari (the judicial formula that 
states when a disappointed litigant has exhausted all appeals, he may 
ask the court's hearing simply because he considers it a matter of high 
importance and substance). 37 Thus the Maryland Court of Appeals ruling 
was allowed to stand. 
Irvin vs. Dowd (366 U.S. 717 - 1961) 
Irvin vs. Dowd became the first case in which the Supreme Court 
reversed an individual's conviction because of "prejudicial publicity" 
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that made a fair trial impossible. It addressed itself in particular 
to the responsibility of the trial judge in presiding over a case. 
Irvin was accused of committing six brutal murders in the Evans-
ville, Indiana, area. Naturally, it received extensive coverage by· the 
. press. Unfortunately, much of the coverage was inaccurate, and in a 
very real sense, constituted a trial by newspaper. Before the case 
came to trial, Irvin had been depicted by the media as an arsonist, an 
AWOL soldier, a parole violator, and a self-confessed burglar. What 
made all of this publicity even more damaging was that the prosecutor 
worked directly with the news media in publicizing the case. The 
police had issued press releases identifying him as "Mad Dog Irvin. 1138 
At the initial hearing a change of venue was granted to the next 
county, yet the publicity followed. Further motions for change of 
venue were denied, despite defense attorney's substantial arguments 
that a fair trial was still impossible due to Indiana's state law. 39 
In the course of jury selection, 430 persons were called to be jurors; 
208 were excused for a variety of reasons. Of the twelve finally chosen, 
eight freely admitted that they thought Irvin was guilty. 40 . One juror 
· said: "You can't forget what you see and hear. 1141 He was convicted 
and sentenced to death. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the case, considering it 
to be of great importance. Irvin's appeal was based on the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause held that an individual 
could not be denied his Constitutional rights, as a citizen of the 
United States, no matter what state he resided in, and what the laws of 
that state said. This had been the contention of the court in Gitlow 
vs. New York (268 U.S. 652 - 1924) when Justice Edward Sanford, writing 
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for the majority, upheld the Constitutionality of a state statute that 
forbid publication or broadcast of material designed to incite people 
to overthrow the government, but that state law could not set aside an 
individual's Constitutional rights. The weight 6f the Constitution 
overshadowed the legislative action of the State of New York. 42 
In Irvin's case, due process had been violated by a state statute 
that provided for only one change of venue. As such, the court was not 
permitted to use the full extent of its authority to guarantee him a 
fair trial by an impartial jury. Justice Tom Clark wrote the majority 
opinion in remanding the case back to lower courts for retrial. 
In it he first affirmed the growing principle that trials cannot 
be held in a vacuum. Potential jurors, if for no other reason than 
practicality, are exposed to some publicity which might be prejudicial. 
He wrote: 
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to 
the guilt or innocence of an accused is sufficient to rebut the 
prescription of a prospective jurij3's impartiality would be to 
establish an impossible standard. 
Yet that should not keep the court from at least trying to maintain 
a sense of equilibrium in the matter. Devices did exist to see that a 
defendant could receive a fair trial without restricting the press's 
freedom to publish. Clark went on to elaborate concerning measures 
such as further change of venue, sequestering the jury and granting of 
continuances, as being tools that could be used to dampen the effects 
of hostile publicity. 44 
His justification for such measures was once again based on prac-
ticality. While one could not shield jurors completely, the other side 
of the coin was that once the prejudicial publicity had invaded the 
jurors' mind, it was extremely difficult to remove. He wrote: "The 
influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that 
it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the 
average man. 1145 
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But of most importance he set down the principle that should guide 
the press in covering controversial cases. When a man is on trial for 
his life, the press owes him responsible coverage. Clark wrote: 
With his life at stake; it is not requiring too much that peti-
tioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of 
public passion,and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds 
of the members admit, ~5fore hearing any testimony, to possessing 
a belief in his guilt. 
Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion attacked the press as 
he had done often in the past. His theme was that until the press began 
to act responsibly in such matters, it was up to the court to hold them 
in line, even to the point of restricting the press's freedom. He 
wrote: "How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested verdict 
based exclusively on what they heard in court, when, before they entered 
the jury box, their minds were saturated by persistent rumors and accu-
sations.1147 
The importance of Irvin cannot be denied. It would become the 
basis for future decisions reversing convictions, including the Sam 
Sheppard murder case. It set down the principle that the burden of 
proof was upon the court to insure a fair trial. Further, that while 
the press may act irresponsibly, it is the court's responsibility to 
see that every legal weapon is exhausted to insure the defendant a 
right to a fair and speedy trial. 
Rideau vs. Louisiana (373 U.S. 723 - 1963) 
Rideau became another landmark case having to do with prejudicial 
22 
publicity. For the first time the high court spoke to the new media: 
television, and its effects on insuring a fair trial, or the lack of 
it. 
The petitioner Rideau had been convicted in a Louisiana court of 
kidnapping and bank robbery. The trial received intense publicity. 
The police and the local district attorney allowed the filming of 
Rideau's interrogation. Later that day, and for two days afterward, 
the film was shown on a local television station. The estimated 
audience for the three broadcasts were 24,000, 29,000, and 53,000 res-
pectively in a parish of 150,000 persons. 48 
The defendant's attorney sought a change of venue. It was denied 
and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Later three of the 
jurors, two of whom were inactive deputy sheriffs, freely admitted that 
they had made up their minds concerning his guilt or innocence after 
viewing the film of his interrogation. 49 
Rideau's appeal to the Supreme Court was once again based on the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that it had been denied 
by the prosecutors releasing the film to the television station, and 
further by the fact that the trial judge had not allowed a change of 
venue. 
Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion which remanded 
Rideau's case back to the lower courts for retrial. In it he enunci-
ated the rule that the new media required new rules. The impact of 
television required the courts to take special care in prosecuting 
cases that engendered extreme publicity. He wrote: "For anyone who 
has ever watched television, the conclusion cannot be avoided that this 
spectacle was Rideau's tria1. 1150 
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Estes vs. Texas (381 U.S. 532 - 1965) 
What the court began under Rideau, it expanded in this case. In 
fact, Justice Clark in his majority opinion handed down a substantial 
doctrine concerning television and the courts. In particular, the 
court addressed itself to the fact that television can take an ordinary 
case and turn it into a "cause celebre. 1151 
Estes had been indicted by a grand jury on charges of swindling. 
The case received extensive national publicity, largely due to the size 
of the operation involved. During the pre-trial hearing, with poten-
tial jurors seated in the courtroom, a motion was brought by the defen-
dant's attorney to prevent television and radio coverage. For over two 
days, the debate on this motion went on in front of those potential 
jurors. Meanwhile the television cameras filmed these proceedings and 
aired them extensively. Finally, the judge refused to grant a blanket 
order, but instead allowed live coverage of the opening and closing 
statements by the state. The balance of the trial would be filmed for 
later rebroadcast. Further, the judge ordered that a special enclosed 
booth be constructed to hide the cameras and thus deny any future 
charge of distraction. He cited as his basis the following: 
This case is not being tried under the Federal Court. This defen-
dant has been brought into this court under state laws, under the 
State Court. I took an oath to uphold this court •.. 52If it is 
distasteful, ... it will just have to be distasteful. 
Estes was convicted, and used all available appeals in an attempt 
to have it reversed. In his appeal for certiorari to the Supreme Court, 
he cited once again the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
And as Rideau had done, he charged that the broadcasting of the pro-
ceedings interfered with his right of fair trial. 
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Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion. He stated the same 
assumption that Stewart had in the Rideau case, that the initial tele-
vised hearings had constituted Estes' trial by television. He stated: 
"The initial hearings on tape did not show a picture of judicial 
serenity. 1153 
But the press's right to cover the trial, along with the public's 
"right to know" had to be balanced. Once again the court walked a 
tightrope. "While maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying 
on this important function in a democratic society, its exercise must be 
subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial pro-
cess.1154 
But then whose interest· is more compelli~? For the first time 
during the entire prejudicial publicity debate, the court said that the 
right of a fair trial was to be favored over an unrestricted press. 
"The use of television (in ascertaining the truth) cannot be said to 
contribute materially to this objective."55 
In actuality Clark and the majority wanted to ban television from 
the courtrooms forever. He wrote: "I believe that it violates the 
Sixth Amendment for federal courts and the Fourteenth Amendment for 
state courts to allow criminal trials to be televised to the public at 
large. 1156 Ju~tice John Harlan, however, preserved the right of televi-
sion in the courtroom by forming a compromise among the members of the 
majority. It was his opinion that while Estes' rights had been vio-
lated, and he was entitled to a new trial, the court might regret 
having banned television forever. With certain guidelines, it might be 
possible to utilize this new mass media instrument. 57 
Nevertheless, Clark's opinion outlined five major reasons why 
25 
television should be banned. First, it is necessary because television 
can take any case and turn it into a "cause celebre," or in more corrmon 
terms, "a media event. 1158 Such a media event with its intensive cover-
age can cause potential jurors to make their decision even before the 
first shreds of evidence are presented. In the Estes case the televi-
sion coverage had been so extensive across the state, it is doubtful 
that a fair trial could have been gained in any county. Thus televi-
sion's great ability to project in a visual manner the daily events in 
a society can become a pervasive weapon, when used irresponsibly, could 
deny an individual of one of his basic Constitutional rights. 
But there was a second reason for limiting television coverage, 
and that was that television can distort the facts, even unintentional-
ly. This distortion was in particular a burden on the jurors who were 
selected. It could distort their view of the case, first, by making 
them think of all those who would be watching them. Would they vote on 
the basis of the evidence? Or, on what people viewing, and their 
friends in particular, would think of th~m?59 But it also would tend 
to distort their perception of the case by making them actors on a 
stage. Clark wrote: "Human nature being what it is, not only will a 
juror's eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind will be preoccu-
pied with the telecasting, rather than with testimony. 1160 
Thirdly, the impact of television on the defendant. Here once 
again the court broke new ground establishing that such a powerful 
medium can effect the psychological well being of the person on trial. 
"Its (television) presence is a form of mental--if not physical--
harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. 1161 
It prevented the defendant from having his widely believed in "day 
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in court." Because of television's ability to create an event 7 it 
could make the trial of a defendant appear to be held in a sports are-
na7 or as Clark called it in a number of cases "a circus. 1162 
Thus the court concluded that with the power of television 7 re~ 
strictions had to be placed on its use in trial proceedings. "The 
television camera is a powerful weapon 7 intentionally or inadvertently, 
it can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public. 1163 
But additional distortion can result because the televising of 
trials would cause the public at large to equate the trial with the 
other forms of entertainment seen on television. 
In the present case 7 tapes of the September 24 hearing were run in 
place of the Tonight Show by one station •••• Commercials for 
soft drinks, soups, eyedrops and seatg~vers were inserted when 
there was a pause in the proceedings. 
Fourthly, television places an awesome responsibility on the judge. 
The judge can be placed in a bind, caught between doing his proper job, 
and using the television for his own political purposes. When a judge 
is up for reelection, it can't help.but affect his judgment, and in 
particular, trying to impress the public sufficiently.65 
Chief Justice Earl Warren added a pessimistic footnote to the 
court's decision in a concurring opinion. It was his belief that tele-
vision's impact on the judicial system was so subtle that the judicial 
system could be destroyed before we realized it. He wrote: "The pre-
judice of television may be so subtle that it escapes ordinary methods 
of proof, but it would gradually erode our fundamental conception of 
Coming from Warren, a champion of civil liberties, including 
an unrestricted press, it is indeed pessimistic. 
Warren was primarily concerned with the fact that television was 
so new a medium and wasn't yet mature. Thus the question was do we 
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entrust an item as important as an individual's trial to such an imma-
ture medium?67 He certainly had justification for such a feeling. 
Only several years prior to this, television had been embroiled in the 
quiz show scandal. Can we entrust a person's civil liberties to a 
media that rigged quiz shows? He concluded that we most likely could· 
not, at least for now. He wrote: "Can we be sure that the public 
would not inherently distrust our system of justice because of its 
intimate association with a commercial enterprise?1168 
Justice John Harlan in his concurring opinion saved the day for 
television. He held that trials are public events, but this does not 
mean they have to become sources of entertainment. Trials in reality 
belong to the defendant. It is he who is on trial; it is he who in 
certain cases must forfeit his life as a result of such a trial. There-
fore, Harlan believed that fair trial had nothing to do with the First 
Amendment. Television's right to be in the courtroom had to be based 
on something more substantial than simple freedom of the press. 69 
Instead, the public trial section of the Sixth Amendment had to be 
considered. It could be fulfilled si~ply in having the courtroom open 
to the public. However, this did not mean that the press could invade 
the courtroom with their television apparatus if it would cause distrac-
tion and therefore deprive the accused of a fair trial. Harlan wrote: 
"The line is drawn at the courthouse door ...• Within the courthouse, 
the only relevant Constitutional consideration is that the accused be 
accorded a fair trial."70 
But without a historical footnote, the depth of this case can be 
overlooked. One of the major elements that went into the court's 
thinking was a trial that had truly been a cause celebre: the Bruno 
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Hauptmann case. If ever there was a case where the courtroom had been 
turned into a veritable "three ring circus," it was this one. Thus as 
the justices reviewed the Estes case, they saw an almost identical pie-
ture, only now through the use of television it could be turned into a 
three dimensioned circus. 
Bruno Richard Hauptmann, a German immigrant, was accused and con-
victed of kidnapping and murdering the child of Charles and Anne Lind-
bergh in what H. L. Mencken described as the "biggest story since the 
resurrection. 1171 His trial generated enormous publicity, primarily for 
two reasons: the family involved had become a veritable American insti-
tution. Lindbergh was revered for his historic crossing of the Atlantic 
less than eight years before. But an even greater factor was the wave 
of anti-German sentiment that was sweeping the world with the rise to 
power of Adolph Hitler. 
The trial was turned into a radio spectacle. For almost a month 
workmen laid cables and installed telephone lines in the Flemington, 
New Jersey, courtroom. All the major American papers, as well as many 
foreign ones, would be represented. The pre-trial publicity had 
labeled the defendant as "the baby killer" and "a Nazi monster. 1172 
But one of the most obnoxious incidents of pre-trial publicity 
originated with the Hearst Newspapers. Eddie Mahar, Hearst bureau 
chief at the trial, commented to his fellow reporters: 
Bruno Richard Hauptmann looks like this new guy they have got over 
in Germany. The one they call "Der Fuehrer." . . . . You got to re-
member Hitler and Hauptmann had exactly the same experience in the 
war, they both were corporals in the German army. They must have 
lear~ed73he same kind of brutality. Same type you look and you'll 
see it. 
Into this shocking environment Bruno Richard Hauptmann went on 
trial for his life. The decorum of the courtroom was shocking. Amid 
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the testimony, telegraph keys clicked, reporters whispered into their 
microphones. Those present said that at times one could not hear him-
self think, let alone concentrate on the testimony. 74 In that atmos-
phere, in that menagerie that often had the look of a sophisticated 
lynch mob, Hauptmann was convicted and sentenced to death. 
Editor and Publisher would later write: 
No trial in this century has so degraded the administration of 
justice. If the life of one man and the unhappiness of hundreds 
are to be commercialized for the benefit of entertainment, of 
radio broadcasters, newspaper publishers, newsreel producers; if 
a public trial means protection from star-chamber tyranny but not 
from the indignities of a mob, then the an7~ent institution of 
trial by jury of peers is without meaning. 
It was the possibility of this being repeated that the justices 
saw in desiring to ban television from the courtroom. If radio could 
have been so pervasive in inflaming public opinion, could not televi-
sion multiply such hatred and prejudice? 
But an attempt to mediate a solution to this dilemma emerged as a 
result of the Hauptmann trial. On September 30, 1937, the American Bar 
Association added a new canon to its Code of Ethics. Canon 35 held 
that: 
Proceedings in the courtroom should be conducted with fitting dig-
nity and decorum ...• (Any actions that) are calculated to de-
tract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the 
court and create misconceptions with r7~pect thereto in the mind 
of the public should not be permitted. 
This was revised in 1952 to include television. 77 The importance, 
though, of Canon 35 was that it forced the media and the courts to sit 
down in informal committees and work out ways to allow the press its 
freedom and the defendant his fair trial. As a result, there are today 
guidelines in all fifty states that attempt to maintain the dignity and 
the decorum of criminal proceedings. 
Times Picayune Publishing vs. Schulingkamp 
(419 u. s. 1301 - 1974) 
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From the pessimism of the Estes case, the courts moved back to the 
use of restrictive orders, or more commonly gag orders. In this case 
which aroused tremendous publicity, two factors were at work. One was 
that the defendants were juveniles and the other was that the press 
was woefully irresponsible. 
The suspects in the case :were two Negro juveniles age 17. The 
victim was a white public health nurse who was in the process of visit-
ing an elderly woman in a public housing project. One must admit that 
it had all the elements of a William Faulkner novel concerning southern 
justice. 
The Times Picayune, one of the largest papers in Louisiana, pub-
lished numerous stories concerning the murder and the trial to come. 
Unfortunately, most of what it printed was woefully inaccurate. One 
story in particular stated that one of the defendants had 43 prior 
arrests. Logic would tell you that for a seventeen year old, that's a 
lot of arrests. But the paper also failed to point out that the 
several arrests he did have were thrown out of court for lack of 
evidence. 78 
After eleven months of this type of journalism, the trial judge 
decided to impose a gag order until a jury had been seated. The judge 
made this on the basis of Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1586.3, which 
prohibited the release of a juvenile's criminal record. At best this 
was like closing the barn door after the horse was out. 
The Times Picayune appealed this order to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court which upheld it. From there the paper appealed to Justice Stewart, 
who acted as Circuit Justice for the Louisiana area, who issued an 
opinion in chambers. 
Stewart in his decision stated that he was on the horns of a 
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dilemma. If he.granted a stay of the order, would the press act respon-
sibly? On.the other hand, if he did not grant the stay, a further prior 
restraint would take place. As such he was compelled to grant a stay. 
He wrote: "The restraints imposed are both pervasive and of uncertain 
duration and therefore constitute an abridgement of freedom of the 
press. 1179 
The significance of this decision was that freedom of the press 
won out, not because it acted responsibly, but instead on the basis of 
a legal technicality. If this added anything to the free press-fair 
trial concept, it added the fact that the press could act irresponsibly 
and get away with it! 
Sheppard vs. Maxwell (384 U.S. 333 - 1966) 
In probably the most famous case having to do with prejudicial 
publicity, the high court set down the premise that a responsible press 
can be the "handmaiden of justice. 1180 
Dr. Sam. Sheppard had been accused of murdering his wife so he 
could marry a former lover. The case attracted nationwide interest. 
The media in Cleveland, Ohio, and in particular the Cleveland Press, 
carried on a virtual crusade against the accused, through the use of 
front page editorials, sensationalized headlines and the printing of 
innuendo. 
Into this kind of atmosphere Sheppard went on trial for his life. 
It was called by many,. including members of the high court, a "Roman 
Holiday," a time when the press and people in general escaped from 
their mundane existence by playing on the tragedies of others. 81 
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The Supreme Court finally agreed to review Sheppard's case after 
he had served almost ten years in prison. The basis for which the 
court agreed to review the case was not primarily tae prejudicial 
publicity, but instead because Sheppard was denied counsel at the time 
of his arraignment. Under the Gideon vs. Wainwright decision of four 
years previous, that constituted violation of the due process clause 
· 82 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In an eight to one decision the Supreme Court reversed Sheppard's 
conviction and remanded the case back. to the Ohio courts for retrial. 
Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion. He reviewed extensively the 
press accounts that had preceded Sheppard's original trial, and sum-
marized the court's belief as to how the judicial system and the press 
can best function. 
The first and most important premise the court cited was that 
justice cannot survive when conducted in secret.83 This was an affir-
mation of the growing principle that jurors and trials must be conducted 
in a public atmosphere. As such it falls to the trial judge to balance 
outside influences with the right of the accused to receive a fair 
trial. 
But now the court went further. It stated that what kept judicial 
proceedings out in the open and above board was a responsible press. 
"A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of 
effective judicial administration. 1184 The best deterrent to judicial 
misconduct is a free and responsible press. Had the press functioned 
in such a manner during the Sheppard trial, justice truly would have 
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been done. 
How does it function responsibly? The court added: "By subjecting 
the police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scru-
tiny and criticism. 1185 This is reflected in the court's seventy year 
record of dealing with contempt citations issued by judges for disobey-
ing their orders. Remember Justice William O. Douglas wrote in Craig 
vs. Harney that press criticism was not "a serious threat to a judge of 
reasonable fortitude. 1186 In the Sheppard case if the press had turned 
its attention to scrutinizing the law enforcement officials and judges, 
it could have unearthed numerous examples of misconduct and offered Dr. 
Sheppard the true guarantee of a public watchdog. 
But the press must not take the attitude that they can win the 
case outside the courtroom. This was the fundamental error in the Shep-
pard case. The press believed they could be judge, jury and execu-
tioner. "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the 
use of the meeting hall, the radio and the newspapers. 1187 Thus there 
is the balancing act between compelling interests, mentioned so fre-
quently in the court's doctrine. 
The thing which ultimately balances the two is the jury. An impar-
tial jury can see through the defects of the court, as well as the un-
wholesome provocations of the press. Yet in the Sheppard case, this 
was impossible for the jury's mind had been so poisoned by the time it 
was selected, it could not tell the truth from the falsehood. 
The court then went on to consider the content of the material 
printed during the trial. "Much of the material printed or broadcast 
during the trial was never heard from the witness stand. 1188 Thus a 
responsible press during_ the actual conduct of the trial will be certain 
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to make sure that their facts are accurate and placed in their proper 
context. This was impossible in the Sheppard trial for reporters were 
constantly going in and out to file their stories, and therefore, only 
partially heard the testimony, and often on a second, third 1 and 
fourth hand basis. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that ultimately, the responsibility 
falls upon the judge to make certain the proceedings are conducted 
fairly. 89 Obviously, if the press is acting responsibly, the judge 
has an easy time maintaining high standards in his courtroom. The 
court alleged that Judge Edwin Blythin's (original trial judge) con-
stant refusal to grant remedies to the prejudicial publicity on the 
basis that he had no right to do so was wrong. 
The court then went on to cite a number of measures that judges 
can take to dampen publicity without restricting press freedom. First, 
the judge can limit the number of reporters in the courtroom.go As 
was seen throughout the trial, Judge Blythin not only courted extensive 
press coverage, but then proceeded to give the press almost free rein 
of the courthouse. 
If the press is acting responsibly, it doesn't need fifty newsmen 
in the same courtroom. In·fact if the press is acting responsibly, 
papers couldn't afford to send a reporter to every trial. In a sense 
this reduces competition among newspapers across the nation, but at the 
same time, it was that competition which caused the newspapers to try 
to outdo one another in the stories they printed. 
Second, the court can insulate witnesses before they testify. 91 
Once again one of the fundamental errors in the original trial was that 
the witnesses were interviewed before hand, and often people knew what 
35 
they would say even before they testified. As such, this does not add 
substantially to the press's ability to scrutinize the proceedings. It 
is the conduct of the witness on the stand that is important. 
Third, the court could have made some effort to control leaks of 
information by members of the police and prosecution team. 92 This is 
not a gag order, but rather a measure to prevent the publication of 
rumor, innuendo and half truths. As was seen in this case, stories 
were printed without complete substantiation and as such became one 
man's opinion. A responsible press does not bring scrutiny to judicial 
proceedings by printing such material. 
Finally the judge should have sequestered the jury.93 As such, it 
represents the only effective method of shielding the jurors from pre-
judicial publicity. "Due process requires that the accused receive a 
trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. 1194 Sequester-
ing the jury only during its deliberation is like closing the barn door 
after the horse is gone. 
Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart 
(427 u. s. 539 - 1975) 
In probably the most controversial case of the seventies, the 
court took up the issue of comprehensive gag orders. Comprehensive 
because in the past such orders have only been issued after extensive 
publicity had already taken place. In this case the judge decided to 
restrain the press from the start. 
On October 19, 1975, Erwin Simants was arrested for the murder of 
six persons in the small Nebraska community of Sutherland. Widespread 
publicity began on the day of his arrest. Thus three days after his 
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arrest, both the prosecution and defense attorneys sought a comprehen-
sive restraining order, citing the Nebraska Bar-Press guidelines as 
their bases. Those guidelines, worked out in an effort to fulfill 
Canon 35, forbade the disclosure or reporting of statements of confes-
sion, opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused, state-
ments predicting the outcome of the trial, results of tests, etc.95 
Thus under these guidelines little or nothing could be printed anyway, 
so the gag order was a logical extension. 
The Nebraska Press Association appealed to the Nebraska Supreme 
Court asking for a stay of the order. Simultaneously, it appealed to 
Justice Henry Blackmun as Circuit Judge to stay the order. Included in 
its appeal to him were forty amicus curiae briefs given by the networks 
and major newspapers across the country. 96 He initially refused consid-
eration deferring to the Nebraska high court. Several days later, the 
Nebraska court not only upheld the order, but strengthened it. 97 The 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue. Ironi-
cally, by the time the court heard the case, it was moot, for the 
original restraining order had expired, with the jury empaneled. 
Obviously, the crucial issue was once again which interest is more 
compelli~? Does the First Amendment carry more weight than the Six~h? 
In the majority opinion, overturning the order, Chief Justice Warren T. 
Burger wrote: 
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign 
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, 
ranking one as superior to the other. In this case, the petition-
ers would have us declare the right of an accused subordinate to 
their right to publish in all circumstances. But if the authors 
of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts be-
tween them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by 
assigning one priority over the other, it is not fo98us to rewrite 
the Constitution by undertaking what they declined. 
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Based on this interpretation of the First and Sixth Amendments, 
and the court's interpretation in Irvin, Rideau and Estes, Burger 
stated: "Pre-trial publicity--even perverse, adverse publicity--does 
not inevitably lead to an unfair trial."99 In addition he went on to 
state that the actions of attorneys, police and public officials could 
be just as influential in creating prejudicial publicity. 100 
Burger then went on to consider the court's view of any prior 
restraints. He cited the Pentagon Papers decision (New York times vs. 
United States--403 U.S. 713 - 1971) in which the court viewed that any 
limitation on freedom of the press bears a heavy presumption against 
its validity. Thus any prior restraint creates results that are "imme-
diate and irreversible" even if for only a brief period of time. 101 
This appeared to be a reversal of the pessimism in Estes. 
Burger proceeded to cite specific reasons for the court maintain-
ing that the order was unconstitutional. First, the trial judge could 
not effectively measure the effects of publicity. The fact that the 
order was issued in such a rapid manner prohibited the court from 
really determining whether such a restraint was just. 102 This was the 
point that the court had made in Times Mirror. 
Further, the trial court did not consider the use of alternative 
h h f t . t 103 measures sue as c ange o venue, con inuance, e c. This would have 
balanced the competing constitutional interests. Once again this re-
fleeted the court's thinking in Irvin, Rideau and Estes. Thus the high 
court placed the burden of proof on the trial judge rather than on the 
press. 
Finally, the court concluded that gag orders are essentially 
unenforceable. Since the courts could not determine what constituted 
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prejudicial publicity, as was concluded under the first point, a 
blanket restraining order became an arbitrary tool. "The First .Amend-
ment cannot be restricted on speculation that publicity might make a 
fair trial difficult. 11104 However, Burger believed that judges could 
close the courtroom to avoid publicity. 105 Thus in essence, a new 
kind of gag order was created. 
There were four concurring opinions which stressed almost identi-
cal points. In the opinion of Justices William Brennan, Stewart, and 
Thurgood Marshall, the strongest case against gag orders was presented. 
In a word they stated that no restrictive order can ever meet First 
.Amendment requirements. 106 They went on to state five reasons why this 
was so. First, gag orders can lead the general public to believe that 
the defendant is guilty. 107 Thus gag orders do the thing that they are 
supposed to counteract. They create prejudicial publicity on their 
own. The court speculated that in a town of 850, rumors can travel 
very fast. 
Second, such a power could·be abused by the courts. 108 No judge 
wishes to have a reversal in a case heard in his court. Thus to pre-
vent even the remote possibility of this, judges would be issuing such 
rulings all the time. The laziness of judges could also not be counted 
out. It is time consuming to grant continuances, changes of venue, 
etc. 
Third, it would create in the minds of the public prejudice against 
the judicial process itself. 109 .Americans in the seventies became skep-
tical of any kind of government functioning in private. The spector of 
the "star chamber" is still an influential factor in our Constitutional 
system. 
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Fourth, it creates a tremendous drain of resources, financial and 
otherwise, to be constantly appealing such orders. 110 The facts of 
life are simple: to fight a case to the Supreme Court costs dearly. 
Often principle is lost due to the price of justice. 
Finally, following logically from this, gag orders would become 
a tool for repressing anyone without the resources to appeal. 111 
Brennan concluded that a choice between the First and Sixth Amendments 
is unnecessary. Instead a judge with any amount of wisdom can find the 
means to give both their Constitutionally protected spheres. 
The significance of this decision is found in the length of the 
opinion, consuming some 40 pages. For· the first time the court directed 
its thinking, not just against a single gag order, but instead against 
all of them._ Brennan's conclusion that no gag order can be supported 
Constitutionally, effectively prohibited its use in the future. For 
the free press-fair trial doctrine, this meant that a major chunk of 
the debate was gone. Restraining orders had been the issue in Times 
Mirror, Pennekarnp, Craig and Baltimore Radio. Thus what we are left 
with are the judicial tools (change of venue, etc.) that can be used to 
balance these Constitutional interests. However, the use of closing 
the courtroom as a tool suggests that a new kind of restraint would 
have to be combatted. 
Murphy vs. Florida (421 U.S. 794 - 1976) 
This was one of the first court cases to deal with the effect of 
publication of a defendant's prior criminal record in predisposing jur-
ors' evaluation of his guilt or innocence. The petitioner had been 
convicted in Dade County, Florida, Criminal Court of breaking and 
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entering with intent to commit robbery. If it hadn't been for his 
prior criminal record, the story of the trial would probably have been 
buried. 
Murphy had been involved in the famous "Star of India" sapphire 
robbery, which had been taken in a daring burglary of New York's Museum 
of Natural History. That case had generated enormous publicity, and 
had significantly labeled "Murph the Surf" as something of a "robber 
extraordinaire." However, he continued to accumulate a massive criminal 
record. 
In 1965 he was indicted on two counts of murder in Broward County, 
Florida. At the time of his arraignment he was declared mentally incom-
petent to stand trial, and was committed to a mental institution. Four 
years.later he was convicted on the charge. One year later, December 
of 1969, he was convicted of the robbery charge. 
During the course of pre-trial hearings, numerous articles were 
published, in which his "Star of India" robbery was highlighted. The 
defense attempted motions of mistrial and venue, but all of these were 
denied. 
Murphy did not testify in his own behalf as a protest of the "pre-
judicial conditions.ii Neither did his attorney cross-examine state's 
witnesses. 112 He was convicted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on appeal. 
Justice Marshall in his majority opinion reiterated a common : 
theme: the mere presence of information about the defendant is not 
inherently prejudicial. 113 He reviewed the key cases: Irvin, Rideau, 
Estes and Sheppard, and concluded that these were different from 
Murphy's in that the published and broadcast material turned the outcome 
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of the trial into "the verdict of a mob. 11114 Thus there must be emo-
tional hostility in the material to make it prejudicial. 
Therefore, the court went on record concerning the publication of 
a defendant's prior record. In all but exceptional cases, it cannot be 
regarded as prejudicial. Marshall wrote: "The proposition that juror 
exposure to information about a defendant's prior record or to news 
accounts concerning the crime with which he is charged cannot alone 
presumptively deprive the defendant of due process. 11115 
Thus it must be prior record in tandem with other elements to make 
such information prejudicial enough to interfere with a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights. This is of particular interest in that judges 
on all levels seem to feel that a person's prior record should actually 
be suppressed until the end of the trial. Therefore, this decision 
clouded the waters of the free press-fair trial debate and left us 
wondering again what is prejudicial publici~y? 
Gannett vs. De Pasquale ( 443 U. S. 368 - 1979) 
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart, the court took a defini-
tive stand against prior restraints. However, it gave to lower courts 
a new tool in the battle against prejudicial publicity: closing the 
courtroom. 116 It did not take long for this tool to become the sub-
ject of judicial review. In Gannett the justices would decide if 
courtroom closings were constitutional. 
Messers Greathouse and Jones were accused of committing murder, 
robbery and grand larceny in and around Seneca County, New York. They 
were later arrested in Michigan and extradited to stand trial. 
The case received extensive publicity, and in particular, by two 
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newspapers owned by the Gannett chain, The Rochester Democrat and 
Chronicle and The Rochester Times Union. Most of the stories covered 
usual aspects of any murder case, but there were two areas where the 
newspapers deviated from this substantially. In the first instance, 
several stories were written that contained speculation and hypotheses 
as to the nature and motivations of the crime. These included the per-
sonal theories of the Seneca County Chief of Police. 11 7 The other 
group concerned themselves with the details of the extradition process 
from the State of Michigan. In particular they included all the legal 
ramifications of Greathouse's extradition, since he was a juvenile. 
At a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, motions were filed by defense 
attorneys to suppress the defendants' confessions which they declared 
were given involuntarily, and physical evidence which had been seized 
as a result of those confessions. 118 Another motion was also filed to 
close the courtroom to the public while arguments were being heard on 
these defense claims. The prosecution agreed and a reporter for the 
Gannett chain who was present did not comment. The judge then granted 
the motion saying in part: "An open suppression hearing 'would pose a 
reasonable probability of prejudice to these defendants. 1111 9 
The next day attorneys for Gannett filed petitions to have the 
closure order set aside. The trial judge denied petitioner's request. 
An appeal was placed before the Appellate Division of the New York 
State Supreme Court, who vacated the order stating that such an order 
"transgressed the public's vital interests in open judicial proceedings 
d f th t • t t d 1 f 1 • t . t II 120 an ur er cons i u e an un aw·u prior res rain. 
It was further appealed by defense attorneys to the New York Court 
of Appeals. Although by the time it handed down its decision, the case 
had become moot. It overturned the Appellate Division's ruling, and 
therefore affirmed the trial judge's (De Pasquale) original action. 
They wrote: "Criminal trials are presumptorily open to the public, 
including the press. . However, the presumption was overcome in 
this case because of the danger posed to the defendant's ability to 
receive a fair trial. 11121 Gannett then appealed to the Supreme Court 
who granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court in affirming the actions of the New York Court 
of Appeals, went on record that the Constitution does not give the 
press an affirmative right of access to all judicial proceedings. 122 
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The justices believed that their actions in Sheppard, Irvin, Mar-
shall, and Estes had established the principle that the burden of proof 
for a fair trial is on the trial judge who presides over the case. It 
is his responsibility to use the necessary judicial tools to insure a 
defendant an impartial hearing by a jury of his peers. In Nebraska 
Press Association the high court stated that one of these tools was 
the right to close the courtroom to the press and public. 123 Justice 
Stewart in the majority opinion wrote: "To safeguard the due process 
rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative Constitutional 
right to minimize the effects of prejudicial publicity. 11124 
To balance this against the First Amendment rights of the press, 
the court went on to discuss the reasons for a pre-trial hearing. Such 
a hearing is to screen out unreliable and illegally seized evidence and 
insure that such material does not become known to the jury. Therefore, 
the public through its agent the press has no Constitutional "need to 
know" what is contained in such inadmissable evidence. 125 
It further asserted that the Sixth Amendment guarantees of public 
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trial does not give the press or the public an unlimited right of ac-
cess. Stewart wrote: "The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of 
access to criminal trials on the part of the public. It is the defen-
dant's right that is dealt with. 11126 Thus trial judges can place al-
most any kind of restrictions on who is permitted in the courtroom if 
he is seeking to insure a fair trial for a person on trial. 
Blackmun in a dissenting opinion cited the opinion of the New York 
Court of Appeals, which held that the public desires access to court 
proceedings for the sake of curiosity rather than to see that justice 
is done. Therefore, right of access can be denied to them. He wrote: 
Widespread public awareness kindled by media saturation does not 
legitimize public curiosity. Here the public concern was not fo-
cused on prosecuratorial or judi1~11 accountability •.•• It was 
chiefly one of active curiosity. 
A second major argument in supporting such closings was that the 
public's interest was best served by closed proceedings. The logic 
being that justice can be swiftly and fairly administered in such a 
format. Therefore, when one member of society's rights are upheld, 
society as a whole benefits. 128 
Building upon this the justices stated that courtroom closings 
could be additionally justified by the fact that many states by statute 
close courtrooms. Alabama closes its courtrooms for cases having to do 
with rape; Georgia whenever evidence involved is considered vulgar; 
Massachusetts for any kind of criminal trial the judge deems appropri-
ate; West Virginia can close its courtrooms for any trial; Minnesota 
denies access to anyone under 17 in criminal trials; Virginia can deny 
access to anyone who might interfere with the course of a trial. 129 In 
addition eight states have statutes that automatically close the court-
room for pre-trial hearings. They are Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota and Utah. Thus in light of the 
actions of so many states that are held Constitutional, the position 
130 of the New York court was supported. 
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Finally, the court believed that the historic term "public trial" 
as contained in the Sixth Amendment is not denied when a courtroom is 
closed for a pre-trial hearing. It was the four-man majority's conten-
tion that the framers wanted trials that were open to public scrutiny, 
and that such scrutiny does not require the public or press to physi-
cally be in the courtroom. In this case transcripts were made available 
at the end of the hearing for the public's review. 131 But one must won-
der if such conduct does not on its own create some form of prejudicial 
publicity. A transcript does not take into account all the nuances and 
non-verbal behaviors that are often significant in an impersonal atmos-
phere such as a transcript where words can easily be distorted. Fur-
ther, if the public has no need to know, a transcript given after such 
a hearing seems to deny this. 
Thus Gannett contributed legitimacy.: to courtroom closure as a tool 
to fight prejudicial publicity. In a very real sense it took on the 
form of a command: When Sixth Amendment rights may be jeopardized, 
close the courtroom. It also reinforced the notion that the press's 
First Amendment rights are not absolute, rather they are balanced 
against other Constitutional guarantees. Mr. Justice Lewis Powell put 
this best when he stated: "The right of access to courtroom proceedings 
is not absolute, it is limited both by the Constitutional right of de-
fendants to a fair trial and by the needs of the government to obtain 
• t • t. II 132 JUS convic ions. 
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Richmond Newspapers et al vs. Virginia et al 
(79-243 1980) 
If the courts could close preliminary hearings to the press, could 
it also close complete trials to the pres_s? The Supreme Court took 
this issue up in Richmond Newspapers. 
A defendant was on trial for murder for the fourth time. The 
first trial which convicted him was reversed on appeal. The second and 
third trials ended in mistrial because of publicity which had been dis-
cussed among jurors. Therefore, at the start of his current trial, de-
fense attorneys asked the judge to close the entire trial proceedings 
from the public. After asking the prosecution if it had objections, 
the trial judge, citing Virginia Code 19.2-266, ordered the courtroom 
to be cleared except for those who would testify in the trial. 133 
A consortium of Richmond Newspapers petitioned the judge to re-
verse the order. It was denied. That same day after the state had 
presented its evidence at the trial, the defense asked the court to 
strike prosecution evidence, dismiss the jury, and find the defendant 
innocent by a directed verdict. The motion was granted. 
Believing that possible misconduct had been done because of closed 
proceedings, the newspapers appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court for 
a writ of mandamus. It was denied after finding no reasonable error in 
the conduct of the judge. The Supreme Court reversed the order con-
eluding that the right of the public and the press to attend criminal 
trials is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Chief 
Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion. 134 
The court examined the historical evidence first. The history of 
common law attests to the fact that only open trials are permissable 
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in our society. Our Constitution indicates that the framers wished for 
that common law tradition to continue. 
Sir Thomas Smith writing in 1565 stated: "All is done openly in 
the presence of judges, the enquired, the prisoner, and so many as will 
or can come near may hear it •.. so that all may hear from the mouth 
of the witnesses. 11135 
Francis Pollock wrote of tt1e open trial system: "One of the most 
conspicuous features of English justice is that all judicial trials are 
held in open court, to insure the public has free access. 11136 
In addition there is every indication that this tradition carried 
over to America. In 1677 in a document entitled Consensus and Agree-
ments of West New Jersey, the assertion was: "That in all public courts 
of justice for trials of causes, civil or criminal, any person or per-
sons may freely come into said courts ..• that justice may not be 
done in a corner or in any covert manner. 11137 Therefore, the court con-
eluded that a bulk of common law history and tradition undergirds the 
Constitution's assertion of an open and public trial. 
But the historical evidence also indicates that such open trials 
have a therapeutic effect on society. Burger cited Jeremy Bentham who 
wrote: "Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient; in 
comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account. 11138 
Thus a public trial helps to defuse public hostility towards not only 
the defendant, but against the judicial system as a whole. It elimi-
nates the vigilante element from our society, and allows the public to 
see that the "system" works. 139 
A second argument raised to support the concept of open trials is 
that the press's First Amendment rights allow everyone to attend the 
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trial whether in person or not. The press's role in trial reporting is 
to disseminate to the public necessary information so that they may be 
able to determine whether justice is being done. 140 
But Burger went on to indicate that such information also keeps 
the government from giving a one-sided message concerning its case. 
"The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and self-
expression to prohibit the government from limiting the stock of infor-
mation from which members of the public may deserve. 11141 
In conclusion the court stated that while certain guarantees to 
the public may not be written into the Constitution, such guarantees 
are at least implied. If the Sixth Amendment's definition of a public 
trial as interpreted by the courts is not written in specific language, 
the spirit of the document can only lead to the contention that unlim-
ited access is Constitutionally protected. 142 To justify such a con-
tention Burger went on to cite that such an item as "guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt" is not written into the Constitution. It is implied 
by common law tradition and by a broad definition of "fair tria1. 11143 
A question must be raised: did this decision overturn De Pasquale? 
The answer is no! Burger and the rest of the court were definite in 
indicating that the First Amendment guarantees upheld here do not apply 
to pre-trial hearings. As pointed out in De Pasquale, the historical 
and corm.non law traditions uphold the closed conduct supported by the 
court. 
However, in the opinion of the author, the court is standing on 
an extremely thin line. For one can easily contend that a pre-trial 
hearing is often as important, if not more important, than the trial 
itself. If as the court has held, that the press has a responsibility 
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to disseminate information concerning judicial proceedings so that the 
public can ascertain whether justice is being done, shouldn't this 
responsibility also apply to something as important as the pre-trial 
hearing? 
In the opinion of the author, this is simply another case of the 
"flip-flop 11 nature of the Burger Court. It leaves the public at large 
wondering if the court really knows what the Constitution sars? Only 
time and future judicial review will allow us to know if the "open 
trial" provision of this decision is an absolute or a limited right. 
Conclusions 
After reviewing more than fifty years of judicial history, can we 
say with some certainty what is prejudicial publicity? It is the 
author's contention that we can. The courts have indicated that all 
of the following contribute to prejudicing a defendant's case and 
therefore deny him a fair trial: 
1. Anytime the media's use of words or pictures creates such a 
biased opinion in the minds of potential jurors as to the defendant's 
guilt, this could indeed be labeled "a clear and present danger," if 
the use of words brings about substantial evil, that evil being the 
deprivation of an individual's Sixth Amendment rights. In nearly every 
case considered, it was not that the media published per se, it was 
that they were irresponsible with the words. This is of most importance 
for some in the legal community feel that anything that is published is 
automatically bad. The courts have consistently said no to this pro-
position. Instead, they have held that if the press is responsible, 
its use of words will be that of making certain the defendant is 
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accorded a fair trial. 
2. Anytime the press attempts to switch its role for that of the 
courts, prejudicial publicity is the result. In Pennekamp vs. Florida 
the court clearly stated that neither the press or the judiciary had 
supremacy. 144 They both had clearly defined roles to play. When the 
press attempts to become judge and jury, it creates publicity of such 
a nature as to deprive the accused of his "day in court." 
3. Anytime the media gives such extensive coverage of a criminal 
act that it essentially becomes the accused's trial, it produces pre-
judicial publicity. A responsible press will keep the coverage of any 
event in its proper perspective. The problem is that all too often 
stories concerning an individual's criminal act become good "fodder" 
for selling newspapers and therefore the story is repeated and repeated 
even though there is nothing new to report. This is done even uncon-
sciously at times. Following the arrest of an individual, the lead of 
every story includes "the accused slayer" or "the accused robber." 
4. Anytime the media, in particular television, uses criminal 
material in such a way that it is impossible for the average viewer to 
distinguish between statements of fact and common entertainment, pre-
judicial publicity is the result. One instance in particular where 
this became the case was the televising of tapes of the Estes trial 
in place of the Tonight Show.:145 Could the average viewer distinguish 
between the trial and mere entertainment? 
5. Anytime the judiciary takes certain actions, it tends to 
inflame public opinion by seeming to make the judiciary look "soft" on 
crime. Indeed the courts realized that things such as gag orders, 
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CHAPTER III 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The courts have stated unequivocally that intensive publicity 
preceding a case does tend to prejudice a defendant's case, and there-
by abridge his right of fair trial. But is there direct evidence? 
Does the research literature indicate that this has been established 
scientifical~y? Indeed it does. 
The importance of establishing such a claim scientifically is that 
judges tend to base their opinions on fine points of law rather than 
empirical evidence. It is for this particular reason that this study 
is being done. As one reviews the literature, it is found that no 
study has ever been done among judges to see if they.can determine 
elements that tend to prejudice a case over which they are presiding. 
Bernard S. Meyer, Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court, 
has written: "One of the vexing problems for a judge handling a crimi-
nal trial .•. is the effect of news reporting upon the fairness of 
the trial. 111 The trial judge must then determine whether there is a 
strong probability "that prejudice will result and the trial therefore 
be deemed inherently lacking in due process. 112 
We can establish, however, significant elements that are inherent-
ly prejudicial based on studies done with actual and mock juries. The 
verdict from these is that the press must be careful in its accounting 
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of criminal news, for it takes very little publicity to develop and 
I 
entrench a predisposition of guilt against a defendant in an individu-
al's mind. 
Rita James Simon established that extensive publication of a 
defendant's prior record resulted in a high degree of convictions 
among mock jurors. Toe rate of conviction was substantially increased 
when stories were "sensationalized. 113 
Kline and Jess found that jurors during deliberations tended to 
use material not adduced in court, and in particular "prejudicial" in-
formation obtained from the media prior to the trial. 4 
Tans and Chafee found that the amount of information concerning a 
defendant's case tended to create a proportionate predisposition of 
guilt in the minds of mock jurors. 5 
Wilcox and Mccombs established that publication of a defendant's 
prior record, as well as the type of crime, produced significant 
amounts of prejudice. But the highest amount occurred when it was 
reported that the accused had confessed to the crime. 6 
Sohn found that types of crimes produced significant predisposi-
tions among mock jurors. Such a disposition tended to rate those 
accused of felonies as more guilty than those accused of misdemeanors.7 
Finally, Padawer-Singer and Barton established also that publica-
tion of a defendant's record produced high rates of convictions among 
actual jurors.8 
Thus there is clear empirical evidence which we will now examine 
in detail. 
The Major Studies 
Rita James Simon 
Simon wished to find out if publication of a defendant's prior 
criminal record tended to prejudice jurors in their deliberations of 
his guilt. She hypothesized that publication of a defendant's prior 
record in the context of a ''sensational news account" would signifi-
cantly prejudice his case.9 
She used mock jurors and randomly assigned them to two groups. 
One group was given news stories written in a conservative format. The 
other group was given news stories concerning the case written in a 
"sensational" style. In the context of both types, the defendant's 
prior criminal record was placed. 
Both groups were then exposed to an experimental trial. 
In pre~tests before the trial, the group which had been exposed 
to the sensational accounts brought in guilty verdicts twice as often 
as those who read the conservative accounts. 10 
At the conclusion of the mock trial, the judge admonished both 
juries to forget the adverse publicity and base their deliberations 
solely on the evidence adduced in court. This resulted in lowering the 
number of guilty verdicts significantly. 11 
However, the judge also in his charge to the respective juries 
told them that if convicted, the defendant could be executed. The 
effect this may have had on the lower number of guilty verdicts was 
not determinect. 12 
Two major weaknesses of this study were, first, it was conducted 
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with mock jurors in a mock court setting. How much this reduces the 
reality of the experiment cannot be determined, but certainly it does 
tend to influence the respondents. 
Second, the sensational news accounts used tended to be so far 
from current journalistic style as to introduce an element that does 
not correspond to reality. 
F. Gerald Kline and Paul H. Jess 
Kline and Jess wished to establish the effect of prejudicial or 
non-prejudicial treatments on potential jurors. They hypothesized that 
it was possible to select an unbiased jury in spite of the type of 
treatment through the voir dire proceedings. 13 
They randomly selected 48 sophomore students from a subject pool 
matched against American College Testing scores and age. They were 
then assigned to two treatment groups. The control group was exposed 
to "non-prejudicial" news stories, the experimental group to prejudicial 
accounts. 
From these two groups, four six-man juries were selected through 
the voir dire proceeding. They then sat through the mock trial which 
had to do with a civil case. 
Upon deliberation they found that at least one member on each of 
the "prejudiced" juries made reference to the material they had read 
previous to the trial. No such references were found among control 
14 groups. 
Further in three of the four cases, peer pressure from within the 
group significantly neutralized the effects of the prejudicial ac-
counts. 15 
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They also found that a juror who ranks high on the Rokeach Dogma-
tism scale tends to be less open to the pressure of his peers during 
deliberations. 
Mary Dee Tans and Steve H. Chaffee 
Tans and Chaffee wished to establish what effect the report of a 
confession had in terms of prejudicing potential jurors, and if the 
amount of information published concerning a case tends to effect the 
potential juror in forming a preconceived opinion. 
They hypothesized that: "The probability that a potential juror 
will prejudge a suspect's guilt or innocence is a function of the amount 
of his prior information about the case. 1116 
Six adult groups were chosen ranging from a university psychology 
class to a conference on home heating. They were all potential jurors 
in the sense that they met age and literacy requirements. However, 
they were not drawn from jury pools. 
Each group was given a booklet containing three news stories, each 
about a different crime: burglary, assault-robbery, kidnap-murder. 
They were asked to rate these stories from "very favorable" to "very 
unfavorable." This was then followed by a semantic differential scale 
in which they were asked to describe the defendant. 
They found that the greater the amount of information given, the 
more likely respondents were to judge them as guilty. 17 When it is 
reported that a confession had been obtained, the guilty verdicts 
among respondents went up to over 80o/o. 18 
Once again the major weakness of this study was that it did not 
simulate reality. The jurors were not drawn from a county juror pool, 
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and demographically, the respondents tested clearly differed from the 
"norm" of jurors in this country. 19 However, they did prove that in 
any type of person, preconceived notions concerning the guilt or inno-
cence of someone are often made on the scantest type of information. 
Walter Wilcox and Maxwell Mccombs 
Wilcox and Mccombs believed there were three key elements in news 
stories that tended to prejudice a defendant's case: prior record, 
type of crime and.a statement of confession or the lack of it. 20 
In addition, they contended that stories concerning crime have a 
high emotional component which often causes the reader to go beyond the 
information given in forming an opinion. 21 
They gave their test subjects eight versions of a crime story 
which contained differing amounts of information concerning the above-
mentioned elements. Respondents were then brought into a courtroom 
setting to hear evidence concerning the crime. They attempted to 
simulate reality as closely as possible through the use of actual 
attorneys and judges. 
They found that the more the juror was exposed to past criminal 
record and type of crime, the higher the number of guilty verdicts. 
These verdicts even exceeded the norms for the state of California 
where the tests were conductect. 22 
But the most prejudicial element was the reporting of a confes-
sion. When it was reported that the defendant had confessed to the 
crime, potential jurors voted overwhelmingly to convict him. 23 
H.P. Weld and E. R. Danzig 
Weld and Danzig did a pioneering study in the area of jury deci-
sion making in 1940. They believed that by dividing the process of 
trial into small segments, it was possible to trace how the jury 
ultimately reached its verdict. 24 
They used three juries: one of twelve men, another of twelve 
65 
women, and a third composed of seventeen men and women. They were then 
taken through a complete trial having to do with a civil case. At each 
of eighteen stages, the juries stopped and rated that section of the 
trial on a 9-point scale.from 1: conviction that the defendant is 
innocent to 9: conviction that the defendant is guilty. 25 
Their results indicated that while in the initial stages of the 
trial, the jury·was very ready to convict. That tendency went down 
during the last. two-thirds of the trial. 26 In particular the defen-
dant's counsel through his closing statement brought the greatest 
reduction in tendency to convict. 27 
In terms of the final verdict Weld and Danzig established that 
when a juror had a slight belief in the defendant's guilt, he was 
usually pushed into voting for conviction by his peer~. However, if 
a juror left the courtroom with a slight doubt as to the defendant's 
innocence, he usually was able to resist such pressure. 28 This would 
seem to affirm our judicial concept of guilty beyond "a reasonable 
doubt.II 
They concluded: "We found that early in the trial, many jurors 
reached a fairly definite decision, and that thereafter, the effect of 
the testimony was merely to change their certainty. 1129 Thus it would 
once again appear that even though prejudicial publicity may taint 
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jurors at the beginning of the trial, it is usually reduced during the 
course of the trial as jurors interact with the evidence. 
Ardyth Broadrick Sohn 
Sohn also was interested in finding what kinds of elements in news 
stories tended to prejudice a defendant's case the most. The three 
elements she tested were: kind of crime, the name of the defendant, 
and the penalty likely to be imposed if convicted. She hypothesized 
that the element of the nature of the criminal act would be most likely 
to arouse conceptions of guilt in the individual's mind. 30 
She used the Q-sort technique among 12 male and 12 female subjects 
in the Carbondale, Illinois, area. In selecting the participants, the 
quota sampling technique was used to make the demographics of the sam-
ple conform to the socio-economic status of those used in other jury 
tests. 31 They then sorted 48 stories along a nine-point continuum from 
most guilty (1) to most innocent (9). 
From this, through factor analysis, she isolated four types of 
jurors. Type I (n = 5) found those accused of committing felonies that 
resulted in bodily harm as most guilty. At the same time, they tended 
to rate those who committed misdemeanors involving property as most 
. t 32 innocen. 
Type II (n = 2) found those accused of committing felonies involv-
ing personal injury as well as damage or theft to property as most 
guilty, while society related crimes such as drunken driving as most 
. t 33 innocen. 
Type III (n = 7) found those accused of "self-harming" crimes 
such as prostitution as most guilty, while those involved with petty 
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theft as most innocent. 34 
Type IV (n = 10) found those accused of crimes against property by 
use of a deadly weapon as most guilty, while those involved with 
crimes involving aggravated battery as most innocent. 35 
Thus she concluded that type of crime does tend to establish pre-
judice in the minds of people. "It does appear there is a tendency for 
some people to assume the accused in a pre-trial news story is more 
guilty than innocent if she or he is charged with committing a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor. 1136 
Of significance then is the fact that none of the major commis-
sions assigned to study the problem of prejudicial publicity have 
addressed the issue of reporting the type of crime for which the defen-
dant is accused. 
The major weakness of this study though is once again these were 
simply individuals, not even potential jurors, giving their opinion in 
a ·non-judicial setting. Further the participants demographically do not 
represent the typical juror in our judicial system. 37 
Alice Padawer Singer and Allen Barton 
Singer and Barton present without a doubt the most impressive study 
found during the author's research of the literature. This study was 
part of the Free Press-Fair Trial Project of Columbia University's 
Bureau of Applied Social Research. Their hypothesis was that jurors 
who have been exposed to the defendant's prior criminal record as well 
as a confession that has been retracted will express the most preju-
dicial feelings against the defendant. 38 
The first phase of the study·involved actual jurors picked at random 
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from the Nassau County, New York, jury pool. They were seated without 
a voir dire, and were not exposed to any "pre-trial publicity." Then 
in an actual courtroom they listened to the tape of an actual murder 
trial that had taken place in Washington, D. C. The jurors then delib-
erated and after six hours found themselves hopelessly deadlocked. 39 
Five other juries listened to the same tape, but they had been ex-
posed to various amounts of prejudicial publicity before entering the 
courtroom. Seventy-eight percent of these voted to convict the defen-
dant.40 
In the second phase of the study, 23 juries were selected from 
jury pools in Kings County (Brooklyn), New York. Thirteen of these 
juries were selected after a vigorous voir dire proceedings, and were 
exposed to little pre-trial publicity. The other ten juries were se-
lected without a voir dire proceeding and had been subjected to pre-
trial publicity. 
Upon deliberation, of the 13 juries not exposed to the prejudicial 
treatment, two returned verdicts of guilty, five verdicts of acquittal, 
and six declared themselves hung. 41 Among the prejudiced juries, six 
rendered guilty verdicts, three voted for acquittal, and one declared 
itself hung. 42 
In commenting on the Singer-Barton study Maurice Rosenberg, a 
pioneer in jury experiments, stated: 
In the absence of anything else, we're bound to say that it looks 
as if jurors, when exposed to stuff of this kind about retracted 
confessions or prior crimina43record are more prone to find guilt 
than the jurors who are not. 
The reason this study has impressed so many individuals both with-
in the legal community, as well as among the press, is the conviction 
that this kind of simulation is as close as researchers will be able to 
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get to the real thing. Unless the judicial community becomes more open 
to permitting experiments on "live" trials, this type of experiment be-
comes the next best thing. In addition, the evidence seems overwhelming. 
The number of juries that voted to convict after they had been exposed 
to pre-trial publicity in comparison with those who had not represents a 
clear indication of the danger of printing a defendant's prior record. 
University of Chicago Jury Project 
This study was conducted by Harry Kalven, Hans Zeisel and Fred 
Strodtbeck under the auspices of the University of Chicago Law School. 
For the study there were five major purposes: 
1) To find out if the jury perceives the law in the same way that 
the law perceives it, 
2) To find out if jurors understand judges' instructions, 
3) To find out if a jury's criteria for conviction or acquittal 
is inconsistent with the law, 
4) To find out if a jury can comprehend rules of evidence, and 
5) To find out if juries are motivated by emotion or by reason. 44 
All of these are important from the standpoint of prejudicial 
publicity, but the last one is essentially critical. If jurors weight 
their verdict on largely emotional evidence and fabrications, it leaves 
open the possibility for serious injustice to be done. 
Fifteen hundred jurors who had previously served in 213 criminal 
cases were given intensive interviews. Since their findings could 
serve as a thesis all in itself, it is our purpose to simply hit the 
highlights of their findings. 
The way in which the jury reaches a verdict was a major finding of 
the study. Only thirty percent of the time do juries, among those 
interviewed, reach a verdict on the first ballot. 45 Thus this tends 
to confirm the findings of Weld and Danzig in that unanimity is rare 
upon reaching the deliberation room. 1be implications of this where 
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pre-trial publicity has been a problem is: Does that lack of unanimity 
represent a lack of evidence or a predisposition not based on evidence? 
What. is more important to our case was their second finding. 
Ninety percent of the cases, involving those interviewed, indicated 
that whoever was on the majority in the first ballot prevailed in the 
ultimate verdict. 46 Thus if jurors are exposed to prejudicial publicity 
and manage to carry that over to the deliberation room, their influence 
following the first ballot can be enormous. 
Another finding was that men tend to dominate in the delibera-
tions.47 A chauvinistic interpretation of these findings would be that 
men, who tend to operate on more rational grounds than women, might not 
be quite as influenced by the prejudicial publicity as women. There-
fore, as leaders in the deliberation room, they could tend to neutralize 
its effect. 
Related Studies 
Warren and Abill hypothesized that a progression of events in the 
course of a trial tends to compound the effects of prejudicial publi-
city.48 
1beir research indicated that once jurors received information 
from outside the courtroom, it fostered a hidden bias which could be 
concealed through the voir dire proceedings and withstand judges' 
instructions to not consider such extraneous material in the reaching 
of a verdict. 49 
Lumsdaine and Janis in experimentation with "one sided" vs. "two 
sided" messages found that those exposed to "one sided" messages, 
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which included prejudicial publicity, were more likely to shift to the 
opposite view when presented with both sides of the case, than those 
originally subjected to "two sided" messages. 50 
Lund conducted a similar experiment and found the same results. 
Subjects tended to embrace the initial argument but shifted to a 
different argument after its presentation. 51 Juries indeed may be more 
"fickle" than we often presume. 
Conclusions 
Does the research literature establish what constitutes preju-
dicial publicity? Indeed it would seem that certain types of informa-
tion disclosed to the public by the media tends to produce preconceived 
opinions in the minds of potential jurors that are difficult to elimi-
nate. The following items in particular produce such opinions: 
1) Any statement concerning a confession to a crime by the defen-
dant, 
2) Any statement regarding the defendant's prior criminal record, 
3) Any statement made by those conducting the investigation as to 
the probable guilt or innocence of the defendant, 
4) Any statements by attorneys as to the psychological stability 
of the defendant, and 
5) Any statements that contain gory or emotional details of the 
crime for which the defendant is accused, or the motivations behind 
such a crime. (There is also evidence that indicates that by just 
labeling someone as a murderer or a rapist, etc. , produces severe 
prejudice . ) 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Milton Cohen in his work, A Preface to Logic, stated: 
There is no genuine progress in scientific insight ••• without 
hypotheses or anticipation of nature. Without some guiding ideas, 
we do not know what facts to gather1 .•. We cannot determine what 
is relevant and what is irrelevant. 
We must therefore approach the problem of prejudicial publicity with 
some preconceived ideas. These ideas are translated into problems and 
hypotheses. 
The scientist demands precision in everything he does. Each 
experiment is to be carefully thought out and structured. The means 
of gathering the data is checked and rechecked to insure accurate 
information is obtained. Finally, the means of analyzing that data is 
decided upon prior to the start of the experiment. 
The scientist builds upon the principle of timebinding, which 
allows others to repeat this experiment and build upon the results. 
Therefore, this chapter gives the essential ingredients in a step-by-
step format. 
Statement of Problems 
Building on the research done with juries that is described in 
the previous chapter, the author sought to assess the views of judges 
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as to what constitutes prejudicial publicity. In particular, three 
aspects of that problem are dealt with: 
1) Is there a relationship, in the opinion of judges, between 
the news elements of criminal magnitude, prior record, and ethnic 
background and possible prejudice to the defendant's case? 
2) Does this relationship change when jurisdiction varies from 
local to state to federal levels? 
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3) Do judges tend to cluster together on the basis of their 
opinions, concerning the relationship of the news elements to possible 
prejudice, apart from their jurisdictional leve~s? 
The importance of these problems are indispensable to an under-
standing of the nature of prejudicial publicity. With the current use 
of gag orders, courtroom closings, and jailing of reporters, it is 
important to try to establish scientifically what items, either in 
print or broadcast form, tend to unduly influence the course of a 
trial over which a judge presides. Without some documentation, such 
judicial restrictions become arbitrary tools. 
Judge Bernard S. Meyer, Chief Justice of the New York Supreme 
Court, has commented on the need for scientific certainty. "A trial may 
involve such a probability that prejudice will result from the publicity 
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process. Our responsibility 
is to learn how to narrow such a probability. 112 
Yet until this experiment, no research has tried specifically to 
isolate news elements that in judges' minds create such a probability 
of prejudice. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
With the problems clearly stated, it is incumbent upon the re-
searcher to state his hypotheses in such a way as to allow them to be 
tested. A number of hypotheses emerge from these three research prob-
lems. However, the author wishes to limit these to the following: 
1) All judges as a group will give stories with the elements of 
criminal magnitude the highest prejudicial ranking. 
2) All judges as a group will give stories with the element of 
prior record the second highest prejudicial ranking. 
3) All judges as a group will give stories with the element of 
ethnic background the lowest prejudicial ranking. 
4) Judges of local jurisdiction will give stories with the 
element of criminal magnitude the highest prejudicial ranking. 
5) Judges of state jurisdiction will give stories with the 
element of prior record the highest prejudicial ranking. 
6) Among judges of federal jurisdiction, there will be no signifi-
cant differences between stories having the elements of criminal magni-
tude and prior record. However, these elements will be ranked higher 
than stories having the element of ethnic background. 
7) Among all judges, when stories with the element of criminal 
magnitude interact with stories with the element of ethnic background 
and when stories with the element of prior record interact with stories 
with the element of ethnic background, no significant differences will 
be produced. 
8) Among all judges, stories with the element of criminal magni-
tude and prior record will interact to account for the most variation 
among prejudicial ranking. 
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9) Between all subjects, we would expect to find two types of 
judges: Type I--judges who give stories with the element of criminal 
magnitude the highest prejudicial ranking; and Type II--judges who 
give stories with the element of prior record the highest prejudicial 
ranking. 
Variables and Operational Definitions 
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As the hypotheses indicate, there are four major variables involved 
in this experiment. They are the news elements of criminal magnitude, 
prior record and ethnic background, and the judge who is assessing the 
amount of prejudice directed at a defendant by each of these news ele-
ments. 
We can be more specific and state that the news elements are the 
independent variables, or the presumed cause, while the prejudicial 
rankings given by judges in the Q-sort constitute the dependent vari-
able or the presumed effect. Thus the scientific basis of our experi-
ment is that given independent variable X, how does Judge Y respond in 
terms of rating the effect of a story on a potential defendant? 
Yet our experiment is made more complicated by the fact that each 
variable has three sublevels. Criminal magnitude has sublevels of mor-
bidity, inducement, and little or no morbidity or inducement. Prior 
record has sublevels of non-criminal· deviance, criminal interaction, 
and normality. Ethnic background has sublevels of minority status, 
customs, and little or no minority status or customs. The type of 
judge has three sublevels: federal, state, and local. 
Thus to insure accuracy, we must assign to each of these variables 
and their sublevels operational definitions. Kerlinger defines these as 
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"assigning meaning to a construct or variable by specifying the activi-
ties necessary to measure it. 113 Such descriptions then must be written 
for each and every experiment and apply only to that experiment. It is 
this element that creates the uniqueness of operational definitions, 
for they become mutually exclusive categories that guide us in our 
understanding of the problem. 
The variables for this experiment are defined as follows: 
Criminal Magnitude 
The total depiction in words or pictures of the criminal act as 
reported by the media for which a suspect is sought, or for which a 
defendant is accused. 
Morbidity. The depiction in words and pictures of the gruesome 
details involved in the commission of the crime as reported by the media. 
Details concerning the physical and mental suffering inflicted on the 
victim by the suspect or defendant, and its subsequent effect on those 
surrounding the victim and the suspect or defendant. 
Inducement. The depiction in words and pictures of the motivations 
and reasons for the clash between the suspect or defendant and the vic-
t:i).m as reported by the media. Explanations as offered by those involved 
in the investigation and subsequent trial: law enforcement officials, 
lawyers, etc. Any alibis given by suspect or defendant, any evidence of 
pre-meditation as reported by those connected with the investigation. 
Little or No Morbidity or Inducement. The depiction in words and 
pictures concerning the magnitude of the criminal act as reported by 
the media, that do not have morbidity or inducement and yet still concern 
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itself with some aspect of the magnitude of the crime. 
Prior Record 
The total depiction in words and pictures of the suspect or defen-
dant's background (other than ethnic), prior to the criminal act for 
which he is accused as reported by the media. Aspects of such a record 
would include, but not be limited to, the number of years of formal 
education, the number of jobs he has held and the duration of each, 
specific criminal acts of which he has been accused, convicted and 
served time. 
Non-Criminal Deviance. The depiction in words and pictures of 
events or actions in the suspect's or defendant's life as reported by 
the media, that are unique to him and that deviate from the societal 
norms in which he lives. Aspects of such deviance would.include but not 
be limited to: occupational and educational record, marital status 
(divorced), any record of psychological dysfunction, use of alcohol or 
drugs. 
Criminal Interaction. The depiction in words and pictures of any 
previous confrontations between the suspect or defendant and the state 
as reported by the media. Aspects of such interaction would include, 
but not be limited to, crimes for which he has been accused, convicted, 
or served time for, the type of prison in which he served time, and his 
behavioral record while serving, previous probation reports. 
Normality. The depiction in words and pictures of events and ac-
tions in the suspect's or defendant's life as reported by the media, 
which neither deviate significantly from the norms of society, nor reflect 
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any interaction with the state in terms of criminal acts. 
Ethnic Background 
The total depiction in words and pictures of the suspect's or 
defendant's ethnic heritage as reported by the media. Aspects of such 
a background would include, but not be limited to, skin color, name, 
customs, and practices unique to such a group. 
Minority Status. The depiction in words and pictures of the sus-
pect's or defendant's ethnic background in terms of being a member of a 
minority group as reported by the media. Such status would be limited 
to what are considered to be common minority groups in today's society: 
Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Cubans or Vietnamese. 
Customs. The depiction in words and pictures of customs and prac-
tices which are unique to the suspect's or defendant's ethnic heritage 
as reported by the media. Aspects of such customs would include, but 
not be limited to, family traditions, ethnic celebrations, religious and 
philosophical beliefs unique to the ethnic group. 
Little or None. The depiction in words and pictures of the defen-
dant's ethnic background as reported by the media, which do not include 
references to minority status or customs and practices. 
Type of Judge 
Those who preside at every level of our society in arbitrating con-
troversies brought before them, relating the facts to the relevant law 
and making new law through the process of decision-making. 
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Federal. Those who preside by appointment of the President of the 
United States over cases affecting aspects of the Constitution or crimes 
against the several states on both an original and appellate jurisdic-
tional level. 
State. Those who preside either by appointment of the Governor of 
the State of Oklahoma, or by direct election of its citizens and arbi-
trate controversies between citizen and the state, or citizen against 
citizen, on both an original and appellate jurisdictional level. 
Local. Those who preside either by appointment of the Mayor or 
manager of a municipality, or by direct election of its citizens and 
arbitrate controversies between citizen and the municipality, or citizen 
against citizen, on an original jurisdictional level only. 
Original Jurisdiction. Those who preside over tribunals that con-
sider the facts of a controversy between the citizen and the state, or 
citizen against citizen. 
Appellate Jurisdiction. Those who preside over tribunals that re-
view the controversy between the citizen and the state, or citizen 
against citizen, as it has been. handled in courts of original jurisdic-
tion to insure that the laws of the government have been applied in a 
just fashion. 
The Sample 
Since the Q-sort technique utilizes a representative sample of 
items, rather than individuals, no special considerations had to be 
given to the selection of respondents, except that approximately the 
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same number of federal, state and local judges participated. 
Judges' names were selected from the Third Edition of The American 
Bench, a national directory of federal, state, and local judges. All 
of the federal judges in the state were invited to participate. State 
judges were selected from the State Supreme Court, Court of Criminal 
Appeals, and District Court Judges from Tulsa, Stillwater, Oklahoma City, 
and Claremore. Local judges were selected from the Tulsa municipal area. 
Thus there was a balance in the participants' backgrounds, as well as 
the areas they serve within the State of Oklahoma. 
The final number of judges and their distribution is as follows: 
8 federal judges, 13 state judges, and 9 local judges. This distribu-
tion reflects a desire to keep the groups as evenly matched as possible 
in terms of size. 
Their demographics were as follows: the average age was 47; the 
average years on the bench was 6; more than 95% were male; all had law 
school educations, with more than 70% being educated at the University 
of Oklahoma Law School. When compared with the other forty-nine states, 
the demographics are similar, except for the place of law school educa-
t . 4 ion. 
Design and Study Description 
Now that the variables have been described and defined, it is 
possible to give a step-by-step guide as to how the experiment is per-
formed. Once again this allows the principle of timebinding to be 
utilized by those in the future who desire to build upon this work. 
85 
Methodology 
Q-methodology was developed by William Stephenson as a means of 
testing various philosophical and psychological ideas without resorting 
to complex survey techniques. In actuality, Q-methodology is a simple 
rank-ordering of concepts over a fixed continuum. 
As previously indicated, this eliminates the need for a carefully 
selected sample of participants. Instead, the stories are distributed 
along a normal curve gradient. In the case of this experiment, 54 
stories are used. These are sorted along an 11-point continuum from 
least prejudicial to most prejudicial. The distribution follows 
(Figure 1). 
Story Value 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Most Prejudicial ---------------------------------- Least Prejudicial 
N-Scores 2 3 4 6 7 10 7 6 4 3 2 
Figure 1. Distribution of Story Values and Stories 
The advantages of using Q-methodology in this experiment are numer-
ous. First, it offers the opportunity to bring the theoretical down to 
a level of participation. The author could have structured a question-
naire to ascertain what judges thought concerning the publication of 
certain items. Instead, they participate; they pass judgment on each 
story, and therefore produce a rank-order scale that can then be statis-
tically analyzed. 
Second, it carefully simulates reality. The Q-sort technique 
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allows the author to carefully structure a realistic case, and have the 
judge role play concerning his deliberations in that case. Experimen-
ters who have worked with actual or potential jurors have emphasized 
that the closer one can simulate the judicial process, the more accurate 
the responses. 5 
Finally, it offers a springboard to further discussions concerning 
the research problem. The author hopes that by using this technique, 
it will relax the participants and prompt them to relate personal exper-
iences with the problem of prejudicial publicity. 
Selection of Stories 
The research problem utilizes three independent variables, each 
with three sublevels. Therefore, there are 27 possible combinations of 
these. Two stories were selected for each combination, thus accounting 
for the figure of 54. 
To insure continuity and to simulate reality, all stories were 
structured to relate to one hypothetical case. The basis for the case 
was the Richard Speck murders of eight student nurses in Chicago in 
1966. Accounts of the murders were drawn from the New York Times, and 
rewritten to conform to the variables. Some examples of these changes 
are: changing the number of victims from eight to six, making Speck a 
Mexican migrant worker, moving the location of the crime to a hypo-
thetical location: Middleton. 
Since newspaper stories did not include all the variables called 
for in the experiment, additional original stories were written by the 
author. Most of these stories related to the ethnic background dimen-
sion. 
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All 54 stories were then carefully reviewed by the author's Gradu-
ate Adviser, Dr. Walter J. Ward, to be certain that they conformed to 
the operational definitions set forth for the experiment. They were 
edited to conform to newspaper form and set in nine-point type with an 
11.5 pica column. This format is used by both Tulsa newspapers. (See 
Appendix A for the complete set of stories.) / 
Pre-Test 
The completed deck was then given to three lawyers from the Tulsa 
area, along with a statement of the operational definitions. They then 
checked to see that each story accurately reflected the operational 
definitions, by sorting the deck repeatedly on one element. at a time. 
( 
All stories were first sorted as to whether or not they conformed to 
the morbidity dimension. Those stories which consistently failed to 
differentiate themselves on the basis of the operational definitions 
were rewritten to assure greater accuracy .. The other dimensions were 
sorted likewise. 
Contacting of Judges 
' 
Each judge selected from The American Bench was sent an initial 
letter inviting his participation. (A copy of this letter is in Appen-
dix B.) The letter described the experiment, and informed him that . 
this was for the author's Master's thesis. 
The letters were followed up with phone calls. These were geared 
towards setting up appointments, as well as answering any further ques-
tions they might have had about the experiment. An hour's time is 
allotted for each respondent's interview. 
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Conduct of the Interview 
Each interview was started with a restatement of the research 
problem to insure that each judge clearly understood what he was being 
asked to do. The Q-sort was then elevated to reality by telling the 
respondent that these represented stories concerned a hypothetical 
murder case that he had been assigned to try. 
The technique was followed until all the stories are distributed 
along the continuum. Upon completion, the judge was asked to share his 
reactions concerning the case, especially how he believed the press 
could have handled this case in a more responsible manner. 
Measurement Instruments 
A Type VI Anova was used to analyze the differences among the 
respondents. This is a three-factor Analysis of Variance where there 
are repeated measures on two factors. Since this experiment had re-
peated measures on three factors, three Type VI Anovas were run, rotat-
ing the news element variables two at a time. Thus the following 
combinations were utilized: Criminal Magnitude X Prior Record, Criminal 
Magnitude X Ethnic Background, and Prior Record X Ethnic Background. 
The sample paradigm (Figure 2) demonstrates how each rotation was set 
up. 
Since we were dealing with differences in opinion among several 
types of judges, we had to see if those differences were statistically 
significant. We compared our hypotheses against the so-called "null 
hypothesis," which simply stated says that no significant differences 
will be found. 6 If after analysis we found that the differences not 
only exceed the null hypothesis but also those which could be brougbt 
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about by chance, we could conclude that the respondents truly differen-
tiated between the news elements as to their possible prejudicial value. 
For purposes of this experiment the author analyzed such variance 
at the 0.05 level, which asked if we repeated this experiment 100 times, 
would we get the same results at least 95% of the time? This assured a 
high degree of confidence in the inferences that were made as a result 
of the experiment. 
The Type VI Anova Table permitted us to obtain various f-ratios, 
as shown in Table I using the first rotation of the variables. 
TABLE I 




Between Judicial Type 
Between Subject Error 
Within Subjects 
1 Between Criminal Magnitude 
2 Between Prior Record 
1 Interaction Judge X 
Criminal Magnitude 
2 Interaction Judge X 
Prior Record 
3 Interaction Criminal Magnitude 
X Prior Record 
3 Interaction Judge X Criminal 




df s. s. m. s. F p 
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Following the Type VI Anova, judges' responses were intercorrelated 
to develop an agreement index. Using McQuitty's Linkage and Factor 
Analysis, we were able to determine typal representatives, or what 
kinds of judges, regardless of level, were most alike. 
These clusters were then substituted back into the Type III Anovas 
in place of federal, state and local categories and reanalyzed in terms 
of the differences within the typal representatives. 
Upon conclusion of the analysis, each hypothesis was analyzed 
against our findings to determine if they were affirmed. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Fred Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. (New 
York, 1973), p. 16. 
2Bernard S. Meyer, "The Trial Judge's Guide to News Reporting and 
Fair Trial," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 
(September, 1969), p. 287, 
3Kerlinger, p. 31. 
4Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 3rd ed. (New York, 1977), 
p. 381-382. 
5connors, p. 21. 
6Kerlinger, p. 19, 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF TI-IE DATA 
Introduction 
Man observes a phenomenon. He speculates on the possible 
causes. Naturally, his culture has a stock of answers to account 
for most phenomena, many correct, many incorrect, many a mixture 
of fact and superstition, many pure superstition and mythology. 
It is the scientist's b~siness to doubt most explanations of 
phenomena in his field. 
Once the experiment is carried out, it is incumbent upon the re-
searcher to apply the same painstaking care in his analysis and inter-
pretation of the data which he has obtained. Anyone can look at table 
after table of numbers and make inferences concerning what they mean. 
But because of the methods of science, the range of possible inferences 
has been narrowed by the application of the hypotheses stated for the 
experiment. 
Sir Peter Medawar, the Nobel Prize winning biologist, has captured 
the essence of this: 
Scientists are building explanatory structures, telling stories 
which are scrupulously tested to see if they are stories about 
real life •..• Scientific reasoning is a kind of dialogue between 
the possible ~d the actual, between what might be and what is in 
fact the case. 
Therefore, each of the judges involved in this experiment has 
been in essence testing those hypotheses to see if they were "stories 
about real life." The testing has been carried out by judgments they 
have passed on each of the fifty-four stories that comprised our 
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hypothetical case. They did this in a "role play" situation which 
placed them as the presiding judge in the execution of the trial. Such 
simulation of reality gave limited assurance that the interpretations 
made as to "what might be and what is in fact the case" can be readily 
applied to everyday judicial situations. 
But more than that, it offers limited assurance that one can sta-
tistically establish what is inherently prejudicial in news stories. 
Granted this has been an exploratory operation into the dimensions of 
meaning as they are structured in the individual judge's mind. But if 
studies of this nature continue, the researcher's case is strengthened 
when he goes before his brethren in the newsroom, and says that to 
publish or broadcast certain types of information will deprive another 
individual of his Constitutional rights. 
Results of the judgments made by the respondents to the news 
stories were analyzed using the procedures outlined previously. In 
this chapter, judges' overall assessments of each story are reviewed, 
as well as how they differed from each other in terms of the news ele-
ments used as variables, and their statistical significance. How they 
clustered together apart from jurisdiction, and how those clusters 
interact with the variables, were analyzed. 
The Semantic Environment And 
Prejudicial Publicity 
Since we are dealing with how individuals structure meaning in 
what they read, it is important to consider some aspects of the semantic 
environment as contained in the hypothetical case used in this experi-
ment, for there are numerous factors which go into taking words on paper 
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and defining them in one's mind. 
The concept of meaning is central to the job of the communicator. 
All of the other steps within the communication model may be fulfilled, 
but if the source and the receiver are unable to agree on the dimen-
sions of the code which they use, no effective communication is pos-
sible. However, one cannot simplify this by running to the dictionary, 
for meanings are in people. 
Words mean nothing by themselves. It is only when an individual 
uses them that they come to have meaning, and such meanings apply only 
to that situation. Out of this theory of meaning comes the indispen-
sable tool of the scientist: the operational definition. At the 
beginning of this experiment, the variables to be utilized were opera-
tionally defined. They provide the dimensions of meaning for the 
research to be conducted. Yet one cannot take these to be emphatically 
exclusive; they hold true only for this case. The next experiment 
will require new meanings. 
Two words not operationally defined at the beginning need to be 
now. Prejudice may be defined as "a relationship between two or more 
individuals, wherein one has a preconceived judgment or opinion of the 
other without just or sufficient grounds or knowledge. 113 
There are two key items to note in this definition. First the 
basis of prejudice lies in a preconceived opinion. Before one ever 
meets another person, or before a defendant is given a chance to prove 
his innocence, he is already characterized. This normally is accom-
plished through stereotyping. Labels such as "ex-convict," "ex-felon," 
and "rapist" provide examples germane to the nature of this experiment. 
Secondly, this basis is reinforced by a lack of knowledge. 
Prejudice festers and grows in an atmosphere of ignorance. Tarnotsu 
Shibutani has written: "Belief in an attitude or statement does not 
wait to be established by the facts. Men believe implicitly that 
everything they hear is true. 114 
Blending the two elements above, prejudicial publicity can be 
operationally defined as the relationship between a potential juror 
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and a defendant, whereby the juror has developed a preconceived opin-
ion concerning the guilt of the defendant on the basis of one-sided, 
inaccurate and incomplete statements offered to him by the media. The 
key to understanding the nature of the problem is indeed simple. As 
stated above, in defining prejudice, the potential juror reads the 
newspaper or hears a broadcast concerning the crime, and on the basis 
of that alone, characterizes the defendant and finds him guilty. 
The dimensions of this problem become even more sinister when one 
considers the basic fickleness of twelve human beings who sit in the 
box. Robert Traver in Anatomy of a Murder states satirically: 
Gambling on what a jury will do is like playing the horses. 
The notorious undependability.of juries, the chance involved, 
is one of the absorbing features of the law. That's what makes 
the practice of law like prostitution, one of the last of the 
unpredictable professions--both employ the seductive arts, both 
try to display their wares to the best advantage~ and both must 
pretend enthusiastically to woo total strangers. 
But why do people label others on the basis of such flimsy evi-
dence? It is this aspect which is often overlooked. There are few 
bigots by choice in our society. Yet prejudice abounds because of the 
fact that man as the "higher animal" cannot live with tension and 
uncertainty in his semantic environment. Therefore, he must take all 
the steps necessary to organize the information he has at his disposal 
into a coherent whole. 
When a criminal act is committed, particularly a gruesome one, 
people everywhere, including those in the media, strive to bring 
meaning out of such brutality. In reality such integration is done 
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to reduce personal and corporate tension and uncertainty. Out of such 
a need to structure meaning comes the labeling, the inaccuracies, and 
highly emotional reporting. 
The public, in looking to the media, receives such interpretation 
without question. If the press says the defendant is an "ex-convict," 
the public can then easily draw the damning conclusion that the defen-
dant must be guilty, because the public operates on the law of identi-
ty that "a must equal a, 116 that once a convict always a convict. 
Psychologists Goggin and Hanover, in their studies of prejudicial 
publicity as it relates to structuring meaning in the individual 
juror's mind, have concluded that man will organize whatever material 
he has, no matter how sparse or incomplete into a coherent whole, and 
then interpret it according to his needs. Once formed, his beliefs 
will tend to be absorbed into the existing belief structure and be 
resistant to change.7 
As a result of their work, several conclusions may be drawn con-
cerning the semantic environment's effect in predisposing jurors' 
opinions towards a defendant. Once again man must organize the data 
around him to maintain his semantic equilibrium. Facts cannot exist 
in isolation. If the individual is to hold down semantic tension, the 
facts must be integrated. 
But such data is not organized haphazardly. Man will organize 
whatever information he obtains, whether it is fact, innuendo, hearsay 
and so forth, according to his value system. If a person believes 
that an "ex-convict" continues in crime, he will tend to pick and 
choose the information available to reinforce that belief, and will 
ignore the balance. This suggests that if the media are to help the 
individual receive a fair trial, it must work not only to "clean up 
what it prints," but also to break down the simplistic value system 
held by such a potential juror and substitute a new one that is more 
tolerant of the rights of others. 
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Other researchers building on Goggin and Hanover have added to our 
knowledge of the semantic environment and prejudicial publicity. Dow 
found that individuals integrated data from news stories concerning 
crime through emphatic identification with the victim. They literally 
interpreted the information through the victim's eyes. 8 As a result of 
this, it was found that many jurors had difficulty distinguishing be-
tween an accusation of a crime and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Wilcox found that jurors go beyond data presented within the court-
room in an attempt to organize meaning.9 In other words, they take 
certain facts and draw inferences that go beyond what can be supported 
by those facts. The individual often finds himself doing this when he 
uses denotative meanings. He can point to an object and say, "That 
appears to be. II But then he proceeds to fill in the blank with a 
word that does not represent the object itself. A clear example of 
this was found in the Richard Speck case. When Speck was isolated as 
the suspect, Police Superintendant Orlando Wilson went on television 
and told the residents of Chicago that "Speck is the killer. 1110 He 
defined the defendant with an inference that went beyond the facts 
available. Granted the police had substantial evidence to arrest 
Speck, but only a jury of his peers could place the label of killer 
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upon him, and then only if the evidence presented convinced them beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, Asch found that juries organize meaning on the basis of 
one particular trait, and in particular, a defendant's prior record. 
Thus as evidence is presented, the jury uses it as reinforcement for 
. 11 their predisposition that the defendant must be guilty. 
In this regard, a defendant's prior record would appear to be an 
excellent tool around which to structure meaning, and therefore produce 
prejudice. The chain of inferences can seemingly be laid out as 
follows. 
Statement of Defendant's Prior Record 
Inference 
"Once a convict, always a convict." 
Inference 
"If he is wanted by others for crimes, he must be guilty • 
. • . Innocent people are not wanted." 
Inference 
"If there is a warrant for his arrest, he probably did it. 
The police don't arrest innocent people." 
Conclusion 
"He's guilty, the evidence is overwhelming." 
Figure 3. Process of Structuring Meaning Through Improper 
Inferences 
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An initial examination of his record produces a simplistic infer-
ence based on the law of identity. This is then reinforced by other 
inferences not supported by the facts. The result is a predisposition 
of guilt. The reasoning pattern laid out here, and confirmed by 
empirical testing, is reminiscent of a scene in Franz Kafka's novel, 
The Trial. In it a young bank employee by the name of Joseph K. is 
arrested, but is never told why. When he confronts the police with 
this, one of them responds as follows: 
We're quite capable of grasping the fact that the high authorities 
we serve, before they would order such an arrest as this, must be 
quite well-informed about the reasons for the arrest and the per-
son of the prisoner •••• 1~ur officials .•• never go hunting 
for crime in the populace. 
Once again the implication is that police don't arrest innocent people. 
Thus, in summation, as the stories and their variable elements 
are considered empirically, one must not forget the perspective of the 
reader or listener, and what goes on in their semantic environment as 
a result of those messages. It is a principle of communication theory 
that man must organize events and facts into coherent modes of meaning, 
no matter what it takes, for man cannot cope with the disunity of no 
meaning. 
Prejudicial Rankings 
Utilizing the Q-technique, the thirty participants sorted the 
stories over an 11-point continuum, using the frequency distribution 
set down in Chapter IV. The criteria for the sorting was that stories 
be ranked from the least prejudicial (1) to most prejudicial (11). 
Therefore, each story could be assigned a numerical value as to where 
it was placed along the continuum. 
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. Building upon the hypotheses set out, one can initially construct 
a theoretical table in which the stories are rank ordered according to 
the experimenter's belief. Such a framework will allow story-by-story 
comparisons, which begin to offer some conclusions as to the validity 
of the hypotheses. 
The theoretical expectations therefore are contained in Table II. 
As this theoretical distrubution indicates, stories which discussed 
the morbid details of the crime and which somewhat bordered on sensa-
tionalism were thought to be most prejudicial. This was based upon 
the evidence of numerous criminal cases in which sensational accounts 
have been adduced as prejudicial to the defendant. 
By establishing the validity of this hypothesis, the researcher 
could determine if judges' thought patterns operated in a similar 
fashion as potential jurors. The review of the literature clearly 
establishes that jurors are swayed by such morbid details which force 
the jurors to organize a "few" highly emotional concepts into a coher-
ent whole, and therefore, establish meaning. If judges operated in a 
similar fashion, it would have far-reaching consequences for our 
judicial process. 
In addition, this theoretical distribution reflected the belief 
that a defendant's prior record, when published, would have some impact 
on creating prejudice, but not be the sole factor. This assumed that 
judges, in structuring their own meanings, would avoid the influential 
leaps of the common man as demonstrated previously. 
Table II also gives the actual prejudicial rankings for all thirty 
judges involved in the experiment. The mean score represents the sum 
of each judge's assessment for that story divided by the number of 
Story 
Number News Tag 
1 Lust for Blood 
2 Horrific Scream 
3 Litter of Crime 
4 Tatooed Ex-Con 
5 Mass Murders 
6 Tortured by Fantasy 
7 No Reason 
8 Description 
9 Violence 
10 Interrogation Procedures 
11 Nude Body 
12 Reward 
13 Coroner's Report 
14 Young Doctor 
15 Suicide 
16 Heart Attack 
17 Confrontation 
18 Serious Setback 
19 Methodical Planning 
TABLE II 
THEORETICAL AND ACTUAL PREJUDICIAL MEAN 
SCORES FOR FIFTY-FOUR STORIES 
Elements 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
Morbidity/Normality/Minority Status 
Morbidity/Normality/Little Ethnic 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Minority Status 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Little Ethnic 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
Morbidity/Normality/Minority Status 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
Little/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Little Ethnic 
Morbidity/Normality/Little Ethnic 


















Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority Status 6.000 
Little/Normality/Minority Status 4.000 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority Status 7.000 
Little/Normality/Little Ethnic 3.000 























TABLE II (Continued) 
f 
Story Anticipated Actual 
Number News Tag Elements Score Score 
20 "That is the man." Inducement/Normality/Minority Status 8.000 10.033 
21 Pop Bottles Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Custom 2.000 4.900 
22 Deviant Sexuality Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Custom 9.000 8.500 
23 Murmur Little/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 4.000 4.633 
24 Insanity Defense Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority Status 5.000 8.366 
25 Relationship with God Inducement/Normality/Custom 6.000 7.000 
26 Air-Tight Case Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Little Ethnic 7,000 5.866 
27 Formal Charge Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Minority Status 8.000 7,366 
28 Wanted for Other Crimes Little/Criminal Interaction/Custom 8.000 7,466 
29 Migrant Workers Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Custom 6.000 6.833 
30 Defendant's Brother Morbidity/Normality/Custom 6.000 4.666 
31 Farce Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Custom 7.000 7. 100 
32 Bragging Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Custom 8.000 10.200 
33 Priest Morbidity/Normality/Custom 6.000 6.866 
34 Grand Jury Little/Non-Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 5.000 6.266 
35 Psychological Revenge Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Custom 7.000 9.566 
36 Indictment Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Minority Status 7.000 6.466 
37 Psychiatric Panel Little/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority Status 5.000 5.200 
38 Expert Little/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority Status 5.000 6.966 
39 Flaw Little/Criminal Interaction/Minority Status 5.000 4.266 
40 Trial by Newspaper Inducement/Normality/Custom 6.000 6.066 
-' 
0 
41 Restrictions Inducement/Normality/Little Ethnic 2.000 3.966 w 
Story 
Number News Tag 
42 Two Wives 
43 ACLU 
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Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Minority Status 
Little/Normality/Little Ethnic 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Little Ethnic 
Little/Criminal Interaction/Little Ethnic 
Little/Normality/Minority Status 
Inducement/Normality/Minority Status 






































In comparing the actual rankings to the theoretical distribution, 
several deviations were noted. Overall, judges did not assess the 
morbidity dimension as highly as was originally hypothesized. In its 
place the motivational and criminal interaction aspects appear to be 
more prejudicial in the minds of the judges. 
In correlating the two sets of scores, a correlation of r equal 
to 0,7766 is obtained, indicating a moderately strong relationship 
between the theoretical and the actual. Such a correlation coefficient 
would at least affirm the proper prediction of a number of other 
hypotheses. These are examined throughout the balance of the chapter. 
Of utmost importance was what the judges actually considered to 
be most prejudicial. What items within each story, when structured 
into a coherent whole, created a substantial predisposition of guilt 
in the individual's mind? To this extent a number of observations may 
be made concerning these scores. 
The story rated most prejudicial was number 20 with a mean score 
of 10.033. It contained the elements of inducement, normality, and 
minority status. The second most prejudicial story was number 32 with 
a mean score of 10.200. It contained the elements of inducement, 
criminal interaction and custom. 
The former concerned itself with the record of the confrontation 
between the sole survivor of the criminal act and the defendant. The 
victim states clearly that the accused is the murderer. The attempt 
to explain the reasons for the clash between the defendant and the 
victim conforms to the operational definition of inducement. 
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However, this does not take place within the confines of the 
courtroom where the accused has an opportunity to confront eyewitnesses. 
This is why it has been consistently held by judges, as well as others 
in the legal community, as being something the media should not print 
until after the trial has reached that stage. No judge interviewed 
saw anything wrong with the press using the victim's words of identi-
fication as they were given in court and subjected to the rules of 
evidence. 
Yet even when subject to such rules, eyewitness identifications 
can lead juries to the wrong conclusions. Edwin Montefiore Bouchard, 
a former professor of law at Yale University, did a major case study 
of trials where eyewitness testimony seemingly provided the conclusive 
evidence. He concluded: 
Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors (mistaken 
identity) is an identification of the accused by the victim 
of a crime of violence. Juries seem disposed more readily to 
credit the veracity and reliability of the victims of an out-
rage than an~3amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of 
the accused. 
Therefore, the media must handle such reports of eyewitness iden-
tification, particularly when it occurs outside of the courtroom, with 
the utmost care. People, in an attempt to organize meaning, will take 
such data and reach a conclusion without hearing all the evidence. 
The psychological studies cited earlier provide documentation for such 
caution. 
But story number 20 not only included a statement that identified 
the accused as the killer, it also contained a statement by the police 
chief to the effect that the police have all the evidence necessary to 
back up the claim of the victim. The chief is quoted as saying, "We 
have fingerprints at the scene, eyewitness identification, and the 
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murder weapon." Judges concluded that all of this contained in one 
story could create in the minds of potential jurors the idea of an 
open and shut case. Such a notion is extremely difficult to dispell. 
A number of judges also criticized the police chief for making 
such statements to the press. Several indicated that if they were 
actually trying the case, such conduct would result in a contempt cita-
tion. This raises a significant point concerning the prejudicial 
publicity problem. Often it is not entirely the press who is to blame. 
As related in the review of Supreme Court cases in Chapter One, such 
prejudicial material originates with the law-enforcement community. 
Story number 32 concerned itself with an interview conducted with 
a former cell mate of the accused. While the defendant's criminal 
record is not precisely recited as in a number of the other stories, 
it does clearly identify him as an ex-convict, which conforms to the 
operational definition of criminal interaction. The inducement dimen-
sion is represented by the statement that the defendant was capable of 
carrying out the crime for which he is charged. As such, this is an 
explanation for the clash between the defendant and the victim. In 
addition, the dimension of custom figures heavily. The former cell 
mate indicates that most migrant workers have poor self-images and must 
commit acts like this to prove his manhood. Therefore, he was not only 
capable of committing the crime, but had a clear motivation for it. 
Such a series of inferences is well documented by social research-
ers. Charles Silberman in his excellent work, Criminal Violence, 
Criminal Justice, concludes that most criminal acts are largely sym-
bolic, a means for the underprivileged to equalize the differences 
between them and the remainder of society, to reach that American dream 
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of success. He writes: 
Violence offers more than just an occasional high; it provides a 
sense of being 'somebody' to people who feel they are nobody, 
whose experience of poverty and discrimination co~~eys a sense of 
rejection, even ostracism, by the larger society. 
Even more to the point is the comment of an inmate as reported by 
the Fortune Society: "If you feel like nothing, a gun can make you 
feel like a king. It's like playing God, knowing you have the power 
of life and death at your fingertip. 1115 
If this is all true, then why do judges take such strong objection 
to these kinds of repor~s? Clearly it is once again a matter of how 
the potential juror integrates such data and forms meaning. While 
judges hold the jury system in high regard, there is a strong belief 
that many know so little about the judicial system that there are no 
built-in safeguards to keep such people from making the kind of "knee 
jerk" inferences that have been continually cited throughout this 
chapter. 
But the question of press responsibility is also raised. Is the 
public's right and need to know enhanced by the publication of such 
statements as found in story ~2? The story adds no information to the 
public's mind which is necessary to the proper prosecution of the 
charge for which the defendant is accused. In fact it adds informa-
tion which is detrimental to such prosecution. Instead of providing 
clear and concise details on the criminal act which is being tried, 
the judicial waters are muddied by trying him on his entire prior 
criminal record. The juror cannot integrate the data necessary to 
reach an objective verdict, and therefore, justice cannot be served. 
Story numbers 45 and 47 were ranked at the bottom of the continuum 
as least prejudicial. Story number 45 with a mean score of 2.233 
contained the elements of little morbidity or inducement, normality, 
and custom. Story number 47 contained the same elements. Since the 
first two dimensions focus on rather normal concerns, the element of 
custom deserves exploration. 
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In story number 45 the emphasis is on what the defendant is doing 
while awaiting trial. The story reports that he is following the usual 
custom for migrant workers when they have spare time--playing cards. 
In story number 47 the defendant's desire to look well-dressed for his 
trial once again relates to a migrant custom. Judges as a whole saw 
little in these reported customs that would prejudice the defendant's 
trial. 
Having considered the high and low ends of the continuum, there 
are several other highly ranked stories that merit attention. Story 
number 35 ranked third highest with a mean score of 9.566 and contained 
the elements of inducement, non-criminal deviance, and custom. It 
concerned itself with a "psychological" theory of revenge as a moti-
vation for the crime. 
Judges, in commenting on this story, again questioned the propriety 
of law enforcement officials making such statements to the press. The 
story is basically the result of a leak among a group of court-appointed 
psychiatrists who are trying to assess the defendant's competency to 
stand trial. The judges interviewed indicated the inference that can 
be made from the story is that he is competent and therefore had a 
motive. 
The custom dimension clearly indicates what the motivation is. 
It is to get even with women in general for past treatment. The chain 
which it sets up in the juror's mind is easily discerned. Since it is 
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the custom of migrant workers to take the law into their own hands, 
the defendant sought to take the initiative in revenging past hurts 
inflicted on him by women. When such inferences are internalized, it 
creates substantial predisposition in the minds of jurors which is 
difficult for them to ignore in their deliberations. 
The other story which deserves comment is number 22. It was the 
fourth highest in terms of overall rankings, with a mean score of 
8.500. It contained the elements of morbidity, non-criminal deviance, 
and custom. The story reports on an interview with a "leading sociolo-
gist," who is an "expert" on migrant workers. He asserts that such a 
sex crime as the one committed by the defendant is not unusual for 
migrant workers because they have developed modes of deviant sexuality. 
Most of the judges questioned believed that the testimony of such 
experts is best left for the courtroom. There is no assurance that 
this "expert" will be called to testify under oath or be subject to 
cross-examination by the defendant's counsel. 
Such "expert" comments are usually based on second or third-hand 
knowledge of the facts in a specific case. Therefore, the probability 
of the inferences they draw from such limited .data being accurate are 
significantly diminished. Once again then the question must be raised 
as to what has the public gained from such a story. Nothing, except 
emotionally charged facts that may be inaccurate, that, when interna-
lized, will result in severe prejudice. 
A final word must be said about the respondents' criticisms. 
Some may raise the question that these were hypothetical cases in a 
hypothetical case, and that the criticisms made by judges might not 
be supported in reality. In the research and legal literature, members 
111 
of the bench have been consistent in their criticism of law enforcement 
"public relations," news writing that portends an open and shut case, 
publication of a defendant's prior record, and the comments of "experts" 
outside the courtroom. 
Judge Bernard S. Meyer of the New York Supreme Court has been 
particularly critical of the law enforcement community and its pre-
trial comments to the press. 
In the Sheppard decision the Supreme Court was emphatic concerning 
this. 'The court should have made some effort to control the 
release of leads, information, and gossip by police officers.' 
••• Judges at every level must be just as emphatic to 15em the 
tide of publicity by the police and prosecutor's office. 
The Reardon Committee of the American Bar Association sought to 
deal with this problem. Its field research indicated that "the over-
whelming bulk of potentially prejudicial information and opinion comes 
from law enforcement officials. 1117 However, in its final report, the 
recommendations indicated that self-regulation by the law enforcement 
community, rather than more stringent standards, was the best way to 
accomplish this. 
It still continues to be a serious problem. Justice Brennan in 
Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart stated: "Judges may stem much 
of the flow of prejudicial publicity at its source (laWYer, police, 
or court official) before it is obtained by representatives of the 
press." 18 
Finally in 1979, in the state of Oklahoma, during the Gene Leroy 
Hart trial, there were repeated statements made by prosecuting attor-
neys and the county sheriff which would match many of the comments 
raised in this thesis by the "hypothetical case. 111 9 
As to publication of a defendant's prior record, no significant 
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progress has been made in bar-press relations in terms of eliminating 
such reports from news stories. The irony of the whole debate over 
this issue is that one's prior record is inadmissable within the court 
system. It has absolutely nothing to do with the proceedings at hand. 
The Supreme Court in Michelson vs. United States, said: 
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law or 
specific criminal acts ..•• The inquiry is not rejected because 
character is irrelevant; on the contrary it is said to weigh too 
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one 
with a bad general record and deny h~e a fair opportunity to defend 
himself against a particular charge. 
Therefore, when a newspaper or broadcast medium reports a defendant's 
prior record, the public's interest is not served, for severe injustice 
has been proven to be the result. 
Yet many in the press justify such publication on the grounds that 
it is part of the public's right to know. Telford Taylor in scolding 
the press has written: "The right to know what? ••• There certainly 
is no authorized interpretation of the First Amendment that I know of 
that guarantees the people's right to know everything at any time and 
every place. 1121 
James C. Goodale, executive vice-president of the New York Times, 
has expressed the frustration of those who have attempted to restrain 
themselves from such publication. 
If indeed you had a million studies which showed conclusively 
that when you ran a prior record, it jeopardized a defendant's 
rights, the press ought to damn well know that2~nd be damned 
sensitive to publication of that prior record. 
Then what of the testimony of experts outside the courtroom? In 
almost every case where there is controversy and high emotion, the 
press seems to be compelled to seek out anyone who can shed some light 
on the 11big why?" In the Speck case, upon which our "hypothetical 
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case" is based, one repeatedly saw "experts" being quoted by the press. 
Granted, the events of July 14, 1966, stunned the world. The thought 
of eight young student nurses being ruthlessly cut down appalled an 
American nation which prided itself on law and order. Therefore, any 
explanation offered by anyone with some authority was sought after. 
The day after the murders, before Richard Speck was even announced 
as being the prime suspect, the New York Times prominently featured a 
UPI interview with an eminent psychiatrist who explained that such 
violence was a result of American's complacency. 23 This story was 
incorporated into the Q-sort as story number 9. 
Newsweek in its August 1, 1966, edition used as part of its story 
on the murders an interview with three noted Harvard Law School pro-
fessors who criticized the conduct of Chicago Police Superintendent 
Orlando Wilson. 24 
On July 28, 1966, UPI ran the results of another interview with an 
"expert on Illinois criminal law." In this story the nation was told 
that "Speck could go free--on an insanity plea--even if he admitted he 
committed an act of murder. 1125 This was also included in this experi-
ment and is listed as story number 38. 
Historically, judges and the courts have looked with disdain upon 
such conduct by the media. In the case of Patterson vs. Colorado, Jus-
tice Holmes stated: "The theory 6f our system is that the conclusions 
be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in 
open court, and not by any outside inference, whether private talk or 
bl . . t 26 pu ic prin .. 
Carolyn Jaffe in an extensive study concerning prejudicial publi-
city from a legal viewpoint concluded: 
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Since every criminal defendant has a federal Constitutional right 
to be confronted by and to cross-examine his accusers, a defendant 
may be prejudiced for inability to exercise this right if the news 
media publish an extra-judicial statementmad27by a person not 
subsequently called as a witness against him. 
Therefore, as previously stated, the problem with expert inter-
views is that they are not conducted under oath, and are not subject 
to cross-examination by·the defendant's attorney. Most judges ques-
tioned in this study believed that such interviews would be better left 
till after the trial, if they are used at all. 
At this point, then, we can draw a preliminary conclusion. In the 
minds of the respondents in this study, at least three areas of news 
reporting contribute to prejudicing a defendant's case. They are cer-
tain kinds of leading statements by law enforcement officials, publica-
tion of any prior criminal record, and statements by experts which will 
not be subject to adversary proceedings during the course of the trial. 
Now that the stories have been considered in the total context, 
they need to be examined at each level of jurisdiction. How did 
federal judges differ from state and local judges in their assess-
ments of the stories contained in the Q-sort? Table III contains the 
mean prejudicial scores of the fifty-four stories for each level of 
jurisdiction. 
Federal and state judges appear to be in rather close agreement 
in their assessments of the degree of prejudice found in the fifty-
four stories of the Q-sort. Local judges tended to differ signifi-
cantly. 
Both federal and state judges concurred on the two highest rated 
stories, overall, with number 20 getting mean scores of 10.625 and 
TABLE III 
PREJUDICIAL MEAN SCORES OF FIFTY-FOUR 
STORIES BY JURISDICTIONAL LEVEL 
STORY FEDERAL STATE LDC.AL I 
1 7.625 7.231 9.667. 
... . 2 ......... 6 • 3 7 5 ······-·--··· 6 • 92 3 --------- 9 : 5 5 61 
3 6.000 7.077 8.4441 
4 8.125 8.231 7.667 
-·····- ~ -------------~-:-~~ ~ -------i: ii~~ ··--1 ii:~~~ I 
7 6.375 5.308 6.7781 
8 5.625 4.769 6.667! 
9 6.000 6 .. 000 5.3331 
--·1 o ·----·--4 ;·o o o ··--l't :·335 s. ss 9 I 
11 5.250 5.923 7.4441 
12 3.875 5.846 6.667 
13 7.000 6.308 6.667 
·-· - l 4 . ·----s:s O O ---5: 0 0 (J 5: 0 0 0·1 
15 5.625 5.385 6.778[ 
16 5.625 4.231 4.333! 
17 7.375 6.000 5.3331 
-·-111 ······-·-·-4 ·:625---4-: 538 5 :222·1 
19 10.125 7.538 7.667! 
20 10.625 10.154 9.3331 
21 5.500 5.615 3.333/ 
-··22 ·------a ~750··---7~ 53a·---9 :·66 7.., 
23 4.875 5.000 3.8891 
24 7.875 8.385 8.7781 
25 7.500 6.615 7.111 
·····26 ---·-----·5 :7 50 6-:·533 5: 0 0 o·I 
27 8.625 7.692 5.778 
28 7.625 7.077 7.889 
29 7.500 7.462 5.333 
... 30 -----4·. 250---4·:16 9· lt":889 
31 7.625 7.000 6.778 
32 10.625 10.077 10.000 
33 5.875 6.538 8.222 
-· 34-----6·:250 5·:592·---5·;·667" 
35 9.750 9.769 9.111 
36 6.750 7.308 5.000 
37 5.250 5.000 5.444 
·-- -] i --------·-r ~ g ~---r-~2 ~----r-~ ~. x 1 
40 7.125 6.538 4.444 
41 3.500 4.615 3.444 
· ·· 4 2-------T:· 5 o o·---7--: o o o·---s ·:-5 5 6 1 
43 4.625 6.462 5.222 I 
44 5.750 7.385 6.333 j 
45 1.500 2.846 2.000 I 
·45·-----·4·:·125 ·4·:-154 ·4·;-555-1 
47 1.875 2.011 1.4441 
48 6.000 6.846 6.444 I 
49 4.250 3.692 4.000 i 
· 5 o -----·--3 ;·3 7 s---s:··2 31----- ir·:·s 5 6 .... 
51 4.125 4.538 3.222) 
52 2.875 3.615 3.889 r 
53 3.750 3.692 2.111, 
- 54 ---···--4·;-125 3:-769 2-:·000·~ 
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10.154 respectively, while number 32 obtained means of 10.625 and 
10.077. Local judges also concurred on story number 32 with a mean 
of 10.000. 
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Therefore, it would appear that all judges, regardless of the 
level of jurisdiction, view extra~judicial statements concerning the 
motivation for a crime and publication of a defendant's prior record 
as inherently prejudicial to the accused's right to a fair trial. 
The matter of extra-judicial statements was singled out in particular. 
Judges seem to be in agreement that until an individual testifies 
under oath and is subject to cross-examination, nothing he says about 
the crime should be made public. 
Local judges differed with their federal and state counterparts 
over story number 6. They gave it a mean score of 10.222, while 
federal and state judges ranked it at 7.250 and 7.077 respectively. 
This story is once again concerned with the views of an "expert." 
In this case it is a psychiatrist who has no legal relationship to 
the defendant. He paints him as a man "tortured by fantasy •.• and his 
macabre imagination." 
These judges believed that such claims cannot be understood by 
the public at large, and therefore, lead them to make unjust infer-
ences based on the Aristotilean concept of the "law of identity." 
Wendell Johnson describes the law this way: People "talk and act as 
if a thing is what it is. It is possible to put it in the general 
form: A is A. 1128 Therefore, people who read this story and operate 
on this·law make the damning inference: "once a rapist, always a 
rapist." Such inference is given extra weight since it comes from 
the mouth of an "expert." 
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As in the previous analysis, the question of whether such a story 
would actually appear in print is raised. This story appeared in the 
Tulsa World of September 26, 1975, in connection with a series of rape-
murders. The wording of the story is exactly as it appeared on page 
one, with the exception of changing the names of the individuals in-
volved.29 Richard Speck's case generated a similar treatment as 
already demonstrated. 
When pressed for particulars on their disagreement with their 
federal and state counterparts over the ramifications of such a story, 
they indicated that such a story when confined within a municipality 
tends to incite the public opinion out of fear of being the "next 
victim." Such a fear makes seating a jury exceedingly difficult, in 
particular, seating female jurors because of possible reprisals. 
Such thinking also apparently influenced local judges' ranking 
of story number 22, which obtained a mean score of 9,667, Federal 
judges rated it with a mean of 8,750, while state judges had a mean 
of 7,538. This story dealt with the comments of an expert on deviant 
sexuality among migrant workers. Judges believed that while this may 
have been a significant factor in the motivation for the crime, such 
opinions once again should be made in the witness stand and not in the 
press. Local judges also indicated once again the difficulty such a 
story would create in seating women as unbiased jurors. 
When the three sets of mean scores are intercorrelated, the 
following correlations (r) are obtained, as contained in Table IV. 
Such relationships tend further to establish that federal and 
state judges are more in agreement in the matter of certain prejudicial 
factors than when either jurisdictional level is compared to local 
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judges' assessments. Further, when state and local judges' mean scores 
are evaluated in terms of agreement, there exists only a moderately 
strong relationship. It is even lower when the federal and local 
judges' scores are compared. 
TABLE IV 
INTERCORRELATION VALUES OF MEAN SCORES 














Summary of Prejudicial Rankings 
When evaluating stories, as to whether they are prejudicial, two 
key values appear, regardless of jurisdictional level. Federal, state 
and local judges tend to agree strongly on the matter of extra-judicial 
statements and their prejudicial implications. All seem to be in 
agreement that the public gains very little in terms of making 
the criminal justice system better. If anything, such statements are 
not in the public interest, because of the continuous controversy they 
generate which forces continuances, changes of venue, and other judicial 
119 
tools which lengthen the time and the cost of meting out justice. 
There was seemingly less agreement at all levels over the preju-
dicial value of publicizing a defendant's prior record. Federal and 
state judges regarded stories containing such information as more 
inherently prejudicial than did local judges. To some degree this may 
be accounted for by the fact that local judges tend to try first-time 
offenders, while the state and federal judges try endless numbers of 
cases involving repeat offenders. 
Therefore, initially we must conclude that the primary element 
for which a strong case may be made across the board is that of the 
extra-judicial statement. 
Analysis of Variance Among Judges 
To analyze the differences among judges, each set of news elements 
was analyzed so as to eliminate chance variations, and therefore allow 
the researcher to know if the judgments on each news story reflect a 
statistically significant trend of thought. The Type VI analysis of 
variance permits the researcher to examine the variable sets two at a 
time. Therefore, criminal magnitude and prior record were examined 
first, followed by criminal magnitude and ethnic background, and then 
prior record and ethnic background. 
In essence the Type VI is a combination of two research tools: 
factorial analysis of variance and treatment by subjects design. When 
they are combined, it permits the researcher to see the effects of 
three factors working in concert and how that affects the repeated 
measures on the two factors being measurect. 29 
Such examination is important when one realizes that in the 
.. 
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physical world, there is constant interaction. No phenomenon simply 
happens in isolation. But rather it is akin to a pool table where the 
cue ball is shot towards the group of balls in the center. All of 
them move, some further than others, but all as a result of that 
single shot. 
The three-dimensional structure set up in this experiment to 
assess prejudicial publicity is built on the assumption that each 
variable by itself might create significant amounts of prejudice. 
However, one needs to measure their effects when they work together 
for that is how physical reality operates. Only then can one be sure 
that his results can be taken to an editor or broadcaster and used as 
evidence to indicate what can or cannot be disseminated without depri-
vation of another's rights. 
Criminal Magnitude-Prior Record 
As structured, the experiment utilized three major variables. 
Each of these had three sublevels. For criminal magnitude they were 
morbidity, inducement and little or no morbidity or inducement. For 
prior record they were non-criminal deviance, criminal interaction 
and normality. Ethnic background's sublevels are minority status, 
custom and little ethnic. Therefore, there were 27 combinations of 
these when utilized three to a story. Thus, two stories for each 
combination resulted in the figure of fifty-four stories for the 
Q-sort. 
Each matrix contains a mean score from each judge for his assess-
ment of six stories containing the combination of two elements being 
considered. The analysis matrix for the first combination is found 
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in Table V. 
A review of the table shows that once again the total score for 
each judge is fixed due to the fixed nature of the continuum. Mean 
scores are shown by judicial levels in each element pair. This analy-
sis answered the following: Are significant differences found between 
elements? Does one element by itself produce a higher probable preju-
diced score than another? Does criminal magnitude with its sublevels 
create a higher degree of prejudice when it interacts with prior 
record or judicial type? Do judges differ significantly between 
levels on their assessments of the variables? 
The analysis of these two combinations is summarized in Table VI. 
There were significant differences in the thought pattern of 
respondents in distinguishing between the constituent elements of 
criminal magnitude and prior record. The probability of obtaining 
F-ratios as high as 202.096 and 90.100 for these respective variables 
by chance would occur less than one time in 100 similar experiments. 
Such significant differences suggest that judges in viewing 
actual news stories can distinguish between the prejudicial value of 
morbidity, inducement, non-criminal deviance, criminal interaction 
and normality, although significant disagreement exists between them. 
This tends to confirm the findings of other researchers in dealing 
with potential jurors that when such items as a defendant's prior 
record and the "gory" details of the crime are disseminated to the 
public, the result is predisposition of guilt and therefore denial of 
that individual's Sixth Amendment rights. 
However, when the type of judge, based on jurisdictional level, 
interacts with each of these variables on a separate basis, no signifi.;.,c 
TABLE V 
TYPE VI ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE 
AND PRIOR RECORD 
FEDERAL JUDGES 
MORBIDITY Ih~UCEMENT 
HOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY HOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE ·SCORE SCORE JUDGE . ·- . SQUARED __ ,._______ ..... -- SQUARED -- ..... . .... SQUARED SQUARED SQUARED 
l 7.167 51.361 7.333 53.778 5.333 28.444 7.833 61.361 7,000 49.000 
2 6.333 40.111 7.833 61.361 5.167 26.694 7.000 49.0cO 7.167 51.361 
3 7.667 58.778 6.500 42.250 5;000 25.000 8.000 64.000 6.333 40.111 
..... 4 ···--· 6 :833 --·-- 46 ;694--5:833 ---- ;H. 028'····-·· 5. 500 ------ 30. 250 -- ···7. 333 53. 778 ···- 7. 333 . 53. 778 · 
5 7.333 53.778 7.333 53.778 4.667 21.778 7.833 61.361 7.000 49.000 
6 7.833 61.361 7.000 .49.000 5.333 28.444 7.500 56.250 6.167 38.028 
7 7.667 58.778 6.500 42.250 5.667 32.111 8.000 64.000 5.833 34.028 
3···-·1. 1r;1----sr:-351--r;: 500 ·---··42; 250 ··----6: ooo --·36. ooo -- ·· 7. 50 o · --·- 56. 250 ·-·--·- 6. ooo · ---··· 36. o o o ·· 
9 5.500 30.250 6.500 42.250 5.167 26.694 7.667 58.778 7.667 58.778 
TTL 63.500 452.472 61.333 
MEAH··-·-7:250 ---------6:"85~ 
420.944 47.833 255.417 68.667 
--------·-· 5. 333·--------··-···---- 7. 625. 
LITTLE MORBIDITY OR INDUCEMENT 
524.777 60.500 410.083 - ····-·-·-·· .. 6. 604··-····· -
HOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL 
j JUDGE ...... --- ...... ----·-sQUAREo··--··· ... ······- SQUARED··-·· .. ----·· SQUARED --- ... . SQUARED 
1 5.667 32.111 4.667- 21.778 3.667 13.444 54.000 2916.000 
2 5.167 26.694 4.333 18.778 4.667 21.778 54.000 2916.000 
3 6.500 42.250 4.333 18.778 3.500 12.250 54.000 2916.000 
··-- "4---··6 ;-157----33: 028--6 ;167---33. 023·--···2. r.61----- 1·.11r·--54. ODO·---· 2916. 000. 
5 6.333 40.111 4.000 16.000 3.000 9.000 54,000 2916.000 
6 6.667 44.444 3.833 14.694 3.833 14.694 54.000 2916.000 
7 6.667 44.444 4.333 18.778 3.167 10.028 54.000 2916.000 
--·3 ···--r, :ooo ---u:·000--5 :·333--·23·;-444--3 :1r.1--·10: 028 --· 54. ooo··---2916. ooo · 
9 5.500 30.250 4.500 20.250 6.333 40.111 54.000 2916.000 
TTL 54.667 334.333 41.500 195.528 34.000 138.444 486.000 26244.000 



























TABLE V (Continued) 
STATE JUDGES 
MORBIDITY INDUCEMENT 
HOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY HOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE 
JUDGE... ···-·-SQUARED____ ·····-SQUARED... . .. SQUARED . SQUARED SQUARED SQUARLD 
. 10 6.167 38.028 8.000 64.000 7.333 53.778 5.000 25.000 6.833 46.694 6.833 46.69~ 
11 4.667 21.778 7.333 53.778 5.000 25.000 6.167 38.028 6.333 40.111 6.333 40.111 
12 7.333 53.778 6.500 42.250 7.000 49.000 7.333 53.778 6.667 44.444 5.833 34.028 
·-13 ·····-7; 661-·-- 58 :11a--6 :so o···---··42; 250-- s; o o o ··- ··-· 25. o o o ··· ·· a. o o o 64. o o o · · 6. 333 · · ··· ti o.111.. 6 .16 7 38. o 2s 
14 6.667 · 44.444 7.167 51.361 5.333 28.444 7.167 51.361 8.000 64.000 5.000 25.000 
15 7.000 49.000 7.833 61.361 5.667 32.111 7.167 51.361 7.833 61.361 4.833 23.361 
16 6.500 42.250 5.333 28.444 6.500 42.250 7.167 51.361 6.500 42.250 6.667 44.4~4 
--·17 -·-··6; 833 -- 46; 6 94--s-; 833 --3'i: 02a·-5: 500 ·-- 30. 2so--··- 1. 333 53. 778 ···· · 1. 333 · · ··· 53. 778 ·-··6.161 38. 02a 
18 6.500 42.250 6.833 46.694 6.667 44.444 6.667 44.444 7.167 51.361 6.167 38.028 
19 6.000 36.000 7.000 49.000 5.500 30.250 7.500 56.250 8.000 64.000 5.833 34.0~8 
20 8.333 69.444 6.667 44.444 7.000 49.000 7.000 49.000 6.000 36.000 6.167 38.028 
···21 ···-·T: ooo--li9~·000--&:667--lili:·4lj4···--· 6 ~16 r·--33. on··--· 7; 667 ···- -- 58. 773-····7: o o o ··- - 4 9: o o o ···--- 6. 333 --··---40.111 -
22 8.167 66.694 6.667 44.444 7.833 61.361 7.167 51.361 6.167 38.028 5.000 25.000 
TTL 88.833 
MEAN -··-·· 6-~ 6 28 
61a.13a 88.333 606.499 80.500 508.916 91.333 
····-····--·· 7.064" 
643.499 90.167 631.138 --··--6~782 ___________ 5.987 · ·······---~ 1 :051·· 
LITTLE MORBIDITY OR INDUCEMENT 
HOH-CRIM DEVIATIOH CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL 
JUDGE.. . SQUARED·-·--· .. -·-sQUARrn··-- . SQUf,RED - . Sl;UARED 
10 . 5.500 30.250 4.667 21.778 3.667 13.444 54.000 2916.000 
11 7.000 49.000 7.500 56.250 3.667 13.444 54.000 2916.000 
12 6.000 36.000 4.833 23.361 2.500 6.250 54.000 2916.000 
··· 13 ····- 6: soo ·-·--"42; 250--"4 ;333 ··--rn: 778 --·· 3. soo ··---··12. 250 ······· 54. ooo · 2916. o o o -
14 4.833 23.361 4.500 20.250 5.333 28.444 54.000 2916.000 
15 6.167 38.028 4.833 23.361 2.667 7.111 54.000 2916.000 
16 7.000 49.000 5.000 25.000 3.333 11.111 54.000 2916.000 
--· 1,----·5;16r--3g·;o28--Ll67-~38 ;023-- 2: 667·---1.111··-··54: 000 .... 2916. 000. 
18 5.500 30.250 5.000 25.000 3.500 12.250 54.000 2916.000 
19 6.500 42.250 4.333 18.778 3.333 11.111 54.000 2916.000 
20 5.167 26.694 5.167 26.694 2.500 6.250 54.000 2916.000 
-· 21 ···--6 :··333·--4o~n1--r+·:333·--1s:na-- 2 :500 ·--6 .2so-sri. ooo ·· 2916. ooo ·· 
22 5.833 34.028 4.833 23.361 2.333 5.444 54.000 2916.000 
TTL 78.500 479.249 65.500 339.416 41.500 140.472 702.000 37908.000 
MEAN···--6:013··---------5~ 0 n----- ·----·------ :L 5 0 0 -··-···· . 
77.333 464.888 
5: 962 .. 
. .... 
~ 
TABLE V (Continued) 
LOCAL JUDGES 
MORBIDITY INDUCEMENT 
NOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY NON-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE JUDGE··-··-··.. ··-·sQUARED ______ .. -·-···-·sQUARED ·····-·-·. . . ----· "SQUARED-- SQUARED SQUARED SQUM!ED 
23 7.500 56.250 5.500 30.250 8.000 64.000 7.500 56.250 6.167 38.028 4.167 17.361 
24 7.000 49.000 5.333 28.444 7.167 51.361 7.333 53.778 7.167 51.361 4.500 20.250 
25 7.333 53.778 6.000 36·.ooo 6.833 46.694 1.000 49.ooo 7.333 53.778 5.ooo 2s.ooo 
··-· 26 ·--7; 333--·-53·:718--·5:66r--32 .111 ·----·7. ooo ·--·-·· 49. 000 ·-·1. 333 ·· ·· -- 53. 778 ·-·---6. 500 ·------ 42. 250 -·- - 5. soo ·-- ···· 30. ;.,so 
27 7.333 53.778 5.000 25.000 7.333 53.778 8.167 66.694 6.333 40.111 5.833 34.028 
28 7.000 49.000 5.667 32.111 7.500 56.250 7.500 56.250 6.833 46.694 5.000 25.000 
29 8.167 66.694 5.500 30.250 7.667 58.778 7.167 51.361 6.667 44.444 5.500 30.250 
-30----1 :·500--56:-250--5:500--30; 250--1: 333··-·-·53: 778·---·-T. 500 · ·---··56. 250 ---- 6 .833 ····-··-·· 46. 694 ·· 6. ooo 36. ooo 
TTL 59.167 438.528 44.167 244.417 58.833 433.638 59.500 443.361 53.8:n 363.361 41.500 218.139 
MEAN 7.481 5.648 7 .407 7 .407 6 .667 5.167 
... - ···- ----·---··--·-- - ----·-·-··----·-··--·-·---------- ....... --·--·· ______ ., ___________ ··-·· .. . ··---------·---·-·-· .. ···-··-· .... . 
TTL 211.500 1509.137 193.833 1271.860 187.167 1197. 971 219.500 1616. 63.7 204.500 1404.581 172.833 1008.748 
LITTLE MORBIDITY OR INDUCEMENT 
HOH-CRIM DEVIATION CRIMINAL INTERACTION NORMALITY 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL JUDGE ···-·· .. ----SQUARED···- .. ----SQUARED-·-··· ·---. SQUARED··- - ... SQUARED 
23 6.000 36.000 5.333 28.444 3.833 14.694 54.000 2916.000 
24 5.833 34.028 5.667 32.111 4.000 16.000 54.000 2916.000 
25 5.833 34.028 5.333 28.444 3.333 11.111 54.000 2916.000 
··-26-----5 :000--36·:ooo--5; ooo·---25; 000·--3. 66 7---13. 444 ·-54. ooo · ·· 2916. ooo · 
27 5.167 26.694 5.333 28.444 3.500 12.250 54.000 2916.000 
28 6.500 42.250 5.000 25.000 3.000 9.000 54.000 2916.000 
29 5.167 26.694 4.500 20.250 3.667 13.444 54.000 2916.000 
-· 30---5;333--28:-444--4·;·000---16·:ooo--4; 000--u; :ooo-· 54. ooo · ·· 2916. ooo 
TTL 45.833 264.139 40.167 203.694 29.000 105.944 432.000 23328.000 
MEAN ____ 5. 741 ___ 5. 000 , _______ 3.481 ___ ·------···-···· ....... __ -···-··-····-





cant differences are found. From this, one can infer that all judges, 
regardless of jurisdictional level, view the prejudicial value of these 
elements about the same. On a limited scale, such a finding would 
indicate that the concept of prejudicial publicity is defined uniformly 
among judges in the state of Oklahoma, whether they sit in local, state 
or federal courts. 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE 
AND PRIOR RECORD 
Source df s. s. m. s. 
Total 269. 490.1510 1.8220 
Between Subjects 29 * * Between Judicial Type 2 * * Between Subject Error 27 * * 
Within Subjects 240 490. 1510 2.0422 
1 Between Criminal Magnitude 2 198.6612 99.3300 
2 Between Prior Record 2 118.1059 59.0520 
1 Interaction Judge X 
Criminal Magnitude 4 3.8359 0.9580 
2 Interaction Judge X 
Prior Record 4 7.0189 1. 7547 
3 Interaction Criminal Magni-
tude X Prior Record 8 24.0889 6.0224 
3 Interaction Judge X Criminal 
Magnitude X Prior Record 8 27.8332 3.4791 
Error 1 54 26.5456 0.4915 
Error 2 54 35.3942 0.6554 













* There are no differences between subjects because of the fixed nature 
of the continuum in Q-methodology. 
126 
When the constituent elements of criminal magnitude and prior 
record interact apart from jurisdictional level, significant differ-
ences are found in the perception of their prejudicial value. The 
probability of obtaining an F-ratio as high as 13.365 by chance is 
less than one time in 100 similar experiments. To the reporter, 
editor and broadcaster, such a finding should raise a flag of caution 
in their minds, because the statistical data suggests that publica-
tion of the morbid details of a crime may not be prejudicial in and 
of themselves, but when disseminated with details of the defendant's 
prior criminal record, significant prejudice may result. 
When the aspect of judicial type is added to this interaction, 
significant differences are still found in the perception of what is 
inherently prejudicial. Therefore, judges do differ in terms of the 
level upon which they rule, in determining whether the morbid details 
of the crime, or the background of the defendant when disseminated, 
provokes substantial predisposition on the part of potential jurors. 
Therefore, the uniformity of meaning as previously suggested may not 
be quite accurate. 
Federal and state judges tended to be similar in their assess-
ments, rating stories that mentioned the defendant's prior record as 
prejudicial. Local judges were more concerned with stories that 
presented the emotional and sensational aspects of the crime. 
When viewed in light of the semantic environment, these results 
once again affirm the fact that.prejudicial publicity cannot be 
examined from a single dimension. It invokes interaction: inter-
action between news elements, and between the type of individual 
examining them. 
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To more carefully study these interactions, the significant ele-
ments that have been isolated can be placed in analysis paradigms. 
Using the statistical tool of critical difference between mean preju-
dicial scores, accurate assessments may be mad.e, and therefore, accu-
rate recommendations to the press and judicial communities. 
When the criminal magnitude dimension is broken into its consti-
tuent elements, no significant differences are found between the mean 
prejudicial scores of morbidity and inducement as shown in Table VII. 
This suggests that all judges viewed these two facets as being equal in 
the amount of prejudice produced. 
TABLE VII 
MEAN SCORES FOR CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS 
OF THE CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE DIMENSION 
AS ASSESSED BY THIRTY JUDGES 
Morbidity Inducement 
6.5833 6.6314 




However, both morbidity and inducement were ranked significantly 
higher than the element of little morbidity or inducement. Therefore, 
judges perceived that the common details concerning the perpetration 
of a crime had little probability of predisposing jurors to find the 
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defendant guilty. 
An example of this can be found in story number 45 where it is 
reported that the defendant is passing time before his trial playing 
cards in his jail cell. Or story number 47 where the visit of a local 
tailor to the defendant's jail cell is reported. The reason for the 
visit was to get him decently clothed for. his trial. The majority of 
judges interviewed saw little or no prejudicial value in· these. 
The reasoning behind these differences, however, goes back to how 
individuals structure meaning. Judges believed that when the morbid 
details of the crime (how it was committed, how it affected the victim 
and those surrounding him) were published, it forced the potential 
juror to find a motivation for it, to answer why. Therefore, when 
speculation was added to such stories as to why the crime was committed, 
whether it came from the police, prosecutor, defense attorney, or 
"experts," potential jurors internalized it to reduce tension and un-
certainty. As a result, their. perception of the incident becomes one 
of an open and shut case that only a person with "X" motive could 
commit such a crime and, therefore, is guilty. 
The sensationalism of the press in the past provides adequate 
confirmation of this. In the Sheppard murder case, the media of the 
city of Cleveland, and in particular the Cleveland Press, unleashed a 
barrage of publicity, most of which allowed the general public to 
utilize the reasoning suggested above. In its now infamous front page 
editorial, "Why Don't the Police Quiz the No. 1 Suspe~t?", the Cleve-
land Press asserted: 
Now proved under oath (Sam Sheppard) to be a liar, still free to 
go about his business, shielded by his family, protected by a 
smart lawyer who has made monkeys of the police, ••. carrying 
a gun part of. the time, left free to do whatever he p~1ases, 
Sam Sheppard still hasn't been taken to headquarters. 
To a potential juror trying to find meaning in a gruesome crime, 
little has been left to chance here. He's a liar; he's free to do 
what he pleases; he carries a gun. The conclusion: a person who 
acts in this fashion must be guilty, because innocent people do not 
lie, do not carry a gun, and do not hide from police. Granted, to the 
educated, such a line of inferences seems ridiculous, but to the aver-
age individual, reading day-in, day-out concerning the crime, such 
conclusions are easy to reach. 
Is the public interest and the cause of justice served by such 
publication? On the basis of this and other studies, the author is 
forced to conclude that the public interest is only served when such 
items, particularly those related to a defendant's prior record, are 
published at least after a jury is seated, if not after the trial is 
completed. 
The defendant must have an opportunity to confront those who 
would accuse him, including the media. Dredging up his prior record 
denies him of.the most fundamental right: standing trial only for 
the crimes for which he is accused. 
When the prior record dimension is broken into its constituent 
elements, as illustrated in Table VITI:, one finds no significant differ-
ences between mean scores.for non-criminal deviance and criminal 
interaction. This once again suggests that judges as a whole viewed 
these as equal in terms of the degree of prejudice producedo However, 
normality, or stories concerning the defendant's background that do 
not discuss either socially deviant practices or past interaction 
with the law, produces significantly less prejudice than the other two. 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN SCORES FOR CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS 
OF PRIOR RECORD DIMENSION AS 











Judges once again strongly affirmed the belief that the admission 
or dissemination of information concerning the defendant's previous 
interaction with the law strongly'pr~disposes jurors to use the law of 
identity: Once a criminal, always a criminal. 
However, when the constituent elements of criminal magnitude and 
prior record interact across jurisdictional levels, the inducement and 
non-criminal deviation combination emerges as that which is highest in 
prejudicial value. This is illustrated in Table De.:: 
Therefore, judges held that stories containing alleged motivations 
for the crime and details of previous deviant behavior by the defendant 
produced significant amounts of prejudice. In analyzing this, one must 
again view it in terms of structuring meaning. If a defendant has en-
gaged in some bizarre practice that society as a whole views as deviant, 
that alone is enough to predispose a potential juror to find him guilty 
simply because he is "not like me." Add to this, comments by officials, 
experts, and others, as to the possible motive for the crime, and that 
predisposition is reinforced. 
TABLE IX 
IVJEAN SCORES FOR INTERACTION OF CONSTITUENT 
ELEIVJENTS OF THE CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE AND 
PRIOR RECORD DI1'1ENSIONS AS ASSESSED 
BY THIRTY JUDGES 
Non-Criminal Criminal Normality Non-Criminal 
Deviance Interaction Deviance 
Morbidity 7.0500 6 .4611 6.2389 7.0500 
Inducement 7.3166 6.8166 5.7611 7.3166 
Little Morbidity 5.9666 4.9055 3.4833 5.9666 br Inducement 
Morbidity 7.0500 6.4611 6.2389 7,0500 
Mean Total 6.8456 6.1610 5.4305 6.8456 








Judges as a whole also viewed the combination of morbidity and non-
criminal deviance as being significantly high in prejudice, although the 
magnitude of its ranking is not as great as inducement and non-criminal 
deviance. Here again the morbidity element would appear to function as 
a reinforcement factor for a predisposition that is already present by 
virtue of the non-criminal deviance element. 
This interaction also demonstrates a possible inconsistency in 
judges' thought patterns. Many of the respondents constantly talked 
about publication of a defendant's past criminal record. However, it 
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would appear that when the facet of the prior record dimension inter-
acts with criminal magnitude dimension, such publication is downgraded 
significantly in terms of possible prejudicial value. This might sug~ 
gest that publication of prior record is a "hobby horse" issue for 
judges in general, and doesn't enter into their deliberations as much 
as they believe. 
Significant differences were also found when these two dimensions 
interacted with judicial type based on jurisdictional level. That 
interaction is illustrated in Table X. 
Federal judges, when interacting with the constituent elements of 
criminal magnitude and prior record, ranked the combination of induce-
ment and non-criminal deviance as b~ing significantly highest in terms 
of creating adverse prejudice. In other words they viewed statements 
concerning the reasons or motivations for the crime, as well as details 
concerning the defendant's deviant behavior as most likely to predispose 
potential jurors to find him guilty. The only combination which did not 
exceed the critical difference was that of morbidity and non-criminal 
deviance. Thus it would seem that either aspect of the criminal magni-
tude dimension when linked with information concerning deviant behavior 
of the defendant will produce significant prejudice in the opinion of 
federal judges. 
When compared with their state and local counterparts, no signifi-
cant differences are found in their perceptions of the prejudicial value 
of morbidity and non-criminal deviance. Judges at all levels viewed 
this combination as being equal in terms of producing prejudice. The 
magnitude of local judges' assessments is greater than federal, although 
not enough to be statistically significant. 
TABLE X 
MEAN SCORES FOR COMBINATIONS OF ELEMENTS 
OF CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE DIMENSION AND 
PRIOR RECORD DIMENSION WHEN 
ASSESSMENTS ARE DIVIDED 
BY JURISDICTIONAL LEVEL 
Jurisdic- ---------Morbidity--------- --------Inducement-------- Little Morbidity or Inducement 
tional Non- Criminal Non- Criminal Non- Criminal 
Level Criminal Inter- Normal- Criminal Inter- Normal- Criminal Inter- Normal-
Deviance action ity Deviance action ity Deviance action ity 
Federal 7.250 6.854 5!333 7.625 6.604 6.104 6.146 4.625 3.458 
State 6.628 6.782 5.987 7.064 7.051 5,962 6.013 5.013 3.500 
Local 7.481 5.648 7.407 7,407 6.667 5. 167 5,741 5.000 3.481 
Federal 7,250 6.854 5.333 7,625 6.604 6. 104 6. 146 4.625 3.458 
Mean Total 7. 150 6.534 6.014 7,430 6.731 5.834 6 .o 11 4.815 3.474 









Judges also concurred in their ranking the inducement and non-
criminal deviance combination the highest in terms of statistical 
significance. Therefore, all judges view statements concerning the 
reasons for the crime, when they interact with statements concerning 
the defendant's deviant behavior, as being inherently prejudicial. 
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State judges disagreed with their federal counterparts in the 
assessment of the inducement and criminal interaction combination, 
ranking it almost equal with the inducement and non-criminal deviance 
combination. Therefore, state judges may be best characterized by 
their concern over statements that deal with the motivations or reasons 
for the commission of a crime when they are backed up with information 
concerning the defendant's past history. 
Apart from these considerations, state judges appear to be in sub-
stantial agreement with federal judges over what news elements contribute 
to prejudice. 
Local judges differed clearly in their assessments of the criminal 
magnitude and prior record dimension. As a group, they rated the com-
bination of morbidity and non-criminal deviance the highest. This con-
firms what has been said of them previously, that they are primarily 
concerned with the highly emotional aspects of criminal reporting and, 
in particular, the morbid details and statements concerning deviant 
behavior on the part of the defendant. While there was no statistical 
difference between local judges and their federal counterparts on this 
combination, local judges did rate it significantly higher than did 
state judges. 
These judges also ranked morbidity and normality significantly 
high, with no difference between their assessment of morbidity and 
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non-criminal deviance and it. Therefore, they reaffirm their view that 
substantial prejudice results from dissemination of the sensational 
aspects of the crime, even when linked with the ordinary aspects of the 
defendant's background. 
Local judges also differ significantly from federal and state 
judges in their assessment of the prejudicial value of publishing a de-
fendant's prior criminal record. They rank it significantly low in com-
parison to the others when it is linked with morbidity, and about equal 
when it is linked with inducement and little morbidity or inducement. 
Since local judges tend to handle first-time offenders, such a finding 
should be expected. 
Therefore, we may summarize these results as follows: 
1) Federal judges may be characterized as non..,.criminal deviance 
oriented. They view any story combination containing this element as 
significantly prejudicial, especially when it is linked with inducement. 
2) State judges may be characterized as inducement oriented. They 
view any story dealing with the motivations for the crime as strongly 
prejudicial, particularly when linked with either non-criminal deviance 
or criminal interaction. 
3) Local judges may be characterized as morbidity oriented, view-
ing any story that deals with the morbid and sensational aspects of the 
crime as inherently prejudicial, particularly when it is linked with 
non-criminal deviance or normality. 
Criminal Magnitude-Ethnic Background 
The analysis matrix for this combination of dimensions is given in 
Table XI. These represent the mean scores for each judge's assessment 
TABLE XI 
TYPE VI ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE 
AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND 
FEDERAL JUDGES 
MORBIDITY IIIDUCEMEHT 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHIHC M!IIORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHtlIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE 
JUDGE ... .. SQUARED ____ . ... SQU/\RED _____ ·sQU,\REif S'lU1\RED SQUARED 
l 6.667 44.444 7.167 51.361 6.000 36.000 7.167 51. 361 7.333 53.778 5.667 
2 7.667 58. 778 6.000 36.000 5.667 32. 111 7.333 53. 778 8.500 72.250 4.667 
3 6.333 40.111 6.833 46.694 6.000 36.000 7.500 5~.250 8.167 66.694 4.833 
·-· 4 · -- 6. ooo·--- 36; ooo--6 :16r--·38. 028·-·-- 6. ooo ··-·- 36. ooo ---··1 .167 · 51.361 ·····- 9.000 ·81.000·· ·4.667 
5 7.000 49.000 6.500 42.250 5.833 34.028 7.167 51.361 8.833 78.028 5.333 
6 8.167 6 6. 6 94 6.333 40.111 5.667 32 .111 6.500 42.250 t,. 66 7 75.111 4.333 
7 7.000 49.000 6.833 46.694 6.000 36.000 6.667 44.444 8.500 72.250 4.833 
--- g-·----6 :833·---46 :694--5:333--46 .694 --·· 6 :ooo--36 .ooo--- 6 .5oo · 42.250 - 8 .833 ··-· 18;028 4.500 
9 6.667 44.444 4.000 16.000 6.500 42.250 7.333 53.778 7.500 
TTL 62.333 435.166 56.667 363.833 53.667 320.500 63.333 446.833 75.333 
8.479 MEAH ____ 6 ;95g--·-----5;533------ ---- 5 :896·--- --- -- ---··7. 000 
··-------
LITTLE MORBIDITY OR INDUCEMENT 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL JUDGE....... .. -----SQUARED____ ···--··-- SQUARED -·- .. SQUARED .. 
1 4.000 16.000 5.167 26.694 4.833 23.361 54.000 
2 4.333 18.778 5.333 28.444 4.500 20.250 54.000 
3 5.000 25.000 4.667 21.773 4.667 21.778 54.000 
- ·4 -··-·- 5·;16r·---· 26 :6 94---4 ;333----- 23: 361 - ·- 5. o oo ------ 25. ooo -· 54. o oo 
5 4.667 21.778 4.000 16.000 4.667 21.778 54.000 
6 4.833 23.361 4.667 21.778 4.833 23.361 54.000 
7 5.000 25.000 4.667 21.778 4.500 20.250 54.000 
---·· a----··5: ooo ---25. 000--l'i :-a33 --23: 36 r-·-4. 667 ___ 21. 778 -- 54. ooo 
9 5.167 26.694 7.167 51.361 4.000 16.000 54.000 
TTL 43.167 208.305 45.333 234.555 41.667 193.556 486.000 




































CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC NINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETIHHC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCOP.E SC'JP.E 
JUDGE .. ... -···SQUARED ______ - SQUARED SQUARED SQUA!sED SQUIIRED SQl/tf·/ED 
10 7.167 51.361 7.000 49.000 7. 333 53.778 7.167 51.361 6.667 44.4'14 4.833 23.361 
11 5.167 26.694 7.000 49.000 4.833 23.361 7.333 6 I. 361 6.667 44.444 4.333 18.778 
12 7.667 58. 778 5.000 25.000 8.167 66.694 7.500 56.250 7.833 61.361 4.500 20.250 
-- 13·-·-·6.333 ··--40:111--6:a33------45_594·-·-· 6.000 --· · 36.ooo 7.500 56.2~;0· 8. 16 7 66.694 4.833 23.361 
14 6.167 38.028 7.667 58. 778 5.333 28.444 7.667 5/l. 778 8.000 6'1.000 4.500 20.250 
15 6.667 44.444 7.167 51.361 6.667 44.444 6.500 42.250 8.500 72.250 4.833 23. 361 
16 6.333 40.111 5.667 32. 111 6.333 40.111 6. 0 0 0 36.000 8. 333 69.4'14 6.000 36.000 
--·11 -·-· --6: ooo·-- 35·:000--6: 16 7----33. 02a ---·- 5·: o oo --·--35. o oo --·-- 7.161 ..... 51.361 .... 9.000 . 81. 000 4.667 21.178 
18 7.167 51.361 5.667 32. 111 7.167 51.361 7.667 58.778 8.167 66 .6H 4 .16 7 17.361 
19 5.667 32 .111 7.500 56.250 5.333 28.4'14 7.167 51.361 9.000 81.000 5. 16 7 26.69'1 
20 7.167 51.361 7.167 51.361 7.667 58. 778 6.333 40.111 7.500 56.250 5.333 28. '•'t 4 
21 ··-- 6 i333 --40:111--7: 50 0--55. 250 ··-·· 6. 000 ·--36. 000 ----- 6. 66 7 . ··4r,.444·· ll. 50 0 ·-12.2so ··-· ·5.833 3'1. 028 
22 7.500 56.250 6.500 42.250 8.667 75.111 7.167 51.361 7.000 49.000 4.167 17.361 
TTL 85.333 566.722 86.833 588.194 85.500 578.527 92.333 659.666 103.333 828.833 63.167 311. 027 MEAN --- L5oo··-------------6:487 __________ ···---- 6: 410 -·---··- -· .... - ···----- 7 .115 7.987 ·· · r1.974 . . 
LITTLE MORBIDITY OR IHDUCEMENT 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL 
JUDGE......... --·--·- SQUARED··-----· . --·· -SQUARED ·-··-· -·---· SQUARED SQUARED 
10 4.000 16.000 5.500 30.250 4.333 18.778 54.000 2916:000' 
11 7.000 49.000 4.500 20.250 6.667 44.444 54.000 2916.000 
12 4.167 17.361 5.167 26.694 4.000 16.000 54.000 2916.000 
-13 --· 5; 000 ----·25: 000--·4 .-66r--21 :778 ·----·4. 66 7 ·---- 2L 778 --54. 00 O . 2 916. 00 O . 
14 4.333 18.778 6.333 40.111 4.000 16.000 54.000 2916.000 
15 4.333 18.778 4.000 16.000 5.333 28.444 54.000 2916.000 
16 5.333 28.444 4.833 23.361 5.167 26.694 54.000 2916.000 
--1 ,------ 5 :161--26 :694---4 ;333--23 :361- 5: 000 --- 25. 000 -- 54. 00 0 . 2 916. 00 0 
18 4.000 16.000 5.333 28.444 4.667 21.778 54.000 2916.000 
19 4.833 23.361 4.167 17.361 5.167 26.694 54.000 2916.000 
20 4.167 17.361 4.833 23.361 3.833 14.694 54.000 2916.000 
-- 21 ··--,L 157--17;·361--4-: 667--21 ~773----4: 333·---18; 773--54: 000 ····- 2 916. 0 00-
22 4.833 23.361 4.333 18.778 3.833 14.694 54.000 2916.000 
TTL 61.333 297.500 63.167 311.527 61.000 293.777 702.000 37908.000 
MEAw·-4·;744·--------5-:1]77--------· -·-·-- 4. 705 ·----····---· ----- ··-· 




TABLE XI (Continued) 
LOCAL JUDGES-
IIIDUCENEtH MORBIDITY 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHIHC MIIIORITY CUSTOM LITHE EHltlIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE 
JUDGE-·-··, ···--·-·sQUARED ______ --·---sQUARrn·----- - ----SQUARED .... SQUARED SQUARED SOU1\REO 
23 6.833 46.694 6.333 40, 111 7.833 61. 361 6.333 40.111 7 .333 53.778 4.167 17. 361 
24 5.667 32 .111 6.333 40.111 7.500 56.250 6.833 46.694 7.500 56.250 4.667 21.778 
25 6.667 44.444 6.333 40 .111 7.167 51. 361 7. 0 0 0 49.000 7.833 61. 361 4.500 20.250 
-·- 26 --- 6 ;500 ----42 :250--·5;500-··--30; 250 ·--·a. ooo ----- 64. ooo -·7. 333 53.778··-----7.167 51.361 . 4. 833 ···- 23.361 
27 6.667 44.444 5.833 34.028 7.167 51. 361 6.833 46.694 7.167 51. 361 6.333 ,,0.111 
28 5.833 34.028 7.000 49.000 7.333 53. 778 6.500 42.250 7.500 56.250 5.333 2B .4'14 
6.667 44.444 8.000 64. 000 6.667 44.444 7.667 58.778 5.000 25.000 29 6.667 44.444 --30----·-6:161---33:-02a--5;a3~46--:694---r:333--53.na----7:ooo --····- -4?.ooo ---··-·1.833 ------61.361 --·---- 5.500 ----·-30.250 
TTL 51.000 326.444 50.833 324.750 60.333 455.888 54.500 371.972 60.000 
7.444 
450.500 40.333 
4.944 ':l~AN ____ !.:.~.!~ 6. 370 -------~:-~~7_ _____________ ~-'. 852 - -··---------- .. 
TTL 198.666 1328.331 194.333 1276.776 199.501 1354,915 210.167 1478.470 238.667 1912.721 148.000 
LITTLE MORBIDITY OR INDUCEMENT 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL 
JUDGE······ .. --· -·--···sQUAREo·--··-- ------SQUARED______ - .... SQUARED·-- - --- - SQUARED 
23 6.167 38.028 5.167 26.694 3.833 14.694 54.0-00 2916.000 
24 5.667 32.111 5.333 28.444 4.500 20.250 54.000 2916.000 
25 5.333 28.444 4.833 23.361 4.333 18.778 54;000 2916.000 
-·· 26··--5.167 -----·25: 694--5; 333----23-;444-- 4. l6r--·-11; 351--··--54. oo o ··· 2916. ooo 
27 4.833 23.361 5.167 26.694 4.000 16.000 54.000 2916.000 
28 5.000 25.000 5.500 30.250 4.000 16.000 54.000 2916.000 
29 5.000 25.000 5.167 26.694 3.167 10.028 54.000 2916.000 
-· 3u---·4;g33--2:r.·361--li·:·333·--13-a1s·--4:u1--17;361--·54. ooo --- 2916. ooo -
TTL 42.000 222.000 40.833 209.361 32.167 130.472 432.000 23328.000 
MEAN 5.204 5.019 4.000 ______ ..::..;. ----·------ --------·--·-----·-·--·-·------·----- -·--·-·--------







of the six stories for the nine combinations. Criminal magnitude once 
again is statements in news stories which describe the morbid details 
of the crime and the motivations for it, while ethnic background are 
statements in news stories which label the defendant as a member of a 
minority group, or refer to the customs of that group. The ethnic back-
ground dimension is broken into three constituent elements: minority 
status, custom, and little ethnic. 
The results of this analysis of variance among the scores for these 
combinations of news elements are summarized in Table XII. 
Significant differences were found in the perception of the consti-
tuent elements of criminal magnitude and ethnic background in terms of 
their prejudicial value. The probability of obtaining just by chance 
F-ratios as high as 202.096 and 70,821 for the respective dimensions is 
less than one time in 100 similar experiments. Thus, as previously 
stated, this indicates that judges can adequately differentiate between 
concepts that they view as being prejudicial and those that are not. 
Just as with the dimensions of criminal magnitude and prior record, 
when each interacts separately with judicial type, no significant dif-
ferences are found. This would indicate that the jurisdictional level 
of the judge has little to do with his assessment of what kinds of items 
are prejudicial. However, when two major dimensions i~teract with the 
type of judge, significant differences are found. Therefore, one must 
again conclude that there is substantial disagreement between jurisdic-
tional levels over the potential prejudice of these elements. 
When the ethnic background dimension is broken into its constituent 
elements, no significant differences are found between minority status 
and custom. However, both are rated significantly higher than the 
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element of little ethnic. One can therefore conclude that judges at 
all levels view minority status and custom about equal in terms of 
creating prejudice. This is illustrated in Table XIII. 
TABLE XII 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE 
AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND 
Source df s. s. m. s. 
Total 269 470.6040 1. 7490 
Between Subjects 29 * * Between Judicial Type 2 * * Between Subject Error 27 * * 
Within Subjects 240 470.6040 1.9608 
1 Between Criminal Magnitude 2 198.6612 99.3306 
2 Between Ethnic Background 2 59.4620 29.7310 
1 Interaction Judge X 
Crimiral Magnitude 4 3.8359 0.9580 
2 Interaction Judge X 
Ethnic Background 4 2.7079 0.6760 
3 Interaction Criminal Magni-
tude X Ethnic Background 4 88.9568 22.2392 
3 Interaction Judge X Criminal 
Magnitude X Ethnic Back-
ground 8 20.5432 2.5667 
Error 1 54 26.5456 0.4915 
Error 2 54 22.6721 0.4198 













* There are no significant differences between subjects due to the fixed 
nature of the continuum in Q-methodology. 
While little research has been done in attempting to determine the 
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effect of a defendant's ethnic background on potential jurors, one can 
still infer that, with the use of labels in American society, signifi-
cant prejudice must result. If it is an ethnic label or calling some-





MEAN SCORES FOR CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF 
THE ETHNIC BACKGROUND DIMENSION 
AS ASSESSED BY THIRTY JUDGES 
Custom 
6.4703 
Critical Difference= 0.5821 
Little Ethnic 
5.3592 
When the criminal magnitude and ethnic background dimensions inter-
act apart from jurisdictional level, .the combination of inducement and 
custom emerges as singularly highest in terms of statistical signifi-
cance. This is illustrated in Table XIV. Thus, judges as a group 
viewed stories containing explanations for the commission of a crime 
and details of custom contiguous to the defendant's ethnic background 
as highly prejudicial. 
The minority and inducement combination is ranked second highest 
in terms of possible prejudice. Thus it would appear that either major 
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aspect of the ethnic background dimension links with the inducement 
element to produce significant prejudice. Such a conclusion suggests 
that even the simplest label such as "Mexican-American," "Black" or 
"Hispanic," when used innocently can produce prejudice if it is utilized 




MEAN SCORES FOR INTERACTION OF CONSTITUENT 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE AND 
ETHNIC BACKGROUND DIMENSIONS AS 
ASSESSED BY THIRTY JUDGES 
Minority Custom Little Minority 
Ethnic 
6.622 6.477 6.650 6.622 
7.005 7.955 4.933 7.005 
Little Morbidity 4.883 4.977 4.494 4.883 or Inducement 
Morbidity 6.622 6.477 6.650 6.622 
Mean Total 6.283 6.471 5.681 6.283 








To demonstrate the effect of labeling, one can look to Charles 
Silberman's lengthy study of "Race, Culture and Crime." Using the label 
"Black" as an example, he concludes: 
Negative symbolism about blackness is built into our language: 
'Black connotes death, mourning, evil, corruption, and sin,' 
while 'white' implies 'purity, goodness, and rebirth.' The 
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black sheep is one who goes a3~ray; and when he does, he receives 
a 'black mark' on his record. 
Realizing that this is the case, it behooves the professional 
journalist to avoid using such labels completely. They contribute 
nothing themselves, and as seen here, when mixed with other factors, 
become a volatile quantity that eventually bursts into outright preju-
dice and hostility. Therefore, the Task Force on the Administration of 
Justice concluded in 1967: "Justice is most seriously threatened when 
prejudice distorts its capacity to operate fairly and equally, whether 
the prejudice that blinds justice operates purposefully or unintention-
ally."33 
Such prejudice is also fueled by ignorance of customs and practices 
unique to that group's ethnic heritage. By not providing adequate news 
coverage of such practices in a consistent fashion, severe distortion 
takes place in the mind of the reader when they are reported in connec-
tion with a negative event such as a crime. The reader then assumes that 
such practices deviate from society's norms and are therefore evil. 
From Table XV we see that federal judges rated the combination of 
inducement and custom highest in terms of prejudice, although the magni-
tude is statistically high only when compared with local judges. Thus 
the tendency to link the inducement element into their structure of pre-
judice is seen again. 
This suggests that federal judges are most concerned when state-
ments concerning the reasons for a crime are directly linked to a custom 
or practice of a minority group. Story number 32 which received the 
highest ranking among that group tied the reason for the murders to a 
lack of self-esteem which is a custom or norm for migrant workers. 
Story number 19 which received the second highest ranking from federal 
TABLE XV 
MEAN SCORES FOR COMBINATIONS OF ELEMENTS 
OF THE CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE DIMENSION 
AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND WHEN 
ASSESSMENTS ARE DIVIDED 
BY JUDICIAL LEVEL 
Jurisdic- --------Morbidity--~------ --------Inducement------- Little Morbidity or Inducement 
tional Little Little Little 
Level Minority Custom Ethnic Minority Custom Ethnic Minority Custom Ethnic 
Federal 6.958 6.583 5.896 7.000 8.479 4.854 4.750 4.771 · 4. 708 
State 6.500 6.487 6.410 7.115 7.987 4.974 4.744 5.077 4.705 
Local 6.500 6.370 7.667 6.852 7.444 4.944 5.204 5.019 4.000 
Federal 6.958 6.583 5.896 7.000 8.479 4.854 4.750 4.771 4.708 
Mean Total 6.729 6.505 6.467 6.991 8.164 4.906 4.862 4.909 4.530 












judges suggested that marital difficulties in the life of a defendant 
was a reason for the commission of the crime, and that such marital 
difficulties were part of the migrant workers' social customs. Thus, 
such combinations generate the notion of an open and shut case and there-
fore predispose potential jurors to find the defendant guilty on the 
basis of information received outside the courtroom. 
This once again raises the question of media coverage given to 
minorities. If such groups are only talked about in light of negative 
connotations, such as criminal acts, poverty, and so forth, then any 
time a minority is mentioned, non-minority members will attacb a nega-
tive meaning to it, in essence the open and shut case fallacy. 
Also we see extra judicial statements. Several of the other stories 
containing the elements of inducement and custom are the results of 
interviews with experts, trying to give meaning to the crime through 
interpolation of the defendant's ethnic heritage. Such stories, as 
already indicated, are looked upon wi~h distaste by the judges in this 
state, but now empirical evidence would seem to say to the reporter or 
broadcaster not to speculate, not even to look for speculation, for 
doing so will result in denial of another individual's Constitutional 
rights. 
Federal judges also rated the combination of inducement and minor-
ity status significantly higher than most of the other combinations. 
Thus the concern again is over dissemination of statements concerning 
motivation for the crime, when linked to any facet of the defendant's 
ethnic background. This reinforces the suggestion made earlier that 
even stating that a defendant is a member of a certain minority group 
can trigger a response which will lead to significant prejudice. 
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An overstated example of this is found in Raymond Fosdick's con-
clusion on his study of American police methods prior to World War I. 
In commenting on southern police methods, he stated: 
There are three classes of homicide. If a nigger kills a white 
man, that's murder. If a white man kills a nigger, that's 
justifiabl~ homi3~de. If a nigger kills another nigger, that's 
one less nigger. 
Granted this exaggerates the problem, but it makes its point: one's 
definition of a criminal act is tainted by the .racial labels involved. 
Compared to state and local judges, federal judges' assessment of 
the inducement and custom dimensions was.similar to state judges, but 
significantly higher than that of local judges. All three groups rated 
the inducement and minority combination equally, thus elevating the 
importance attributed to racial labeling in stories containing reasons 
for the crime, be they concrete or speculative. 
Local judges concluded their trend towards a high morbidity orien-
tation, by ranking the combination of morbidity and little ethnic sig-
nificantly higher than most of the other combinations, and higher than 
federal and state judges viewed them. However, the magnitude of the 
morbidity ranking overall goes down as aspects of minority status, and 
customs are linked to them. This would seem to suggest that local 
judges perceive aspects of a defendant's ethnic background as less 
prejudicial than the morbid details of the crime itself. However, 
such a trend does not follow when ethnic background is linked with the 
reasons for the crime. 
In summation: 
1) Judges at all levels view the interaction of inducement and 
custom news elements as being significantly high in prejudicial value. 
2) Federal and state judges may be characterized as inducement 
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oriented when linked with any aspect of a defendant's ethnic background. 
3) Local judges retain a strong morbidity orientation; however, 
morbidity's linkage with ethnic background reduces it. Local judges 
also seem to be inconsistent in viewing the ethnic background dimension 
overall. 
Prior Record-Ethnic Background 
The analysis matrix for the final combination of dimensions is 
given in Table XVI. Both of these have been previously examined in 
relation to the criminal magnitude dimension. 
The results of this analysis of variance between the scores for 
these combinations of news elements are summarized in Table XVII. 
As would be expected, significant differences were found between 
constituent elements of the prior record and ethnic background dimension. 
The major finding, however, is in the significant difference when the 
type of judge interacts with the prior record dimension. The probabil-
ity of obtaining such significance by chance is less than give times 
in 100 similar experiments. This suggests that when federal, state and 
local judges examine the prejudicial value of publication of a defen-
dant's prior criminal record or prior evidence of social deviance, there 
is substantial disagreement. However, this does not carry over into 
interaction of type of judge with ethnic background. There are neither 
significant differences when examined singularly or when combined with 
the prior record dimension. 
When prior record and ethnic background interact apart from juris-
dictional level, significant differences are found. The probability of 
obtaining an F-ratio as high as 42.3141 by chance is less than one time 
TABLE XVI 




MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC MINORITY 
CRIMINAL INTERACTION 
CUSTOM LITTLE 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE JUDGE ...... . . - SQUARED____ ···- ..... SQUARED·----- . . -·· .. SQUARE[) SQUARED 
1 6.833 46.694 8.167 66.694 5.667 32.111 6.000 36.000 7.000 
SQUARED 
49.000 6.000 
2 6.500 42.250 7.833 61.361 4,167 17.361 6.500 42.250 6.500 42.250 6.333 
3 7.167 51.361 7.833 61.361 7.167 51.361 6.000 36.000 7.167 51.361 4.000 
ETIHHC 
SCORE 






23.361 5 6.833 46.694 7.667 58.778 7.000 49.000 6.333 40.111 7.167 51.361 4.833 
6 7.500 56.250 8.167 66.694 6.333 40.111 5.667 32.111 6.667 44.4-44 4.667 
7 7.167 51.361 8.000 64.000 7.167 51.361 5.333 28.444 7.333 53.778 4.000 
----s--r;;ooo--3(;-:ooo---"1:833 ___ !il:361--·6;a33---46. 694 ---·-·6 .167 ····----.- 38. 02s ··-·-· s .161 
9 6.500 42.250 6.667 44.444 5.50~ 30.250 6.667 . 44.444 6.500 
.. 66.;694 ...... 3.500 
42.250 5.500 
TTL 60.667 410.889 69.500 538.472 56.667 364.944 55.667 346.388 64.833 470.583 42.833 
MEAN-·--6·;771· ;354·· 6:396--------------·-6.125 ······--· ··-·· -·--·-····1.2?2 ····- ..... - ........ 4.667 
NORMALITY 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL JUDGE _______ .. ··-· ····-·sQUARED" ____ .. ··---·--sQUARED _____ . . ···· sQUARE[) _____ .. . SQUARED. 
1 5.000 25.000 4.500 20.250 4.833 23.361 54.000 2916.000 
2 6.333 40.111 5.500 30.250 4.333 18.778 54.000 2916.000 
3 5.667 32.111 .4.667 21.778 4.333 18.778 54.000 2916.000 
--- ·4--5 ;·161-··-2r;:-r;94--·1L·333---1a :11s--4 .833 ·---·23. 361- 54. ooo ·--· 2916; ooo-
5 5.667 32.111 4.500 20.250 4.000 16.00P 54.000 2916.000 
6 6.333 40.111 4.833 23.361 3.833 14.694 54.000 2916.000 
7 6.167 38.028 4.667 21.778 4.167 17.361 54.000 2916.000 
-s--6:161--3s-:02s-i.:500·--20:250-li":s33·--23;3n--·- 54:000 ·····- 2916 .ooo 
9 6.000 36.000 5.500 30.250 5.167 26.694 54.000 2916.000, 










TABLE XVI (Continued) 
STATE JUDGES 
NON-CRIMINAL DEVIANCE CRIMINAL INTERACTION 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE 
JUDGE... . ... SQUAREo·-----·· ·-··--sQUARED --··· SQUARED - SQUARED SQUARr:D SQUAll[O 
10 5.167 26.694 6.000 36.000 5.500 30.250 6.833 46.694 7.833 61.361 4.833 23.361 
11 6.833 46.694 6.333 40.111 4.667 21.778 8.500 72.250 6.667 44.444 6.000 36.000 
12 6.667 44.444 6.500 42.250 7.500 56.250 6.167 38.028 7.000 49.000 4.833 23.361 
····13·-··---·7;~61--- 5r:361--1-:·a3r-- 6 L"361-····-··7.161 ·-·--- 51. 361 - ·-·-· 6. o o o ·· ···-·, 36. oo o · -· · 1.161 ·· ··· ·· ·51. 361 -·- -···4. o o o ··· 16. o o o 
14 6.667 44.444 8.500 72.250 3.500 12.250 5.667 32.111 8.333 69.444 5.667 32.111 
15 5.833 34.028 7.833 61.361 6.667 44.444 6:500 42.250 8.500 72.250 5.500 30.250. 
16 6.500 42.250 6.333 40.111 7.833 61.361 6.000 36.000 7.167 51.361 3.667 13.444 
--17···--·-·6; 16 7--· -38·;028~:-333 --53 :778 ---·6; 333··-·-·46 ;6 94 ---7. 0 OD .. ---·-- 49. DO O ·-··-· 8. 333 -· -·····6 9 '. 444 -·-- 4. 00 0 16. 0 0 0 
18 5.833 34.028 7.000 49.000 5.833 34.028 6.667 44.444 7.500 56.250 4.833 23.361 
19 6.667 44.444 7.667 58.778 5.667 32.111 5.833 34.028 8.167 66.694 5.333 28.444 
20 6.333 40.111 6.500 42.250 7.667 58.778 5.667 32.111 7.500 56.250 4.667 21.778 
~- 21 -·---7 ;·000--49:-000·--,:·soo--s& :2so---·6 ;sou---- 42: 250--5. soo - ----30; 250--- ·1. 533·----·- 61. 361 -···· 4. 667 -·- ·· ·- 21. 778 
22 6.500 42.250 7.167 51.361 7.500 56.250 6.667 44.444 6.667 44.444 4.333 18.778 
TTL 83. 333 
MEAw---6-:410 
537'. 777 92.500 664.861 82.833 547.805 83.000 537.611 98.667 753.666 62.333 
-----~.077-----------6.218-·---·.·--··--···--6.385 ·--·-· -·-·· ----·7_577---·---· ···-·- ····--· 4.885 
NORMALITY 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL 
JUDGE" .. ·-· ... -· ····-·--""SQUARED--····· . ·--·-SQUARED·----··· ····-·sQUARED .. --··. . SQUARED 
10 6.333 40.111 5.333 28,444 6.167 38.028 54.000 2916.000 
11 4.667 21.778 5.167 26.694 5.167 26.694 54.000 2916.000 
12 6.500 42.250 4.500 20.250 4.333 18.778 54.000 2916.000 
··-13-·--- 5. 661·---·32 :111--4: 667---2r:11a ·----·4. 333 ------18. 778 -·- 54. ooo ·· ·· 2916. ooo 
14 5.833 34.028 5.167 26.694 4.667 21.778 54.000 2916.000 
15 5.167 26.694 3.333 11.111 4.667 21.778 54.000 2916.000 
16 5.167 26.694 5.333 28.444 6.000 36.000 54.000 2916.000 
--· 17---5; 161---26 :694-----i. ;333 --13 :778 ·-4 ;333·-·--23: 351 ·--·54. 000 2916. 000 
18 6.333 40.111 4.667 21.778 5.333 28.444 54.000 2916.000 
19 5.167 26.694 4.833 23.361 4.667 21.778 54.000 2916.000 
20 5.667 32.111 5.500 30.250 4.500 20.250 54.000 2916.000. 
·- ·21 ···-- 4 :·661--2r:11a--5:·333·--·2s·:44lj-·-5: ooo· ---25·, ooo--5q; ooo --··· 2916. ooo -
22 6.333 40.111 4.000 16.000 4.833 23.361 54.000 2916.000 
TTL 72.667 411.166 62.167 302.027 64.500 324.028 702.000 37908.000 





TABLE XVI (Continued) 
LOCAL JUDGES 
NON-CRIMINAL DEVIANCE CRIMINAL INTERACTION 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETIIIIIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE -SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE JUDGE··· ·-----·-sQUARED' ____ . - ... -··-sQUARED _____ . -···· SQUARED···-··... SQUARED . SQUARED SQU1\l!ED 
23 6.667 44.444 6.833 46.694 7.500 56.250 6.167 38.028 6.667 .44.444 4.167 17.361 
24 5.833 34.028 7.000 49.000 7.333 53.778 6.33~ 40.111 7.333 53.778 4.500 20.250 
25 6.167 38.028 7.000 .49.000 7.000 49.000 7.000 49.000 7.500 56.250 4.167 17.361 
- -26- --- 6; 661 ·-----44 ;·444--r:333----·53 :778 ·-···6. 66 r·-·--- 44. 444 --- 6. 333 4 o .111 ·---· 6. 667 --· - -- 44. 4,,4 --- · 4: 161 ·-··· --17: 361 · 
27 6.667 44.444 7.333 53.778 6.667 44.444 5.833 34.028 6.167 38.028 4.667 21.778 
28 6.167 38.028 7.667 58.778 7.167 51.361 5.667 32.111 7.167 51.361 4.667 21.778 
29 6.833 46.694 7.500 56.250 6.167 38.028 5.833 34.028 7.000 49.000 3.833 14.694 














1285.470 219.833 1621.970 194.333 1290.165 186.833 1176.415 219.166 1612.915 139.500 
NORMALITY 
MINORITY CUSTOM LITTLE ETHNIC 
SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE TOTAL TOTAL 
JUDGE"···--·- - ----SQUARED_______ ·--·- SQUARED ·-··- --·-·· SQUARED..... .. SQUARED 
23 6.500 42.250 5.333 28.444 4.167 17.361 54.000 2916.000 
24 6.000 36.000' 4.833 23.361 4.833 23.361 54.000 2916.000 
25 5.833 34.028 4.500 20.250 4.833 23.361 54.000 2916.000 
··· 26 ----- r,; ooo -·-·3r,~ oo o·--·4; oo o ·---·16·: oo o -·--··r, .16 T'·-·--- 38. 028 ·-- 54. o o o ·· ·· 2 916. o o o · 
27 5.833 34.028 4.667 21.778 6.167 38.028 54.000 2916.000 
28 5.500 30.250 5.167 26.694 4.833 23.361 54.000 2916.000 
29 5.667 32.111 5.000 25.000 6.167 38.028 54.000 2916.000 
--· 30-·--r,;-1r,7---33:023--i.·:r;6r---2r:773·-·6:500----42:250 --· 5•L ooo ···-29ir,. ooo · 
TTL 47.500 282.694 








243.778 432.000 23328.000 







in 100 similar experiments. This suggests that when aspects of a de-
fendant's background are disseminated and linked with some parts of his 
ethnic heritage, substantial prejudice is formed. 
TABLE XVII 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIOR RECORD AND 
ETHNIC BACKGROUND 
Source df s. s. m. s. 
Total 269 375.8520 1.3972 
Between Subjects 29 * * Between Judicial Type 2 * * Between Subject Error 27 * * 
Within Subjects 240 375.8520 . :1.5660 
1 Between Prior Record 2 118.1059 59.0529 
2 Between Ethnic Background 2 59.4620 29.7310 
1 Interaction Judge X Prior 
Record 4 7.0189 1. 7547 
2 Interaction Judge X Ethnic 
Background 4 2.7079 0.6769 
3 Interaction Prior Record 
X Ethnic Background 4 77.5366 19.3841 
3 Interaction Judge X Prior 
Record X Ethnic Background 8 3.4736 0.4342 
Error 1 54 35.3942 0.6554 
Error 2 54 22.6721 0.4198 
Error 3 108 49.4800 0.4581 
* There are no differences between subjects because of the 














When the interaction of prior record dimension and judicial type as 
152 
defined by jurisdictional level takes place, one finds substantial 










MEAN SCORES FOR CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS 
OF PRIOR RECORD DIMENSION WHEN 
ASSESSMENTS ARE DIVIDED 
BY JURISDICTIONAL LEVEL 
Non-Criminal Criminal Non-Criminal 
Deviance Interaction Normality Deviance 
6.9197 6.0493 5.0308 6.9197 
6.6324 6.2564 5.1110 6.6324 
6.8541 5.7569 5.3889 6.8541 
6.9197 6.0493 5.0308 6.9197 
6.8314 6.0279 5.1403 6.8314 








Federal judges, when interacting with the constituent elements of 
the prior record dimension, rate the element of non-criminal deviance 
significantly higher than criminal interaction or normality, although 
the relationship between non-criminal deviance and criminal interaction 
is borderline in terms of critical difference. This tends to reinforce 
the trend seen in the examination of the other analyses of variance. 
These judges, as a group, are most concerned about the dissemination of 
any details concerning the defendant's past deviant behavior. 
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State judges, when interacting with the same elements, view the 
prejudicial value of non-criminal deviance and criminal interaction 
about the same. However, both are c;leemed as being more prejudicial 
than normality. This would suggest that state judges view dissemina-
tion of any aspect of the defendant's background, except for routine 
matters, as inherently prejudicial •. Such a comprehensive view tends 
to make state judges seemingly more susceptible to placing severe re~ 
strictions on the media. 
Local judges, when interacting with these elements, concur with 
federal judges on the high prejudicial value of dissemination of details 
concerning the defendant's past deviant behavior. However, they rate 
details concerning criminal interaction and normality about the same. 
Therefore, the trend of downplaying the importance of publication of a 
defendant's prior record continues. 
From Table XIX, judges as a whole ranked the element of non-
criminal deviance and criminal interaction equal in significance when 
linked with the element of custom. Therefore, any story having any com-
bination of these three would be viewed as highly prejudicial to the 
defendant. Therefore, judges may view either for themselves or for the 
people who form juries that certain facets of ethnic background are in 
and of themselves deviant from the norms of society. 
Silberman, in his study previously cited, asserts that this may be 
true for at least one minority group. In studying black crime, he 
states: "A propensity to violence was not part of the cultural baggage 
black Americans brought with them from Africa •••• Violence is some-
thing black Americans learned in this country.rr35 He bases this con-
clusion on the fact that all other major ethnic groups have been able 
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largely to assimilate themselves into the mainstream of American cul-
ture, but for the black who was brought to America in chains, and pos-
sesses skin color which cannot fade into the great American melting 
pot, complete acculturation has not been possible. Therefore, the 
black must find a way to circumvent the system which closes him out. 
Violence has become that way. In the words of a black American folk 
song: 
White man goes to college, 
Nigger to the field; 
White man learns ·to read and3W'ite; 
Poor nigger learns to steal. 
TABLE XIX 
MEAN SCORES FOR . INTE.RACTION OF CONS TI WENT 
ELEMENTS OF PRIOR RECORD AND ETHNIC 
BACKGROUND DIMENSIONS AS ASSESSED 
BY THIRTY JUDGES 
Non-Criminal Criminal Normality Non-Criminal 
Deviance Interaction Deviance 
Minority 6.527 6.227 5.755 6.527 
Custom 7.327 7.305 4.777 7.327 
Little Ethnic 6.477 4.650 4.950 6.477 
Minority 6.527 6.227 5.755 6.527 
Mean Total 6.707 6.102 5.309 6.707 










1) Judges as a whole view the interaction of non-criminal deviance 
with either minority status or custom as significantly prejudicial. 
However, the extent of such interaction varies with jurisdictional 
level. 
2) Federal judges continue to view non-criminal deviance, no mat-
ter what it is linked with, as significantly prejudicial. 
3) State judges take a more comprehensive view on dissemination 
of any material concerning the defendant's background. It seemingly 
is all prejudicial. 
4) Local judges rate non-criminal deviance significantly high, 
particularly when linked with ethnic background. However, they seeming-
ly downplay the effect of dissemination of prior criminal record. 
Summary of Variance Among Judges 
Based upon the analysis of the differences in the respondents' 
assessments of what news elements create the most prejudice, some clear 
conclusions may be drawn. These can take the form of guidelines for 
the media as a whole. They are empirically tested observations that 
can be applied to news situations. 
Overall, judges view the elements of inducement and non-criminal 
deviance as most prejudicial, particularly when they interact with any 
aspect of a defendant's ethnic background. It would seem that if a de-
fendant is a member of a minority group, he already has one strike 
against him in terms of the prejudice created among potential jurors, 
even with the most rational kind of news reporting. Because of this, 
it would seem prudent that the media avoid using any kind of racial 
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labels. It doesn't matter whether a man is an Indian, a Mexican or a 
Black, when he stands before the bar of justice. All that does count 
is that he is a human being entitled to fair treatment by his peers, 
and that he is an American who is entitled to certain inalienable 
rights, including that of being tried by a fair and impartial jury of 
his peers. 
Inducement and non-criminal deviance, as a combinat1on, also con-
tribute to substantial prejudice. Judges view dissemination of any 
details concerning the defendant's deviant behavior as a motive in and 
of itself. When valid or speculative reasons for the crime are con-
tained in the same story, the probability of predisposition on the part 
of potential jurors is highly increased. 
Federal judges can best be characterized as non-criminal deviance 
oriented. Whatever is linked with it in terms of interaction is viewed 
as being strongly prejudicial. Therefore, these respondents would recom~ 
mend that the press withhold or downplay the more bizarre aspects of a 
defendant's past behavior. The only behavior that must be reported, for 
the media to fulfill its First Amendment responsibilities, is the actual 
behavior of the defendant in the commission of the crime as it is 
established by the rules of evidence in the courtroom. 
State judges can best be characterized as inducement oriented. 
Here again the other elements that link up with it to produce signifi-
cant differences may vary, but the inducement dimension is consistently 
rated high. Therefore, these respondents would recommend that the 
press avoid speculation as to a motive for the crime until it is estab-
lished in a court of law. Such speculative reporting is made more 
prejudicial when the information comes from the mouth of an "expert." 
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The rule of thumb should be no expert interviews until they have testi-
fied in court. Over and over, the press has gotten itself into trouble 
by printing the testimony of those who will never be called to the 
witness stand. 
Finally, local judges can best be characterized as morbidity 
oriented. Their concern is that such sensational details as how the 
crime was committed, does not serve the public interest, because it not 
only taints the opinion of the public as a whole, but makes it diffi-
cult to seat a representative jury that is also impartial. 
Intercorrelation and Linkage Analysis 
Now that the differences in the assessments of the thirty judges 
had been analyzed, it was necessary to determine where they were in 
agreement. More correctly, one needs to know what judges are most 
alike in their perceptions apart from the jurisdictional levels which 
separate them. Each judge's scores was compared with the other twenty-
nine with the·amount of agreement being given in terms of an r-value, 
or Pearson Product-Moment correlation. 
This measurement tool does not attempt to measure cause and effect, 
rather it serves as an index of the magnitude and direction of the 
relationship between two sets of measures. R-values, therefore, range 
from -1.00 to +1.00. The.statistical significance of this measure may 
be analyzed as follows: 
0.00 - 0.20 negligible relationship; 
0.20 - 0.40 definite, but small relationship; 
0.40 - 0.70 moderate, but substantial relationship; 
0.70 - 0.90 high, marked relationship; and 
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0.90 - 1.00 very dependable relationship. 37 
Table XX represents the r-values that were found when each of the 
judge's fifty-four scores were compared. Using the scale above, one 
could then examine the magnitude of the relationship between each judge 
and his counterparts as to what constitutes prejudicial publicity. 
From this matrix, analysis can be done which will allow one to 
break down the thirty judges into types, or groups of judges who are in 
basic agreement with one another in their assessments of which elements 




McQuitty's Linkage and Factor Analysis is a simplified means of 
examining the intercorrelation data. The matrix given in Table XX tells 
one the amount of agreement between respondents, but does not break them 
down into clusters which is ultimately what the researcher is looking 
for. The methodology is rather easy. 
One first looks across the matrix and underlines the highest score 
in each column. This indicates that these two individuals are most 
alike in their perception of prejudicial publicity. Additional respon-
dents are added to this reciprocal pair until all underlined entries 
along the rows of the reciprocal pairs are exhausted. The process then 
continues with the next highest pair until all the respondents have 
been assimilated into clusters. 
An analysis of the intercorrelation data for this experiment 
found that nine types of judges emerge out of the thirty respondents. 
The linkage of these clusters is graphically portrayed in Figure 4. 
JUDGE 1 2 
TABLE XX 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF THIRTY JUDGES' 
ASSESSMENTS OF PREJUDICIAL VALUE 
OF·NEWS STORIES 
JUDGES 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.0 0.612 0.542 0.348 0.648 0.664 0.542 0.485 0.436 0.306 
• ...... 2 -·-------- 0 . 612 -- 0 . 0 - ---- 0 : 5 3 0 ..... 0 . 2 2 4 - 0 . 6 5 2 --· 0 : 77 3 -- 0 . 5 5 2 ... 0 .4 0 6 ·--· 0 . 5 4 2 0 . 3 3 9 
3 0.542 0.530 0.0 0.573 0.824 0.748 0.952 0.673 0.230 0.433 
4 0.348 0.224 0.573 0.0 0.673 0.397 0.579 0.867 0.179 0.442 
5 0.648 0.652 0.824 0.673 0.0 0.788 0.858 0.821 0.318 0.412 
· ····-· 6 --··--·-·· o : 6 6 4 ·-o : n 3-· o: 7 4 8-·-o ·:· 391-·- o :1 sa·- o. o · -·· o . 8 o 9 --· o . 6 o o ---- o . 3 9 4 ·· o : 3 2 r · 
7 0.542 0.552 0.952 0.579 0.858 0.809 0.0 0.727 0.248 0.433 
8 0.485 0.406 0.673 0.867 0.821 0.600 0.727 0.0 0.233 0.482 
9 0.436 0.542 0.230 0.179 0.318 0.394 0.248 0.233 0.0 0.252 
--·1 o ··- ------ o : 3 o 6 -·o : 3 3 9 -· o·: 4 3 3--0·;· ri 4 2 ··-o : 412-- o : 3 2 r- o : 4 3 3 ·-·· o ·. 4 a 2 ---o : 2 5 z-- o . o .. ., ·· 
11 0.306 0.342 0.367 0.452 0.427 0.245 0.324 0.400 0.085 0.324 
12 0.521 0.452 0.667 0.555 0.639. 0.624 0.694 0.603 0.309 0.482 
13 0.542 0.530 1.000 0.573 0.824 0.7ti8 0.952 0.673 0.230 0.433 
·····14 -------o :6 6 4·-··o :6 o o-o-;A10-·o:-30 9-·o :·so 9-- o: 533-·· o: 44 2-·o: 382-·o: 36 r--···o: 37 6. 
15 0.585 0.512 0.673 0.676 0.779 0.624 0.694 0.706 0.227 0.485 
16 0.197 0.148 0.497 0.730 0.621 0.327 0.518 0.700 0.124 0.273 
17 0.348 0.224 0.573 1.000 0.673 0.397 0.579 0.867 0.179 0.442 
-···1a·------·o--: 44 s···-·o: 4 7 9-0·~·506·--o: 6 o 5-- o: s10·--o: 46 4 ·-·o: 536 ·- o: 61s·-o: 415··-· o. 83 o · 
19 0.497 0.585 0.718 0.600 0.752 0.627 0.718 0.609 0.273 0.336 
20 0.464 0.339 0.618 0.573 0.630 0.548 0.661 0.664 0.276 0.445 
21 0.588 0.530 0.642 0.642 0.739 0.648 0.676 0.736 0.461 0.452 
---·22-·-- o: 5 o 5·-0 ·: 3ss-o·. 555·--0~·521-0·: 553-0 :s91·-··o;694·-o .67 o --·o: 252 -·o: 455··· 
23 0.406 0.306 0.612 0.479 0.494 0.509 0.627 0.515 0.300 0.303 
24 0.503 0.2~1 0.506 0.515 0.500 0.455 0.524 0.527 0.421 0.318 
25 0.506 0.385 0.606 0.636 0.636 0.597 0.624 0.639 0.368 0.309 
··---25-·----·o:ns-··u-·:rioo-o: 6 06--o·:·533--0 :·6 o 9-·o: 533·-o~ 535···-·o :6 94··-o ;37 3 ··- o. 439· 
27 0.461 0.330 0.521 0.509 0.567 0.452 0.548 0.564 0.364 0.252 
28 0.521 0.382 0.645 0.570 0.645 0.552 0.673 0.645 0.253 0.324 
29 0.458 0.361 0.579 0.621 0.603 0.491 0.600 0.667 0.297 0.412 
·-··-·3 0-------0 ·:432-·o ·:-38s·-o: 6 21-0-: 56 4·-0 :·618 -· o·: 515·- o :·5 3 o--o. 6 o 6-·-·o: 221--0: 3 91 - ...... V1 
\.0 
TABLE xx (Continued) 
JUDGES 
JUDGE 11 12 13 14 · 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 0.306 0.521 0.542 0.664 0.585 0.197 0.348 0.445 0.497 0.464 
2 . ... . . 0 . 3 4 2 . 0 . 4 5 2 -- 0 . 5 3 0 -- 0 . 6 0 0 -· . 0 . 512 . 0 . 14 8 . . 0 . 2 2 4 . 0 . 4 7 9 0 . 5 8 5 0 . 3 3 9 
3 0.367 0.667 1.000 0.470 0.673 0.497 0.573 0.506 0.718 0.618 
4 0.452 0.555 0.573 0.309 0.676 0.730 1.000 0.606 0.600 0.573 
5 0.427 0.639 0.824 0.509 0.779 0.621 0.673 0.570 0.752 0.630 
6 ............ o. 245 ·-- o; 624 ·- o. 743··-o: 533·-- o: 624 - o. 327 ·- o. 397 --- o. 464 -- o. 627 · o. 548 
7 0.324 0.694 0.952 0.442 0.694 0.518 0.579 0.536 0.718 0.661 
8 0.400 0.603 0.673 0.382 0.706 0.700 0.867 0.615 0.609 0.664 
9 0.085 0.309 0.230 0.367 0.227 0.124 0.179 0.415 0.273 0.276 
- - 1 o ··-- ·-·-·- -- o ; 3 2 4 ··--· o : 4 a 2 - o : 4 3 r-· o . 3 7 6 --- o : 4 a 5 --- o ·: 2 1 3 --· o . 4 4 2 -- o i a 3 o --- o . 3 3 6 - -o . 4 4 5 
11 0.0 0.209 0.367 0.261 0.318 0.294 0.452 0.330 0.418 0.138 
12 0.209 0.0 0.667 0.373 0.652 0.467 0.555 0.630 0.548 0.652 
13 0.367 0.667 0.0 0.470 0.673 0.497 0.573 0.506 0.718 0.618 
··1 c, --·-----·· o. 261···o·:373-0 .410-·o: o ···-o .·515··- o :.109 ····o: 309- o: 436 ····o: 50 9 ······ o .119 · 
15 0.318 0.652 0.673 0.515 0.0 0.500 0.676 0.624 0.764 0.652 
16 0.294 0.467 0.497 0.109 0.500 0.0 0.730 0.352 0.500 0.470 
17 0.452 0.555 0.573 0.309 0.676 0.730 0.0 0.606 0.600 0.573 
-·· ·· 18 -----o-: 3 3 o ··--- o : 6 3 o- o ·:· 5 o 6--- o : 4 3 6 --- o : 6 21t··· - o ; 3 5 2 ··· o : 6 o 6 -- o . o · - o : 5 21 --- o . s 4 s 
19 0.418 0.548 0.718 0.509 0.764 0.500 0.600 0.521 0.0 0.482 
20 0.188 0.652 0.618 0.179 0.652 0.470 0.573 0.545 0.482 0.0 
21 0.370 0.576 0.642 0.391 0.685 0.558 0.642 0.591 0.794 0.715 
-· 2 2 ---···· 0 : 2 3 3-· 0 : 7 91-- 0 ·: 6 5 5 -- 0 ·; 31 g -o : 718 ·- 0 . 4 9 7 -· - 0 : 6 21 --- 0 : 5 91 -- 0 . 5 0 9 - 0 . 7 9 4 . 
23 0.188 0.700 0.612 0.300 0.533 0.352 0.479 0.436 0.445 0.685 
24 0.230 0.603 0.506 0.421 0.570 0.364 0.515 0.470 0.464 0.579 
25 0.285 0.636 0.606 0.342 0.645 0.452 0.636 0.491 0.570 0.667 
2 6 -·---·-· o ; 3 o o--·o : 6 5 g·-o: 6 o 5-·T: 3 21-··· o . 6 o 9·--- o . 4 6 4 --- o : 6 33 - o . ss 2 ···- o : s 2 4 ··· o . 6 1 3 
27 0.173 0.539 0.521 0.324 0.524 0.494 0.509 0.424 0.415 0.609 
28 0.264 0.594 0.645 0.430 0.621 0.412 0.570 0.403 0.536 0.594 
29 0.215 0.582 0.579 0.439 0.585 0.476 0.621 0.494 0.421 0.655 





TABLE XX (Continued) 
JUDGES 
JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 · 29 30 
1 0.588 0.506 0.406 0.503 0.506 0.415 0.461 0.521 0.458 0.482 
..... ·- 2 ··--· ... ·-· o : 5 3 o ·--- o : 3 88 ...... o ; 3 o 6 ·- o . 2 9 r- o ; 3 s 5 .... o ; 4 o o --· ·o . 3 3 o ··- o . 3 s 2-- o ~ 3 6 1· · o . 3 a 5 
3 0.642 0.655 0.612 0.506 0.606 0.606 0.521 0.645 0.579 0.621 
4 0.642 0.621 0.479 0.515 0.636 0.633 0.509 0.570 0.621 0.564 
5 o.739 o.658 o.494 o.5oo o.636 0~609 o.567 o.645 o.603 o.618 
···-·--6-····-···· o. 6 48 ·-·o: s 9r--o :-so 9 -o: 4 55·-- o-: 5 9r··· o; s3r·-·o. 452 --·o: 552--- o·~ 4 9 c-··o :s 1 s 
7 0.676 0.694 0.627 0.524 J.624 0.636 0.548 0.673 · 0.600 0.630 
8 0.736 0.670 0.515 0.527 0.639 0.694 0.564 0.645 0.667 0.606 
9 0.461 0.252 0.300 0.421 0.388 0.373 0.364 0.258 0.297 0.227 
-·-·1 o-·----·· o ~-452--o:4ss-o:·303-·o·:31a-o·: 30 9·-0: 43 9--o·:2s2--o ~- 324-·o i412 -··o·;-3 9r 
11 0.370 0.233 0.188 0.230 0.285 l.300 0.173 0.264 0.215 0.285 
12 0.576 0.791 0.700 0.603 0.636 0.658 0.539 0.594 0.582 0.597 
13 0.642 0.655 0.612 0.506 0.606 0.606 0.521 0.645 0.579 0.621 
·-·· 14-·--o-~ 3 91-o:-31a·-·o--:-30 o-o:'421-o·:342-0: 321-·o:324-·o ~ 430--0 :'43 9··- o: 524 
15 0.685 0.718 0.533 0.570 0.645 0.609 0.524 0.621 0.585 0.56i 
16 0.558 0.497 0.352 0.364 0.452 0.464 0.494 0.412 0.476 0.418 
17 0.642 0.621 0.479 0.515 0.636 0.633 0.509 0.570 0.621 0.564 
...... 1s--:-·-· ·o: 591--·o: 591-·o:-43~0: 47 o-----o ·;491-0 :·532 ·-·o :'424-·o ·: 403·--o: 494··--o = 491 
19 0.794 0.509 0.445 0.464 0.570 0.524 0.415 0.536 0.421 0.591 
20 0.715 0.794 0.685 0.579 0.667 0.673 0.609 0.594 0.655 0.524 
21 o.o 0.600 0.518 0.582 0.670 0.655 0.600 0.645 0.591 0.642 
--·22---·o :6 o o-o·:-o···---·o·:·s30·-o:·1s2-·o :·a o 9-o:·a30--·o :64s·-o; 121 -·o :716····0. 682 
23 0.518 0.830 0.0 0.836 0.809 0.709 0.633 0.742 0.721 0.676 
24 0.582 0.752 0.836 0.0 0.876 0.724 0.645 0.779 0.715 0.718 
25 0.670 0.809 0.809 0.876 0.0 0.803 0.758 0.824 0.791 0.745 
---25·-----o·: 6 55--0·:a 30·-0:-1 o 9--0·:· 724·-u: a o·r-o·:· o ···-- o :136--o ;·16 4-0·:a 42···· o: 11 o · 
27 0.600 0.645 0.633 0.645 0.758 0.736 0.0 0.752 0.779 0.739 
28 0.645 0.727 0.742 0.779 0.824 0.764 0.752 0.0 0.858 0.800 
'29 0.591 0.776 0.721 0.715 0.791 0.842 0.779 0.858 0.0 0.815 
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Figure 4. Linkage Analysis of Nine Clusters Produced from Intercor-
relations among Thirty Respondents 
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The clusters form along rather unusual lines. Type I consists of 
four federal judges linked together with one state judge. Judges 3 and 
13 were perfectly correlated with assessments of the fifty-four stories 
being exactly the same. The strength of the relationship among the 
federal judges is very strong. 
Type II judges again found a federal and state judge to be perfect-
ly correlated. The balance of the cluster consists of two more state 
judges and a federal judge whose thought patterns are in fairly strong 
agreement with the state judge in the reciprocal pair. The weakest link 
in this cluster is that between judge 11 and judge 17. Their relation-
ship in terms of agreement can only be characterized as moderate. 
Type III judges are all local ,by jurisdiction. Their relationship 
is quite strong. 
Type IV represents the largest cluster. It is formed around a 
reciprocal pair of local judges, into which the balance of that judi-
cial group link together. This strongly suggests that local judges are 
in closest agreement with one another over the issue of what news ele-
ments are inherently prejudicial. The consistent morbidity orientation 
seen by them in the Type VI analyses tend to confirm this strong rela-
tionship. Two state judges also link into this cluster; however, the 
magnitude of their relationship to the local judges can only be charac-
terized as slightly stronger than moderate. 
Types V and VI are single reciprocal pairs of state judges. The 
consistent fragmentation of federal and state judges in terms of agree-
ment suggests a tending to be more independent in their judgments and, 
therefore, the uniformity of justice may not be quite as strong on their 
levels as it appears to be on a local scale. 
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Types VII and VIII are single reciprocal pairs that also link a 
federal and state judge together. The magnitude of their relationship, 
however, is only moderate, indicating that they are in less agreement 
than some of the other federal-state clusters seen previously. 
Type IX is made up of a single state judge. This means that he 
agreed significantly with no one in terms of what is prejudicial. His 
assessments were so different as not to permit him to link into a 
cluster. 
To establish typal representatives and, therefore, factor loadings 
for each type, the intercorrelation matrix has to be subdivided in 
terms of each cluster and its constituent judges. These new matrices 
are given in Tables XXI through XXVIII. 
The individual having the highest sum of the intercorrelation 
ratios becomes the typal representative, or is most like all the other 
judges in that cluster. Therefore, an examination of his story assess-
ments alone will allow one to formulate a profile for that group in 
terms of what they view in news stories as being most prejudicial to a 
defendant's case. Judge 7 becomes the typal representative for Type I 
judges, as seen in Table XXI. 
As shown in Table XXII, judges 4 and 17 each have the highest sum 
of ratios. Therefore, judge 4 was selected as the typal representative 
by the flip of a coin. 
From Table XXIII, judge 24 is the typal representative for Type 
II judges. 
Judge 29 is the typal representative for Type IV judges, as seen 
in Table XXI1l~ 
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TABLE XXI 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR TYPE I JUDGES 
Judge 3 5 6 7 13 
3 * 0.824 0.748 0.952 1.000 
5 0.824 * 0.788 0.858 0.824 6 0.748 0.788 * 0.809 0.748 
7 0.952 0.858 0.809 * 0.952 13 1.000 0.824 0.748 0.952 * 
Total 3.524 3.294 3.093 3.571 3.524 
TABLE XXII 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR TYPE II JUDGES 
Judge 4 8 11 16 17 
4 * 0.867 0.452 0.730 1.000 8 0.867 * 0.400 0.700 0.867 11 0.452 0.400 * 0.294 0.452 16 0.730 0.700 0.,294 * 0.730 
17 1.000 0.867 0.452 0.730 * 
Total 3.049 2.834 1.598 2.454 . 3.049 
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TABLE XXIII 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR TYPE III JUDGES 
Judge 23 24 25 
23 * 0.836 0.809 24 0.836 * 0.876 
25 0.809 0.876 * 
Total 1.645 1. 712 1.685 
TABLE XXIV 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR TYPE IV JUDGES 
Judge 12 20 22 26 27 28 29 30 
12 * 0.652 0.791 0.658 0.539 0.594 0.582 0.597 20 0.652 * 0.794 0.673 0.609 0.594 0.655 0.524 22 0.791 0.794 * 0.830 0.645 0.727 0.776 0.682 26 0.658 0.673 0.830 * 0.736 0.764 0.842 0.770 
27 0.539 0.609 0.645 0.736 * 0.752 0.779 0.739 28 0.594 0.594 0.727 0.764 0.752 * 0.858 0.800 
29 0.582 0.655 0.776 0.842 0.779 0.858 * 0.815 30 0.597 0.524 0.682 0.770 0.739 0.800 0.815 * 
Total 4.413 4.501 5.245 5.273 4,799 5.089 5.307 4.927 
Judge 10 is the typal representative for Type V judges by the flip 
of a coin. This is illustrated in Table XXV. 
TABLE XXV 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR 












From Table XXVI, judge 21 becomes the typal representative for 
Type VI judges by the flip of a coin. 
TABLE XXVI 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR 












As seen in Table XXVII, judge 1 is the typal representative for 
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Type VII judges by the flip of a coin. 
TABLE XXVII 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR 












Judge 9 is the typal representative for Type VIII judges as the 
result of a flip of a coin, as shown in Table XXVIII. 
TABLE XXVIII 
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR 















With the typal representatives isolated, a series of factor load-
ings may be set up. A factor loading represents the magnitude of the 
relationship between the concept tested and the factors involved. 39 
In other words, each type may be characterized in terms of their pre-
dominant orientation. The thirty correlations to that type therefore 
represent the magnitude of each judge's relationship to that orienta-
tion. These are given in Table XXIX. 
Summary of Factor Loadings 
Local judges demonstrate the most consistent relationship in terms 
of agreement with the Type I factors of inducement and custom, although 
the strength of the relationship can only be classified as moderate. 
Meanwhile, federal and state judges continue to exhibit great 
differences in terms of agreement. This is particularly so among state 
judges where the index of agreement with the Type I factors ranges from 
0.248 to 0.952. Therefore, we would expect highly individualized opin-
ions, and possibly even internal inconsistencies on the part of these 
judges. 
Federal and state judges also demonstrate a similar relationship 
to Type II factors of inducement and custom. On the whole, federal 
judges tend to show a smaller magnitude of agreement than their state 
counterparts. 
In the Type III category of morbidity and normality, local judges 
once again exhibit the strongest relationship to it in their assess-
ments of its importance as a prejudicial factor. Local judges also 
demonstrate a similar relationship to Type IV factors of morbidity and 
little ethnic. Therefore, local judges seem to establish a significant 
TABLE XXIX 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR TYPAL REPRESENTATIVES 
TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge 
7 4 24 29 10 21 1 9 15 
Inducement Inducement Morbidity/ Morbidity Criminal Inducement Non- Inducement Criminal 
/Custom /Custom Normality /Little Interaction /Custom Criminal /Criminal Interaction 
Judge Ethnic /Custom Deviance Interaction /Custom 
/Custom. 
1 0.542 0.348 0.503 0.458 0.306 0.588 · 1.000 0.436 0.585 
2 0.552 0.224 0.291 0.361 0.339 0.530 0.612 0.542 0.512 
3 0.952 0.573 0.506 0.579 0.433 0.642 0.542 0.230 0.673 
4 0.579 1.000 0.515 0.621 0.442 0.642 0.348 o. 179 0.676 
5 0.858 0.673 0.500 0.603 0.412 0.739 0.648 0.318 0.779 
6 0.809 0.397 0.455 0.491 0.321 0.648 0.664 0.394 0.624 
7 1.000 0.579 0.524 0.600 0.433 0.676 0.542 0.248 0.694 
8 0.727 0.867 0.527 0.667 0.482 0.736 0.485 0.233 0,706 
9 0.248 0.179 0.421 0.297 0.252 0.461 0.436 1.000 0.227 
10 0.433 0.442 0.318 0.412 1.000 0.452 0.306 0.252 0.485 
11 0.324 0.452 0.230 0.215 0.324 0.370 0.306 0.085 0.318 
12 0.694 0.555 0.603 0.582 0.482 0.576 0.521 0.309 0.652 
13 0.952 0.573 0.506 0.579 0.433 0.642 0.542 0.230 0,673 -..:J 0 
TABLE XXIX (Continued) 
TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE 
Judge I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
14 0.442 0.309 0.421 0.439 0.376 0.391 0.664 0.367 0.515 
15 0.694 0.676 0.570 0.585 0.485 0.685 0.585 0.227 1.000 
16 0.518 0.730 0.364 0.476 0.273 0.558 o. 197 0.124 0.500 
17 0.579 1.000 0.515 0.621 0.442 0.642 0.348 O. 179 0.676 
18 0.536 0.606 0.470 0.494 0.830 0.591 0.445 0.415 0.624 
19 0.718 0.600 0.464 0.421 0.336 0.794 0.497 0.273 0.764 
20 0.661 0.573 0.579 0.655 0.445 0.715 0.464 0.276 0.652 
21 0.676 0.642 0.582 0.591 0.452 1.000 0.588 0.461 0.685 
22 0.694 0.621 0.752 0.776 0.455 0.600 0.506 0.252 o. 718 
23 0.627 0.479 0.836 0.721 0.303 0.518 0.406 0.300 0.533 
24 0.524 0.515 1.000 0.715 0.318 0.582 0.503 0.421 0,570 
25 0.624 0.636 0.876 0.791 0.309 0.670 0.506 0.388 0.645 
26 0.636 0.633 0.724 0.842 0.439 0.655 0.415 0.373 0.609 
27 0.548 0.509 0.645 0.779 0.252 0.600 0.461 0.364 0.524 
28 0.673 0.570 0.779 0.858 0.324 0.645 0.521 0.258 0.621 
29 0.600 0.621 0.715 1.000 0.412 0.591 0.458 0.297 0.585 
30 0.630 0.564 0.7 18 0.815 0.391 0.642 0.482 0.227 0.567 
--.J 
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trend in terms of perceptions of the prejudicial value of morbidity. 
Such consistency of thought is not exhibited by federal and state judges. 
All judges, regardless of jurisdictional level, demonstrate a mod-
erate relationship to Type V factors of criminal interaction and custom. 
A similar quantitative phenomenon is also seen in judges' relationships 
to Type VI factors of inducement and custom, Type VIII factors of non-
criminal deviance and custom, and Type IX factors of criminal interac-
tion and custom. This once again tends to confirm that portions of a 
defendant's ethnic background serve as a reinforcing factor. 
To see more clearly the interaction of these types with overall 
assessments, one can break down mean scores for each combination of 
elements and compare it with the mean scores assessed by each type. 
This is illustrated in Table XXX. 
Type III Analyses 
With the thirty judges participating in the experiment broken down 
into nine clusters or types, it was possible to reanalyze the data to 
determine the extent of the differences among them as they interact with 
the three dimensions. A Type III analysis was utilized for this process. 
It can best be described as a combination of factorial analysis and 
treatments by subjects. In this case nine types of judges were involved. 
Their responses to the stories were analyzed as if they were the sub-
jects. 
As with the Type VI, the analysis is done in rotations of two fac-
tors at a time. Since many of the differences have already been elabor-
ated upon in the Type VI interpretations, this section will simply 
highlight the major findings. 
Overall 
TABLE XXX 
MEAN SCORES FOR ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL 
MAGNITUDE, PRIOR RECORD AND ETHNIC 
BACKGROUND DIMENSIONS AS ASSESSED 
BY TYPES OF JUDGES 
Element Prejudicial Type Type Type Type Type 
Combination Score I II III IV V 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal 7.0500 7.6328 6.3994 7.2770 7.5414 6.3350 Deviance 
Morbidity/Criminal 6.4611 6.7660 6. 1664 5.6110 5.8960 7.4165 Interaction 
Morbidity/Normality 6.2389 5 .1332 5.7000 7.3320 7.3320 7.0000 
Inducement/Non-Criminal 7.3166 7.9332 7.0998 7.2770 7,3957 5.8335 Deviance 
Inducement/Criminal 6.8166 6.1580 6.6998 7.0550 6.4999 6.9998 Interaction 
Inducement/Normality 5.7611 5.0000 6.3333 4.5550 5.6040 6.4998 
Little Morbidity or Induce- 5 9677 
ment/Non-Criminal Deviance · 6.4210 6.4464 5.8880 5.6457 5.5000 
Little Morbidity or Induce- 4.9055 4.2860 6.0333 5.4440 4.8332 4.8335 ment/Criminal Interact'n 
Little Morbidity or 3.4833 3.4000 3. 1002 3.7220 3. 1458 3.5835 Inducement/Normality 
Morbidity/Minority 6.6220 6.9660 6.0667 6.3890 6.7708 7. 1667 
Morbidity/Custom 6.4770 6.6640 6.3660 6.3333 6.3124 6.3335 
Morbidity/Little Ethnic 6.6500 5.9000 5.8332 7,4990 7.7916 7.2498 
Type Type Type Type 
VI VII VIII IX 
6.5000 6.9165 5.9165 7.0000 
6.8335. 7.2500 7. 1665 7.8300 
5.8335 5.3330 5. 1667 5.6667 
7.5833 7.5000 7.3300 7. 1667 
7.5000 7.5000 7.4168 7.8300 
6.0830 5. 1650 5.7500 4.8300 
6.4165 5.2500 5.3330 6. 1667 
4.3333 4.5835 4.4165 4.8300 
2.9165 4.4498 5.4998 2.6770 
6.0000 6.4168 7. 1663 6.6777 _, 
7.5000 7.4168 5.0000 7. 1667 --:J w 
5.6667 5.6650 6.0835 6.6777 
TABLE XXX (Continued) 
Overall 
Element Prejudicial Type Type Type Type Type Type Type Type Type 
Combination Score I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Inducement/Minority 7.0050 7.0667 6.9334 6.7220 6.9165 7,4168 7.4166 7,4168 7.3333 6.5000 
Inducement/Custom 7.9550 8.4660 8.3667 7,5550 7,4582 7,4168 8,7500 7,6665 8.0000 8.5000 
Inducement/Little Ethnic 4.9333 4.7990 4.8334 4.4779 5.1247 4.5000 5.5000 5.0833 5.1663 4.8333 
Little Morbidity or 4.8833 4.9000 5.5334 5.7222 4,7498 4.0000 4.4999 4. 1667 4.7498 6.3333 Inducement/Minority 
Little Morbidity or 4.9776 4.6002 4.7664 5. 1109 4,9790 5.4165 4.4166 5.2500 6.2498 4.0000 Inducement/Custom 
Little Morbidity or 4.4944 4.6668 5.3002 4.2553 3.8957 4.5000 4.7500 4.4166 4.2500 5.3333 Inducement/Little Ethnic 
Non-Criminal Deviance/ 6.2277 7. 1668 6.3328 6.2222 6.5833 5.4998 6.8335 6.7500 6.5000 5.8333 Minority 
Non-Criminal Deviance/ 7,3277 7.9000 7,0333 6.9443 6.9061 6.5000 7,5833 8.3335 7,2449 7,8333 Custom 
Non-Criminal Deviance/ 6,4776 6.9666 6,5998 7,2776 6.7187 5.6650 6.0835 4.5835 4.8335 6.6667 Little Ethnic 
Criminal Interaction/ 6.2277 5,9000 6.9333 6.4999 5.8958 6.7500 5.6650 5.8333 6.5833 6.5000 Minority 
Criminal Interaction/ 7.3055 7 .1002 7,7332 7 .1667 6.9167 7.6667 8.0000 7.6667 6.5000 8.5000 Custom 
Criminal Interaction/ 4.6500 4.3000 4.2334 4.2778 4.4163 4.8333 5.0000 5.8335 5.9160 5.5000 Little Ethnic 
....... 
Normality/Minority 5,7553 5.9002 5.2267 6.1110 5.9583 6.3333 4.9168 5.4166 6.1665 
-...J 
5.6667 ~ 
TABLE XXX (Continued) 
Overall 
Element Prejudicial Type Type Type Type Type Type Type Type Type 
Combination Score I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Normality/Custom 4.7777 4.6680 4.7431 4.8880 4.6875 5.0000 5.0831 4.8333 5.5000 3.3000 





Criminal Magnitude-Prior Record 
In comparing the differences among types on their assessments of 
the constituent elements of criminal magnitude and prior record, signi-
ficant differences were found. These are summarized in Table XXXI. 
TABLE XXXI 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE AND 
PRIOR RECORD WHEN EXAMINED BY TYPES 
Source df s. s. m. s. 
Total 485 2618.530 5.3990 
Between Subjects 53 1618.080 30.5290 
Between Criminal Magnitude 2 415.624 207.8120 
Between Prior Record 2 255.765 127.8820 
Interaction Criminal Magni-
tude X Prior Record 4 46.952 11. 7380 
Between Subject Error 45 899.741 19.9940 
Within Subjects 440 1000.448 2.2730 
Between Types 8 * * Interaction Type X 
Criminal Magnitude 16 27.717 1.7320 
Interaction Type X 
Prior Record 16 138.013 8.6258 
Interaction Type X Criminal 
Magnitude X Prior Record 32 142.772 4.4616 











* There are no differences between subject types because of the fixed 
nature of the continuum in Q-methodology. 
As with the findings of the Type VI analysis, significant differences 
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exist between types in their perception and assessment of the dimensions 
of criminal magnitude and prior record. This confirms that not only do 
judges generate significant differences in perception within jurisdic-
tional levels, but also when they are regrouped according to agreement 
among subjects. Therefore, we should anticipate finding wide areas of 
disagreement in their opinions among the various types when they are 
profiled. 
Unlike the Type VI analysis, when criminal magnitude and prior 
record interact, apart from type, no significant differences are pro-
duced. This tends to indicate that both actions in concert are viewed 
differently by all individuals. 
However, when examining the criminal magnitude dimension, as it 
interacts with the judicial type, no significant differences are found. 
This indicates that while there may be widespread differences within the 
constituent elements as assessed by each individual, within the types 
themselves, there is little disagreement. 
The opposite effect is seen in the prior record dimension. When 
interacting with judicial type, it does produce significant differences. 
This would tend to indicate that there is some disagreement over the 
relative prejudicial value of this dimension. Consistency within each 
type then becomes a crucial factor in ascertaining how strongly each 
type responds to that orientation. 
Finally, both dimensions when interacting with judicial type pro-
duce significant differences. This confirms the findings of the Type VI 
analysis which strongly suggested that prejudicial publicity may not be 
able to be reduced to one simple dimension as opposed to others, but 
rather is a series of factors when working in concert to produce strong 
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influences within a potential juror's mind. 
Criminal Magnitude-Ethnic Background 
The results of the analysis of variance for these combinations is 
summarized in Table XXXII. 
TABLE XXXII 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL MAGNITUDE AND 
ETHNIC BACKGROUND WHEN EXAMINED 
BY TYPES 
Source df s. s. m. s. 
Total 485 2438.038 5.0268 
Between Subjects 53 1703.920 32. 1356 
Between Criminal Magnitude 2 359.210 179.6050 
Between Ethnic Background 2 120.246 60.1230 
Interaction Criminal Magnitude 
X Ethnic Background 4 132.914 33.2285 
Between Subject Error 45 1090.872 24.2400 
Within Subjects 440 734.846 1.6700 
Between Types 8 * * Interaction Type X Criminal 
Magnitude 16 27.717 1. 7320 
Interaction Type X Ethnic 
Background 16 138.013 8.6250 
Interaction Type X Criminal 
Magnitude X Ethnic Background 32 112. 534 3.5160 











* There are no differences between subject types because of the fixed 
nature of the continuum in Q-methodology. 
When types are analyzed on their assessments of the prejudicial 
value of these two combinations, significant differences are found 
which deviate from those seen in the Type VI analyses. 
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When ethnic background was analyzed previously along both individual 
and jurisdictional levels, significant differences were found between 
the elements. Here, when analyzed in terms of individuals, no signifi-
cant differences are found between elements. This would indicate that 
there was widespread agreement among all judges as to its prejudicial 
value. One can therefore expect that when each type is profiled, the 
various elements of the ethnic background dimension will be found to be 
a critical factor in the generation of adverse public opinion against the 
defendant. 
When criminal magnitude and ethnic background interact among each 
of the nine respective types, non-significant differences are also 
found. Once again this strongly suggests that judges across the board 
viewed equally that the prejudicial value of these when they act in 
concert is of value. When each type is analyzed in detail, one should 
find that the elements of criminal magnitude will be assessed differ-
ently with the ethnic background elements being applied equally. Ethnic 
background continues to act as a reinforcing factor. 
Such reinforcement is utilized by the general public to strengthen 
an already preconceived opinion. If people react to stories describing 
the morbid details of the crime, or the motivations for it, with only 
moderate prejudice, linking that to some aspect of the defendant's ethnic 
background will turn such predisposition into hard-core prejudice which 
is hard to dispell. 
When within-subjects effects are considered, significant deviations 
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from the Type VI results are also found. When each of the separate 
types are analyzed in terms of their individual interactions with each 
dimension, no significant differences are found between type of judge and 
criminal magnitude. However, significant differences are found between 
type of judge and ethnic backgrqund. Both interactions were found to be 
significant in the Type VI analysis. 
This suggests that all types rate the single aspect of criminal 
magnitude about the same, in terms of potential prejudice. Some element 
of criminal magnitude will therefore be found as part of each type's 
general orientation. 
Meanwhile, when each type interacts with ethnic background, signi-
ficant differences do occur. Therefore, while individuals across the 
board may have widespread agreement about its prejudicial value, within 
each type there is widespread disagreement. 
Each type also viewed their action in concernt differently, for 
significant differences were generated. 
Prior Record-Ethnic Background 
The results of the analysis of variance for these combinations is 
summarized in Table XXXIII. 
When these final combinations are analyzed in terms of types, signi-
ficant deviations from the Type VI results are also found. Here the 
prior record dimension, when viewed apart from the types, is significant 
only at the 0.05 level, indicating a statistically lower level of confi-
dence in the differences generated. Therefore, we may expect to find 
extensive disagreement as to its prejudicial value within each type. 
However, at the same time, no significant differences are found 
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among the ethnic background dimension when viewed apart from the type. 
This suggests a continued consensus among all judges as to its preju-
dicial value. 
TABLE XXXIII 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIOR RECORD AND ETHNIC 
BACKGROUND WHEN EXAMINED BY TYPES 
Source df s. s. m. s. 
Total 485 2566.088 5,2909 
Between Subjects 53 1591.179 30.0222 
Between Prior Record 2 207.001 103.5005 
Between Ethnic Background 2 121.317 60.6585 
Interaction Prior Record 
X Ethnic Background 4 126.463 63.2315 
Between Subject Error 45 1136 ,398 25.2532 
Within Subjects 440 974,909 2.2157 
Between Types 8 * * Interaction Type X Prior 
Record 16 137,155 8,5721 
Interaction Type X Ethnic 
Background 16 138.013 8.6250 
Interaction Type X Prior 
Record X Ethnic Background 32 90,780 2.8360 








5. 1804 0.01 
5.2124 0.01 
1. 7139 0.05 
* There are no differences between subject types because of the fixed 
nature of the continuum in Q-methodology. 
When differences are analyzed within types, all are found to be 
significant in terms of the interaction of each of the factors. Both 
prior record and ethnic background generate strong degrees of variance 
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in assessment as to their prejudicial value. This suggests that each of 
the nine types, when these two dimensions are considered, truly deline-
ate from each other in their respective judgments. However, when type 
interacts with both dimensions, it is significant only at the 0.05 
confidence level. 
Summary of Type III Analyses 
To summarize the results of the Type III analyses, the following 
significant developments are found: 
1) There appears to be widespread disagreement between types in 
their assessment of the prior record dimension. This suggests that items 
such as a defendant's prior record may not be viewed as strongly in 
terms of prejudicial value as other studies have found it to be. It may 
also indicate some internal inconsistencies within types over each 
story's assessments. In other words, a type of judge may have a signi-
ficant criminal interaction orientation, yet not manifest it consistent-
ly in judging each story containing that element. Thus, the matter of 
judicial uniformity is once again called into question. 
2) Ethnic background emerges as a strong dimension in terms of 
its prejudicial value. In studying interaction, it seems to act as a 
reinforcing factor. If there is the potential prejudice within the 
mind of a potential juror, the association of the defendant with an 
ethnic group or custom will turn that potential prejudice into a 
significant influence. 
3) There is also substantial disagreement over the criminal 
magnitude dimension among the types. An analysis of the types will 
determine the magnitude of the differences. 
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Profiles of Judicial Types 
With the various clusters of judges segregated, and their differ-
ences analyzed, the task of examining each group microscopically offers 
opportunity to study in detail the thought processes of each of these 
judicial types. In actuality this represents the apex of this research, 
for now with confidence one can say that given "X" information, "Y" 
prejudice will result in the opinion of each -judicial type. 
It also offers an opportunity once again to lay down some guide-
lines for the working press. To simply go through the process of 
examining all the data without coming up with concrete applications 
leaves one with no sense of accomplishment. 
Type I Judges 
Type I judges can best be characterized as inducement and custom 
oriented. They view statements concerning a defendant's motivation, 
particularly when linked with some custom or practice in his ethnic 
background, as highly prejudicial. Their mean score of 8.466 was signi-
ficantly above the mean for all judges. However, three other judicial 
types rated this combination with a similar degree of severity. 
The combination of inducement and custom is perceived as leaving 
little to chance for the potential juror to make the inferential leap 
from an accusation of guilt to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As 
stated previously, it is the subtle racial nuances that seemingly rein-
force any motivations stated for the crime. But w~y? Again it would 
seem that much of the responsibility must lie at the foot of the media • 
. The white press and its readership has had little exposure to minorities 
except in a negative manner. Therefore, to hear or read of.a member of 
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a minority group being involved in some kind of criminal act, immediate-
ly reinforces the attitude that all minorities are criminals. There-
fore, why should this individual be different? 
One researcher has concluded: 
The most compelling single finding is that press coverage of 
blacks has been so slight throughout the entire twentieth century, 
that the Kerner Commission's observation that our nation is 
'moving towards two societies' perhaps somewhat overdramatizes 
the more sobering truth that black and white Americans ha~e always 
been separate and that nothing is really changing at all. 
But it is more than simply poor coverage by the media. Ultimately 
the problem reverts back to the individual's semantic environment and 
how he structures meaning. Stereotypes, racial labels, and negative 
attitudes towards ethnic practices suggest an inability to cope with 
uncertainty, with ignorance, and therefore, the necessity to resort to 
such damning practices. 
One judge involved in this study said that a member of a minority 
group in this state has one strike against him when he comes into court, 
for no matter how much you try to eliminate that subtle prejudice, you 
simply can't change people's minds. 
In terms of specific story ratings for the combination of induce-
ment and custom, the overall means and Type I means are summarized in 
Table XXXIV. 
Except for story 44, Type I judges rated these six stories equal 
to or above the mean for all judges. Since story 32 was rated by all 
judges as being significantly prejudicial, no comment is necessary. 
However, story 19 should be examined closer, since it has all the 
makings of leading the jurors to feel the defendant is guilty. It 
discusses the fact that the defendant was having marital problems. 
That, by itself, is a potent motive for a sex slaying. However, the 
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story goes on to state that most migrant workers have marital problems. 
Since the average individual cannot readily distinguish between this mi-
grant worker and all migrant workers, he makes the damning inferential 
·1eap that the defendant must be guilty. Since all migrant workers have 











IVIEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING ELEMENTS 
OF INDUCEMENT AND CUSTOM AS RATED 
BY JUDGES OVERALL AND 
TYPE I JUDGES 
Judges 
Description Overall 
"Marital Difficulties" 8.266 
"Naturally Remorseful" 7.000 
"Brag About Exploits" 10.200 
"Revenge--a Migrant.Custom" 9.566 
"No one would Hire a Migrant" 6.066 









WendellJohnson was indeed correct when he stated: "One can never 
say all about anything, just as one can never observe all of anything. 1141 
Yet the public tries! So the press must help to educate them. In the 
case of the findings here, two recommendations arie in order. First, the 
press should again stop.using labels. It matters not whether someone is 
a Mexican, American, or a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant. But then the 
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press must also feature ethnic groups in a more favorable light. Their 
various customs and practices must be made known to forbid the curse of 
ignorance from working within the mind of men. 
Type I judges also rate the combination of non-criminal deviance 
and custom as highly prejudicial. Here again many ethnic customs and 
practices seem strange, but when combined with reports of the defen-
dant's bizarre behavior, it can once more become a volatile mixture for 
the generation of prejudice. 
Type II Judges 
These can also be characterized as being inducement and custom 
oriented. However, the magnitude of their rating is much stronger than 
that of Type I judges, when compared to the other news elements. To do 
this comparison with Type I, the mean scores for the above stories are 
added in Table XXXV. 
As can be seen, Type II judges tend to be stronger in their ratings 
of these six stories. They are particularly higher than either the 
overall mean or Type I when considering stories 40 and 44. Story 40 had 
to do with claims by the defense attorney that the defendant was being 
tried by newspaper and this trial carried over to migrant workers as a 
group. While the story tries to condemn the·allness of its readers, in 
the minds of these judges, it backfires, making the defense attorney out 
to be a "bleeding heart liberal," and therefore representing an indivi-
dual who must be guilty. 
Story 44 is comparable with the defense attorney, invoking the 
migrant custom of work performed with long hours. The inference the 
story is attempting to make is that migrants have no time to get into 
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trouble. Once again, in the minds of these judges, it triggers the 










MEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING 
THE ELEMENTS OF INDUCEMENT AND 
CUSTOM AS RATED BY JUDGES 
OVERALL AND TYPE I 
AND II JUDGES 
Judges 
Description Overall 
"Marital Difficulties" 8.266 
"Naturally Remorseful" 7.000 
"Brag About Exploits" 10.200 
"Revenge--a Migrant Custom" 9.566 
"No one would Hire a Migrant" 6.066 
"No Time to get into Trouble" 6.633 








Like Type I judges, this group tends to rate any other element 
which interacts with custom as capable of producing substantial prejudice. 
They are stronger than Type I judges in their assessment of non-criminal 
deviance and custom; little morbidity or inducement and custom; and 
criminal interaction and custom. 
Both groups also tend to downplay the publication of a defendant's 
prior record. Their mean scores for stories having criminal interaction 
element are in most cases lower than the overall means. 
Type II judges differ from the norm and Type I in their assessment 
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of morbidity as a prejudicial factor. Whenever it is combined with any 
of the other elements, it is rated significantly lower than the mean 
for judges as a whole. 
Type III Judges 
These three local judges that cluster into Type III can best be 
characterized as morbidity and normality oriented. For them, stories 
containing the sensational details of the crime tend to provoke signi-
ficant prejudice in the minds of potential jurors. As previously stated, 
much of the local judges' assessment of morbidity as related to preju-
dice comes from the difficulty of seating a representative jury. In 
particular, it is often difficult, if not impossible, for them to seat 
some females in juries to hear a case involved with a sex crime. 











MEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING ELEMENTS 
OF MORBIDITY AND NORMALITY AS ASSESSED 
BY JUDGES OVERALL AND TYPE III JUDGES 
Judges 
Description Overall 
"Night of Macabre and Horror" 7.566 
"Litter of Crime" 7.200 
"Methodically Slaughtered" 5.667 
"Meet his own Brutal End" 5.566 
"Brother of Accused Slayer" 4.666 










The Type III judges reacted most strongly to the initial reports 
of the crime, taking strong exception to the use of terminology such 
as "night of macabre and horror," "horrific scream," and "blood every-
where" as used in story 2, or "methodically slaughtered" as used in 
story 8. Such terms are deemed overly descriptive, and add nothing 
but potential prejudice. Most judges felt that the use of these kinds 
of highly emotional phrases were to incite and satiate the public's 
appetite for violence and not for information that is in the public 
interest. 
Carolyn Jaffe has written: 
This type of material tends to be inflammatory--that is to cause 
the jury to want to convict--and thus to be prejudicial to whom-
ever happens to be the defendant, not because he is any particular 
person about whom the public!~Y has been disseminated, but merely 
because he is the defendant. 
Such a conclusion demonstrates the often irrational approach that 
members of the public take in assessing crime. Inflammatory reporting 
merely feeds that kind of "semantic insanity." 
Type III judges also tend to rank all the other combinations con-
taining morbidity significantly above the mean: morbidity and non-
criminal deviance at 7.277, morbidity and little ethnic at 7.499. This 
suggests again the concept that morbidity in and of itself is sufficient 
to generate prejudice, but when it is combined with another element 
such as non-criminal deviance, it reinforces the conclusion already 
reached. 
These judges also do not see the publication of a defendant's 
prior record as significantly prejudicial. 
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Type IV Judges 
Type IV judges can be characterized as morbidity and little ethnic 
oriented. They view stories that are predominantly concerned with the 
morbid details of the crime as significantly prejudicial. Such stories 
may contain non-specific.or no details concerning the defendant's ethnic 
background. Therefore, like Type III judges, it.is primarily a concern 
with the sensational. Another similarity to Type III is that once again 
this cluster primarily comprises local judges. 











MEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING ELEMENTS 
OF MORBIDITY AND LITTLE ETHNIC AS 
ASSESSED BY JUDGES OVERALL 
AND TYPE IV JUDGES 
Judges 
Description Overall 
"Insatiable Lust for Blood" 8.066 
"Litter of Crime" 7.200 
"Long History·of Mass Murder" 4.800 
"Tortured by Fantasy'' 8.066 
"Nude Body" 6.200 









While they tend to rate these stories significantly above the 
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overall mean, the magnitude of the differences is not as great as with 
Type III judges. 
They are strongest on stories 1 and 6. Story 1 describes the 
defendant as a "sub-animal" and proceeds to describe the condition of 
the bodies as police found them. In terms of structuring meaning, the 
label "sub-animal" leads the reader to make serious, if unsubstantiated, 
inferences. 
Story 6 relates the testimony of a psychiatrist, an "expert," not 
under oath, who presents a personality s).<etch of the defendant who is 
still unidentified. As previously related, judges overall, and local 
judges in particular, viewed this story as highly inflammatory. This 
kind of journalism creates hysteria. 
Story 11 presents the defendant's name with no other ethnic infor-
mation. While it was rat.ed by both, judges as a whole and Type IV 
judges in particular, as moderate in terms of prejudice, the comments 
of several judges must be mentioned. 
Previously it was stated that the element of little ethnic can be 
described as non-specific details concerning the defendant's cultural 
background. Several judges indicated that they felt the simple act of 
mentioning the defendant's name, . if it is an ethnic one, · in connection 
with the crime was sufficient to provoke prejudice in some potential 
jurors' minds. The name Martinez automatically links him to a minority 
group with all the stereotypes that are associated with it. 
This is not the first time such an accusation has been made. 
Ardyth Broadrick Sohn, in her 1976 study, found that persons with 
uncommon names were consistently rated as more guilty than those with 
common ones. The common-uncommon continuum was operationally defined 
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as follows: "common" - names which do not carry references to ethnic, 
racial, or religious backg:round; "uncommon" - those which carried an 
ethnic or racial connotation. 43 Thus, this opens an entirely new area 
that demands research. If the simple mention of someone's name in 
connection with a crime is indeed prejudicial, our system of justice 
has a significant problem to deal with. 
Type IV judges, like Type III judges, also tend to rate the ele-
ment of criminal interaction below the means of judges as a whole. In 
contrast, they rate the non-criminal deviance element higher than Type 
III and in some cases higher than the overall mean. Overall, they are 
more consistent in their judgments than Type III. 
Type V Judges 
Type V judges may best be characterized as criminal interaction 
and custom oriented, viewing stories that describe the defendant's prior 
criminal record and ethnic customs as being significantly prejudicial. 
As with other combinations, the custom element would seem to act as a 
source for reinforcement of inferences made on the basis of criminal 
interaction information. It is epitomized by the ethnic stereotyping 
that says "once a criminal, always a criminal,!! and if he's a minority, 
he's guilty for sure. 
Their rankings of stories containing these elements are found in 
Table XXXVIII. 
These judges are not totally consistent in ranking criminal inter-
action and custom elements as most prejudicial. They are most strong 
in their assessment onstories 29 and 44. Story 29 clearly lays.out his 
prior record, where he has served time and for what charge. The ethnic 
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custom asserts that migrants are peace-loving. In these judges' minds, 
people would use such an assertion as a backlash reinforcement. They 
would react apart from what is reported. Their line of thinking would 
run as follows. He's an ex-convict. He's a migrant. Even though this 
official says they are non-violent, we know that migrants are trouble-










MEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING ELEMENTS 
OF CRIMINAL INTERACTION AND CUSTOM AS 
ASSESSED BY JUDGES OVERALL AND 
TYPE V JUDGES 
Judges 
Description Overall 
"Strong Connection" 7.466 
"Migrants. . • Non..,.violent'' 6.833 
"Peace Lovers. . • Farce" 7 .100 
"Rape as. . • a Status Symbol" 10.200 
"Resigned to Accept" 5.600 









Story 44 clearly uses the A= A law of identity. Here the defense 
attorney chides the people for thinking that "once a man's in trouble, 
he's always in trouble." Here again it would seem that, rather than 
defusing potential prejudice, such statements generate more. 
Type V judges are consistent in rating the criminal interaction 
element high, no matter what is linked with it. They are also 
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consistent in rating any combination that contains an ethnic background 
element. Thus, it continues to appear that who the defendant is in 
terms of ethnic background, is as important, if not more important, 
than what he's accused of in terms of generating prejudice. 
Type VI Judges 
Type VI judges may be characterized as inducement and custom 
oriented. Like Types I and II, they tend to view stories relating to 
motivations for the crime with the defendant's ethnic heritage as signi-
ficantly prejudicial. To compare them more accurately, Table XXXIX 
shows the story ratings of the three types of judges on the inducement 










Jv:JEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING ELE!'1ENTS 
OF INDUCEMENT AND CUSTOM AS ASSESSED BY 
JUDGES OVERALL AND TYPE I, II, 
AND VI JUDGES 
Judges Type I . Type II 
Description Overall Judges Judges 
"Marital Difficulty" 8.266 10.200 10.000 
"Remorseful" 7.000 7.800 7.000 
"Rape. . . Status Symbol" 10.200 10.600 10.400 
"Revenge" 9.566 9.600 9.800 
"Migrant" 6.066 7.400 8.400 










In comparison with the other two inducement and custom types, Type 
VI judges seem more emphatic in their appraisal of the prejudicial 
value of these elements, although not consistently. They are particu-
larly strong on stories 25 and 44. They viewed the comment of a 
minister stating that the defendant was naturally remorseful as substan-
tially prejudicial. Once again the custom element reinforces it. If 
the defendant is remorseful, he must have done it. Also if a migrant 
seeks a minister's counsel, something seemingly alien from his culture, 
he had to do it. Story 44, previously mentioned, once again semanti-
cally backfires. 
However, Type VI differs from I and II significantly in the way 
they handle some of the other elemen.ts. It rates criminal interaction 
element much stronger than the others do, particularly when it inter-
acts with morbidity or inducement. It rates morbidity higher when it 
interacts with custom, than do Types I or II. Type VI judges continue 
to rate inducement consistently stronger, regardless of what it inter-
acts with. Thus, Type VI appears to have a better overall grasp of the 
problem than do Types I or II. 
Type VII Judges 
Type VII judges can best be characterized as non-criminal deviance 
and custom oriented, rating stories that describe the defendant's past 
deviant behavior, when linked to ethnic customs, as strongest in terms 
of producing prejudice. Thus custom continues to emerge as a dominant 
element in the making of substantial prejudice. 
The deviant action of a defendant can range from the rather mun-
dane to the bizarre, and in some cases, the customs associated with his 
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culture could be classified as such. But the two variables acting upon 
one another to form a social stigma is not new. Consider this state-
ment from the Managers of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism 
in the City of New York written in 1819: 
We lament to say that they are too often led by want, by vice, 
and by habit to form a phalanx of plunder and depredation, 
rendering our city more liable to the ~ijcrease of crimes, and 
our houses of correction more crowded. 
If the physical environment can affect the individual in terms of 
making him more deviant in his behavior, certainly it is not difficult 
to believe that the semantic environment can affect the reactions and 
behavior of a potential juror, who reads of those who are led by want 
and by habit, and then makes radical inferences. 
The story ratings are summarized in Table XL. Once again as seen 
in other types, these judges are not overly consistent in their assess-
ments of the non-criminal deviance and custom combination. They do 
express strong opinions, however, on several key stories, which in a 
real case would have to be dealt with by the presiding judge. For 
example, story number 19, which has already been discussed in connec-
tion with another combination of elements, involves marital difficul-
ties. The admission of marital difficulties in.traditional American 
society is still considered evidence of social deviance, even though 
many believe we shed our Puritanism a long time ago. Add to this the 
statement that most migrant workers, as part of their social milieu, 
have constant marital problems. The ordinary man in the street can 
make numerous inferences as to the defendant's possible guilt. 
The inconsistency of these judges, then, is seen in their low 
ranking of story 42 which discussed the fact that the defendant had 
two wives, one at home, and one he traveled with. Once again this 
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deviant behavior is attributed to migrant customs. One would expect 










MEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING ELEMENT 
OF NON-CRIMINAL DEVIANCE AND CUSTOM AS 
ASSESSED BY JUDGES OVERALL AND 
BY TYPE VII JUDGES 
Judges 
Description Overall 
"Tattoo--Common Symbol" 5.133 
"Marital Difficulties" 8.266 
"Soda Pop Diet" 4.900 
"Deviant Sexuality" 8.500 
"Psychological Revenge" 9.566 









In addition, the rating on story 22, which discusses deviant 
sexuality as part of the migrant culture, is rated much lower than we 
would expect of these judges, based on rankings given to stories 14, 
19 and 21. 
Their inconsistency can also be seen in their assessments of other 
elements where non-criminal deviance is a factor. Morbidity and non-
criminal deviance are ranked slightly below the mean; inducement and 
non-criminal deviance, slightly above; and non-criminal deviance and 
minority status, slightly below. However, they are much more consistent 
in ranking combinations with the element of custom as significantly 
high in prejudice. Therefore, it might be more accurate to simply 
characterize Type VII as custom oriented. 
Type VIII Judges 
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Type VIII judges may be characterized as inducement and criminal 
interaction oriented. They view stories that link motivations for the 
crime, and the fact that the defendant has a prior criminal record, as 
prejudicial. In terms of the semantic environment, these types of 
stories provoke the reaction that, since he's been a criminal, he'll 
act like a criminal always; therefore, he had a motive for doing what-
ever he did. These kinds of reactions can best be characterized as the 
"human nature fallacy," which says ~he defendant couldn't help himself 
because that's his nature. Of all the prejudicial combinations studied 
in this experiment, this one leaves us most in despair. If it is true, 
the defendant is never capable of rising above the environment in which 
he finds himself, then we indeed have one of the most rigid caste 
systems in the world. 
An examination of their story ratings will reveal more about this 
fallacy. They are summarized in Table XLI. 
Their assessments ·Cail only be characterized as marginal. Like 
Type VII, they lack consistency in their judgments of stories in this 
area. The only story they strongly rate as prejudicial is number 26. 
It concerns itself with the authorities' concern to build a firm case 
against the defendant, while at the same time providing the Constitu-
tional safeguards to him to avoid a later dismissal on appeal. 
The basis of prejudice in this story is once again the backlash 
effect. When the law enforcement authorities take great pains to 
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insure a defendant's rights, it is often interpreted as a sign of weak-
ness, of coddling someone who doesn't deserve such treatment; that 
since he's been a criminal in the past, he will only continue to be 
one. Therefore, sufficient hostility is built against the defendant, 
creating significant probability that prejudice will result. 
Story 
TABLE XLI 
MEAN SCORES FOR STORIES CONTAINING THE 
ELEMENTS OF INDUCEMENT AND CRIMINAL 
INTERACTION AS ASSESSED BY 
JUDGES OVERALL AND BY 
TYPE VIII JUDGES 
Judges Type VIII 
Number Description Overall Judges 
4 "Tat!\::.Q011 8.033 8.000 
26 "Air Tight Case" 5.856 8.000 
32 "Rape. . • Status Symbol" 10.200 9.500 
44 "No Time for Trouble" 6.533 6.500 
48 "Change of Venue" 6.500 6.000 
50 "Right to a Fair Trial" 3.666 2.500 
Once again the Sheppard case provides a graphic example. In 
another of its editorials, the Cleveland Press stated: 
If ever a murder case was studded with fumbling, halting, stupid 
uncooperative bungling--politeness to people whose place in this 
situation completely justified vigorous searching, prow~t and 
effective police work--the Sheppard case has them all. 
What people fail to realize is that, if all authorities were let 
loose to fully enforce the law, the result would be chaos. Restraint 
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is necessary for freedom to continue. Consider the comment of Judge 
Charles Breitel: 
If every policeman, every prosecutor, every court, and every 
post-sentence agency performed his or her responsibility in strict 
accordance with the rules of law, precisely and narrowly 4~id 
down, the criminal law would be ordered, but intolerable. 
The balance of the stories in this combination are rated at about 
the norm for judges as a whole, if not below the norm. This would 
suggest that this cluster tends to be uncertain about the .mattter as a 
whole and may tend to rule on the basis of narrow observations rather 
than on broad principles of law. 
Comparing them on other assessments, when non-criminal deviance 
is connected with other combinations, judges in this type tend to flip-
flop. There is not the trend of consistency throughout, as exhibited 
by other types. The criminal interaction element is handled similarly. 
Type IX Judge 
This is the most significant type, for this single judge does not 
correlate with any of the others. His judgments therefore would be 
expected to be extremely different. In terms of characterization, the 
best label is criminal interaction and custom, the same one as given 
to Type V judges. To begin to assess the apparent radical differences, 
an examination of the manner in which each type rated stories in the 
criminal interaction and custom element is summarized in Table XLII. 
The differences between these two types on stories 28 and 32 are 
minimal. Story 28 dealt with the comments of a Texas law enforcement 
official who believed that the defendant may have committed crimes in 
his state. Considering the operational definition of the criminal 
interaction element, such a law rating is significant. Judges strongly 
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oriented toward that element would be expected to score this story 
higher. The minimal differences on story 32 are consistent in that all 
rate this significantly high. 
TABLE XLII 
MEAN SCORES FOR THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL 
INTERACTION AND CUSTOM AS ASSESSED BY 
JUDGES OVERALL AND BY TYPE V AND 
TYPE IX JUDGES 
Story 
Number Description 
28 "Strong Connection" 
29 "Migrants ••• Non-Violent" 
31 "Peace Lovers • • • Farce" 
32 "Rape •.• Status Symbol" 
43 "Resigned to Acceptu 

























The major differences in assessments of stories 29, 31 and 44 are 
significant. Story 29 dealt with the comments of a United Farm Workers 
official, stating that migrants were by custom peace-loving. It also 
included a clear statement of the defendant's prior recordo The Type 
IX judge assessed this a 10 in the continuum, therefore, considering 
this one of the top five prejudicial stories in the deck. Overall, 
judges assessed this as only minimal, at the middle of the continuum. 
This might suggest a strong orientation among Type IX to view clear 
statements of time served for certain crimes as highly prejudicial. 
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Story 31 tends to confirm this. It dealt with a rebuttal of the 
United Farm Workers official's comments and went on to picture migrants 
as violent and therefore more likely to interact with the law. Here 
again Type IX rated it a 10, placing. it once again in the top five 
stories. 
He downgraded story 43. It did not specifically mention the defen-
dant's prior record. Rather, it simply. dealt with the fact that mi-
grants often do not interact very successfully with the criminal 
justice system. If a judicial type was extremely oriented towards 
viewing publication of a defendant's prior record as highly prejudicial, 
such a low score would be expected. 
Finally, story 44, which dealt with the "once-in-trouble-always-
in-trouble" fallacy, was also rated a 10 by the Type IX judge, much 
higher than judges overall and even h~gher than Type V. Since the 
defense attorney attacked publication of the defendant's past record, 
such a high score is once again consistent. 
Therefore, it would appear that one can conclude that what sepa-
rates Type IX from the others involved is his consistency in assess-
ment. This is confirmed when his scores on elements containing criminal 
interaction are compared with the ?Verall, as well as with other types. 
In each case he scores significantly higher than the balance of other 
types. When comparisons are made on the custom element, the same holds 
true. 
Summary of Judicial Type Profiles 
After carefully examining each judicial type, one can conclude the 
following: 
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1) Nine types of judges emerge out of the thirty involved in the 
experiment. Such diversity indicates rather substantial disagreement 
between federal, state and local judges in Oklahoma over the nature or 
causes of prejudicial publicity. Further examination yields the con-
clusion that. for many judges such decisions are based on personal 
experience, rather than broad principles of law. 
2) Federal and state judges tend to cluster together in several 
groups, while local judges remain largely intact as a single cluster. 
Such broad disagreement among federal and state judges, when contrasted 
with the rather consistent assessments of local judges, suggests that 
the uniformity of justice at the higher levels of the judiciary may be 
somewhat lacking. 
3) Such uniformity is further called into question when one 
examines the lack of consistency within types over major areas that 
emerge within the prejudicial publicity debate. Even among the primary 
orientations for each type, there is substantial disagreement over 
interpretation of stories. 
4) Among the nine types, the ethnic background dimension emerges 
as a significant reinforcing element. If some prejudice is aroused 
through dissemination of such items as a defendant's deviant behavior 
or past criminal record, when it is linked with an aspect of ethnic 
background, it is rated significantly higher in terms of prejudicial 
value. There appears to be some suggestion among judges that even 
something as innocent as an ethnic name, on the part of the defendant, 
is sufficient to reinforce prejudice aroused by one of the other 
elements. 
5) Local judges appear most consistent in terms of their morbidity 
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orientation. Stories containing any kind of information which could be 
considered sensational are rated significantly high. 
6) There is substantial disagreement among types as to the preju-
dicial value of publishing a defendant's prior criminal record. Most 
researchers have found this to be significant in generating predisposi-
tion among jurors, yet it does not appear to carry over.consistently 
among the various types, and when it does, the stories within that 
element are not consistently rated. 
7) The single judge, who fell into Type IX by his extreme disa-
greement with the balance of judges, appears to be most consistent 
overall in rating the various prejudicial categories. 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of this chapter, the thoughts of Sir Peter Medawar 
were stated. He defined scientific reasoning as a "kind of dialogue 
between the possible and the actual, between what might be and what is 
in fact the case. 1147 After this extensive analysis of the data, it is 
necessary to summarize what is actual and what is in fact the case. 
In structuring the experim~nt, three research problems and nine 
hypotheses were set down to narrow the range of the subject matter to 
be considered. At this time the author quoted Judge Bernard S. Meyer 
who stated: "Our responsibility is to learn how to narrow such a proba-
bility (of prejudice). 1148 Have we isolated the parameters as to what 
is prejudicial publici~y? 
It i.s the author's belief that this experiment, while exploratory 
in nature, has significantly defined some parameters. To summarize those 
parameters, the specific problems and hypotheses will be utilized. 
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Conclusions of Research Problems 
The three problems dealt with were: 
1) Is there a relationship, in the opinion of the judges, between 
the news elements of criminal magnitude, prior record, and ethnic back-
ground, and possible prejudice to a defendant's ca~e? 
2) Does this relationship change when jurisdiction varies from 
local to state to federal leve~s? 
3) Do judges tend to cluster together on the basis of their 
opinions, concerning the relationship of the news elements to possible 
prejudice, apart from their jurisdictional lev~l? 
There is a significant relationship in the judges' opinions of the 
prejudicial value of the news elements. Judges, regardless of jurisdic-
tional level, viewed the major aspects of the prior record dimension, 
especially non-criminal deviance, as being a critical factor in the 
development of significant prejudice towards a defendant. 
The ethnic background dimension, in particular custom, was seen as 
a reinforcing factor. If potential prejudice was initiated by certain 
aspects of the defendant's background, and in particular his socially 
deviant ones, the aspect of ethnic background turned such potential 
prejudice into an influence which could substantially predispose jurors 
to find the defendant guilty even before one piece of evidence was 
adduced into court. There is even some evidence that the mere use of 
an ethnic name in a news story concerning a crime is sufficient to 
initiate the chain of inferences in a potential juror's mind that will 
result in assessing him as guilty. 
The relationship of judges' opinions on the prejudicial value of 
news elements does indeed change with jurisdictional level. Federal 
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judges express strong opinions as to the prejudicial value of the non-
criminal deviance element. Such deviance from the trivial to the bi-
zarre is viewed equally by this group. When such deviance is linked to 
a custom or practice in the defendant's ethnic heritage, it strengthens 
the prejudicial value of the non-criminal deviance element. 
State judges express strong opinions on the prejudicial value of 
the inducement element. Any recitation of the motivations or reasons 
for the crime is deemed significantly prejudicial by this group. These 
judges as a group are particularly adamant when such statements come 
from "experts" whose opinions are not given under oath, and who will 
never be subject to cross-examination by the defense. 
Local judges exhibit consistently strong opinions on the prejudi-
cial value of the morbidity element. Any stories which review the gory 
and often sensational details are deemed as prejudicial. 
The assessments of all judges when compared finds nine different 
types emerging. Among each type, local judges cluster together most 
consistently. Significant fragmentation of opinions is exhibited by 
the way federal and state judges group together in terms of agreement. 
Conclusions of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. All judges as a group will give stories with the 
elements of criminal magnitude the highest prejudicial ranking. 
This hypothesis is not confirmed. As a group judges exhibit 
inconsistencies as to the prejudicial value of this dimension. Only 
local judges exhibit a high ranking and then only on the single element 
of the dimension of morbidity. 
Hypothesis 2. All judges as a group will give stories with the 
elements of prior record the second highest prejudicial ranking. 
This hypothesis is not confirmed. Judges as a group exhibit a 
strong tendency to rate elements of this dimension as significantly 
highest in prejudice. 
Hypothesis 3. All judges as a group will give stories with the 
elements of ethnic background the lowest prejudicial ranking. 
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This hypothesis is not confirmed. Elements of ethnic background 
are rated equally with those of prior record in terms of prejudice 
involved. 
Hypothesis 4. Judges of local jurisdiction will give stories with 
the elements of criminal magnitude the highest prejudicial ranking. 
This hypothesis is confirmed. Local judges, both individually and 
as a group, exhibit a strong morbidity orientation. 
Hypothesis 5. Judges of state jurisdiction will give stories with 
the elements of prior record the highest prejudicial ranking. 
This hypothesis is confirmed. State judges, both individually and 
as a group, exhibit a strong inducement orientation. 
Hypothesis 6. Among judges of federal jurisdiction, there will be 
no significant differences between stories containing the elements of 
criminal magnitude and prior record. 
This hypothesis not confirmed. Federal judges, both individually 
and as a group, exhibit a strong non-criminal deviance orientation. 
Hypothesis 7. Among all judges, when stories with the elements of 
criminal magnitude interact with elements of ethnic background, and 
when stories with the element of prior record interact with ethnic 
background, no significant differences will be produced. 
This hypothesis is not confirmed. Ethnic background interacts 
with both criminal magnitude and prior record to produce significant 
differences. 
Hypothesis 8. Among all judges, stories with the.element of 
criminal magnitude and prior record will interact to account for the 
most variation among prejudicial rankings. 
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This hypothesis is not confirmed. Prior record and ethnic back-
ground account for the most variation in scores. 
Hypothesis 9, Between all judges, we would expect to find two 
types of judges. 
This hypothesis is not confirmed. Nine types of judges emerge. 
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CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS AND REC0!'1MENDATIONS 
Introduction 
Can one now say with some certainty what is prejudicial publicity? 
Indeed this study has been able to reach some definite conclusions as 
to what kind of news elements do tend to prejudice potential jurors in 
the minds of federal, state and local judges. 
Prejudicial publicity can thus be summarized as follows: 
1) Statements identifying the defendant as a member of a minority 
group, or describing the customs and practices of a minority group, are 
prejudicial. Such statements seem to reinforce prejudice placed by 
other news elements. 
2) Statements describing the defendant's past history in terms 
of the deviant practices he has been involved in are prejudicial. 
3) Statements made by "experts" not under oath, attempting to 
explain a reason or motivation for a crime are prejudicial. 
4) Statements reciting a defendant's past criminal record, crimes 
for which he has been convicted of and time served are prejudicial. 
With these in mind, it is the author's desire to apply the power 
of knowledge principle. Sir Francis Bacon, the father of the scientific 
method, once wrote that "knowledge is power. 111 The promise of science 
is that as man examines the phenomenon that surrounds him, he has within 
his power the ability to improve his state in life, if he can make the 
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leap from the theoretical to the practical. One knows theoretically 
that the items mentioned above are prejudicial. However, if these 
cannot be transferred into salient recommendations of such, knowledge 
is powerless. 
The leap, however, from the theoretical to the practical is often 
difficult. Many things that look good on paper are hard to transform 
into reality, primarily because they require people to change, changing 
their thought patterns, lifestyles and conduct. Thus it is not just 
knowledge of subject matter that can be transformed into power, but 
knowledge of how people react and behave. In fact, often the knowledge 
of behavior is more important than the subject matter. 
Thus the recommendations made must be based not only upon the 
empirical knowledge level, but the behavioral characteristics of 
journalists, lawyers and judges. The desired goal is change, a dis-
tinct change in the behavior of each group. 
Therefore, we will commence by briefly discussing the practical 
implications of the four news elements found to be prejudicial on the 
lives of each of these groups. From there some areas for further study 
will be cited. 
Finally, detailed recommendations will be offered to both the press 
and judicial communities, with the hope that in the future, the course 
of individual trials can be improved. 
Implications 
Earlier in the review of Supreme Court cases, the words of Justice 
Stanley Reed in Pennekamp vs. Florida clearly described the cutting 
edge of the entire issue under study. He stated: "A free press is not 
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to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judici-
ary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other. 112 Thus as we 
conclude;'"i~~ not a matter of whether research has established a more 
compelling right for one camp over the other, but rather the goal of 
this study has been to find ways for both camps to live in "responsible 
peace." 
The phrase "responsible peace" is the key. Both the press and the 
judiciary must clearly see the roles·they are called upon to carry out 
if society is to remain rational. When a conflict arises over these 
roles, they must be settled in a responsible fashion, often meaning 
apart from the courts. The law has a way of doing funny things with 
the lives of individuals and institutions. Norman Mailer has written: 
The law is built on the assumption that life is mad, and law 
offers the same stability society brings to restless humankind. 
Look you fools, says society, the way we do it makes no one happy3 
but somehow, most of the time, you get through life in one piece. 
Based on such assumptions, it is easy to see that if the momentous 
decisions that the press and the judiciary must make are left to the 
law to resolve, ultimately someone's freedom will be lost. 
Therefore, the press in particular must develop its clear sense of 
social responsibility. The Hutchins Commission in 1947 stressed what 
the alternative would be if the press did not develop such a sense of 
responsibility. They stated: 
Everyone concerned with freedom of the press and with the future 
of democracy should put forth every effort to make the press 
accountable, for if it does not become so of its own motion, the 
power ~f government will be used as a last resort, to force it to 
be so. 
But what does it mean for the press to act responsibly. Can such 
conflict be operationally defined? Indeed it can. It is the author's 
belief that the basis of social responsibility for the press can be 
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simply stated: freedom carries obligations and responsibilities, and 
since the press enjoys a privileged position in society, it is obligated 
to act in a responsible way. In the matter of pre-trial publicity, the 
obligations involved are many. What about publication of a defendant's 
prior record? What about ethnic and racial labels? Do the people have 
an instanteous need to know? Only a responsible journalist can weigh 
all the effects of such dissemination and arrive at a just conclusion 
which not only protects his own freedom, but also the freedom of the 
defendant. 
Invariably there is the temptation to say, "Why should my paper or 
television station act in such a way, when everybody else is going 
about it the same old way?" Indeed it is difficult, in particular where 
the responsible journalist tends to lose at the box office. Such a 
problem has always confronted men and women of conscience, and the 
answer has always been the same. It is what Atticus Finch told his 
children in To Kill a Mockingbird: "The one thing that doesn't abide 
by majority rule is a person's conscience. 115 
Therefore, the stronger members of the press must take the lead 
for their weaker brethren, and show them the path they must trod 
towards maturity. Otherwise, one must face the consequences. The 
British jurist Lord Chancellor Hardwicke stated in 1742: 
Nothing is more encumbent upon the courts of justice, than to 
preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is 
there anything of more pernicious consequence than to prejudice 
the minds of the public against p5rsons concerned as parties 
before the case is finally heard. 
The question then must be will the press solve its own problems, or 
will it allow an often hostile judiciary to solve the problems for 
them? 
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Let us examine some of the pernicious consequences of what this 
study has established empirically, consequences that effect the press 
and the judiciary. Of initial importance was the lack of uniformity in 
news judgments. As the data was analyzed, it became apparent that 
there is substantial disagreement between judges as individuals and as 
a group over what is inherently prejudicial. While one believes that 
"equal justice under the law," as it is inscribed on many courthouse 
exteriors, is a working principle, our findings indicate that that 
quality of justice may vary significantly from courtroom to courtroom. 
Such lack of uniformity in areas of sentencing, and admissability 
of evidence has been connnon knowledge for some time. Former Attorney 
General Robert Jackson has stated: 
It is obviously repugnant to one's sense of justice that the 
judgment meted out to an offender should be dependent in large 
part on a purely fortuitous circumstance; namely the personality 
of the parti9u1ar judge before whom the case happens to come for 
disposition. 
Now it appears that prejudicial publicity assessments may be added to 
this growing list. 
Nowhere is such alack of agreement more critical than in the area 
of voir-dire proceedings. The selection of twelve jurors to hear a 
case is often complex and time consuming, but a careful examination is 
necessary to produce individuals who will judge a case strictly on the 
evidence adduced in court. As part of that sorting out process, the 
judge is required to question potential jurors on the publicity surround-
ing the case. It is rare in a controversial case to find individuals 
who have not read or heard about it. Therefore, it becomes a question 
of discerning whether such publicity has created a predisposition. If 
a judge is unclear as to what aspects can predispose, such a careful 
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voir-dire examination can be impaired. If it is impaired enough, the 
ability to offer the defendant his clear Sixth Amendment rights is in 
jeopardy. According to Judge Bernard,S. Meyer, the presiding officer 
of the court can never be too careful in questioning jurors. He writes: 
A juror who states that he has formed an opinion but that he will 
be able to decide impartially should nonetheless be excused if the 
publicity is of a highly inflammatory nature,.or concerns incrimi-
natory,matter of significance that may be inadmissable as evidence.8 
Once again it is clear that a judge cannot grapple with the issue, 
as Meyer has explained it, unless on his own he has come to a decisive 
conclusion as to which news values are prejudicial and which are not. 
But this conclusion must be reached on the basis of broad principles of 
law rather than personal experience. In interviews with the partici-
pating judges, the author was impressed by the differences in reasoning. 
Many judges based prejudicial publicity decisions on simple "gut feel-
ings," which in the conflict of interest can result in infringement of 
rights. 
It is for this reason that Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, 
in their concurring opinion in Nebraska Press Association, pointed out 
that the power of restraint when given to judges in a broad context can 
become a tool of repression. They stated: 
A judge importuned to issue a prior restraint will be unable to 
predict the manner in which the potentially prejudicial informa-
tion would be publishgd ••• or the impact, evaluated in terms 
of current standards. 
Thus the court believed that leaving blanket gag orders at the disposal 
of judges did two things: first, it allowed them to avoid coming to a 
decision on the basic issue of what is prejudicial publicity, but also 
it abused the power of the court. 
Therefore, it would seem apparent that judges overall in this 
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state need to do more "homework" on the prejudicial publicity issue, to 
take their "gut reactions" and measure them against the volumes of case 
law that have been developed on the subject. However, in deference to 
many of the judges, the overwhelming case load that they are expected 
to bear does not permit them the time to do such work. 
Another area where the implications are enormous is the findings 
made in the area of ethnic labels and background. While such racism 
may be subtle, it has the effect of reinforcing a predisposition in a 
juror's mind. The fact that a judge in this study believed that a 
minority group member had "one strike" against him in the courts of 
this state opens up a pandora's box in terms of infringement of rights 
and due process. 
The responsible media must drop the use of racial labels or the 
quality of justice in the United States will continue with a cloud of 
racial inequality over it. In essence, it is the author's belief that 
such labels are utilized to fulfill a basic American train of thought. 
When a serious crime is committed, Americans in their search for meaning, 
must have a scapegoat immediately, upon whom they can pour out their 
wrath and often irrational wrath at that. 
John Lofton in commenting on this classic American phenomenon 
writes: 
There is relief when the murderer is finally spottedo He is not 
after all a person like you and me; he is a villain and he has 
been caught by an infallible power; the supercilious 1Bd omnis-
cient detective knows exactly where to fix the guilto 
What better scapegoat than the member of a minority gro~p? 
History tends to confirm this. Bruno Richard Hauptmann, a German 
immigrant, the accused kidnapper and murderer of the Lindbergh baby, 
became the victim of some of the most intense racial scapegoating ever. 
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The Hearst chain continuously contrasted him with Adolf Hitler, who was 
then coming to power as head of the Nazi movement. 11 
Therefore, it cannot be emphasized too much that a person's ethnic 
background has no correlation to the fair trial to which he is entitled. 
If we truly affirm, as a nation, the premise of "equal justice under 
the law," all that matters is that this is a human being who is entitled 
to a rational and fair hearing of his case without all the subtle racial 
nuances that often occur. 
But such indications also imply that the quality of reporting on 
minority groups is far from what it should be, in spite of all the 
"blue-ribbon" recommendations made over the past forty years. The 
Hutchin's Commission in its 1947 report stated: "The press itself 
should assume the responsibility of providing the variety, quantity, 
and quality of information and discussion which the country needs. 1112 
But what does the country ne~d? The commission went on to state as one 
of its "Five Ideals:" "The projection of a representative picture of 
the constituent groups in society. 1113 Unfortunately, the press has not 
in the past painted such a picture of our diverse society. 
Because of this the Kerner Commission, in its report on racial and 
civil unrest in 1968, concluded: "We believe the media have thus far 
failed,,to report adequately on the causes and consequences of civil 
disorders and the underlying problems of race relations. 1114 The Commis-
sion went on to add that what coverage was given over to race relations 
"sensationalized the disturbances consistently overplaying violence. 1115 
But in spite of the Kerner Commission's findings, the press has 
still largely dragged its feet. A recent UNESCO study of the world 
press and minorities concluded: 
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To get coverage, blacks have had to stage demonstrations. How-
ever, when demonstration is covered, too often the event itself 
becomes the news, 6overshadowing the causes, problems, and griev-
ances behind it. 
Finally a study done by a leading television news magazine con-
eluded that coverage of the Liberty City riots in 1980 was once again 
inadequate. "There was no effort to connect the violence in Miami to 
black problems elsewhere in the country or to place it in the context 
of persistent racism throughout the seventies. 1117 
Thus this study implies heavily that the responsible press, par-
ticularly in this part of the country, needs to see itself as an agent 
of education, making the largely white populace more aware of the posi-
tive aspects of minority cultures. Otherwise, we face a continued 
battle with the forces of ignorance who are determined to make "equal 
justice under the law" a white-man-only rule. 
Another area of broad implication is the manner in which extra-
judicial statements are handled. While the press cannot be held total-
ly responsible for the actions initiated by those within the law 
enforcement community, the maturing media must deal with great restraint 
in this area. 
The responsible press must come to grips with the fact that unless 
such statements are made under oath and subject to cross-examination, 
they have it within their power to deny an individual a fair trial by 
assemination of such material. The fact that the individual making 
such statements may be an "expert" in his field, does not oblige him to 
circumvent another's Sixth Amendment rights.· In People vs. Roof, the 
California Appellatte Court made this clear: "It is the effect of the 
statement, and not the motive behind it, which is determinative of the 
question whether the case of the defendant was substantially impaired. 1118 
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But it is not just the motive of the individual who makes such 
statements that is in question, it is also the press's motivation. In 
its immaturity the media has consistently displayed a tendency to grasp 
at straws to arrive at a meaning for a crime. Such conduct is inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment, as well as the profession's Code of 
Ethics. 
The unsworn comments of individuals in such celebrated trials as 
the Hauptmann, Sheppard, and Speck cases do not necessarily fall under 
the broad umbrella of the First Amendment and the "right to know." The 
public has a right to be kept informed with the details as they are 
stated during the course of the trial, so that they can fulfill their 
role of scrutinizing the proceedings, to make certain they are consis-
tent with the Sixth Amendment. However, speculative statements given 
on the basis of second or third hand knowledge cannot be said to fit 
into this category of information • ..J1 
It is also inconsistent with the profession's Code of Ethics. The 
1975 Canon under the area of responsibility states: "The primary pur-
pose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve the 
general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make 
judgments on the issues of the time. 111 9 .J 
The authors of this document seemed to believe that if the American 
people were given sufficient information, they could structure accurate 
meaning in proportion to the accuracy of the data. While this may be 
overly optomistic, the principle laid down is clear: the masses must 
make up their own mind! In relating this to the discussion at hand, 
the speculative testimony of experts does not aid this process. 
Rather, the kind of reporting being talked about as that which 
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characterizes a mature press, is the decisive scrutiny of courtroom 
proceedings, the bringing to light of judicial misconduct, the abuse 
of police power, and the infringement of a defendant's rights. If the 
press in the past had spent the same amount of energy scrutinizing the 
proceedings· in the courtroom, rather than racing helter.,.skelter to 
this expert and that one, substantial strides could be made in assur-
ing a defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights. -vi' 
A final implication is the need to reassess how the media, as well 
as the law enforcement community, will handle not only a defendant's 
prior criminal record, but also any past history of social deviancy. 
To the surprise of the author, the publication of a defendant's prior 
criminal record does not emerge as high in prejudicial value as was 
expected, nevertheless, it does contribute to prejudice when linked 
with another news element. 
It is apparent that more research needs to be done in this area. 
However, there are several cogent arguments for suppression of a prior 
.record until after the trial is over. First, such material is not 
admissable as evidence, therefore, it is not matter which is necessary 
for the potential juror to decide the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
A defendant is ultimately tried only on the crime he is currently 
charged with and not his past. The decision of Michelson vs. United 
States cited earlier made this law on the basis that a defendant cannot 
be "type cast" in the format of "once a criminal, always a criminal," 
and still receive a fair trial. 
Second, if a defendant cannot escape his past, if he is constantly 
being hounded by it, he can never move ahead. Rather his life becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy that once a criminal, he can never be 
223 
anything more than a criminal. It is for this reason that the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in 
its Task Force Report on Corrections, endorsed the idea of expunging a 
defendant's prior record after five years from date of release from 
incarceration. Their model for legislation held that under such a 
system, a defendant's prior record would be expunged. "In every aspect 
of his activities and interests of a non-criminal nature, he shall have 
the absolute right to affirm that he has never been arrested or con-
victed of an offense in the past. 1120 
Finally, just as with ethnic labels, the title of ex-offender 
stereotypes and demeans the individual. Such labels do not aid society 
in passing judgment on the guilt or innocence of the individual. Rath-
er, they simply appeal to our petty passions and prejudices. 
Areas for Future Research 
With these implications in mind, at least four key areas can be 
cited for future research. 
The Effects of Ethnic Labeling 
This study has hinted at the fact that a member of a minority 
group can be substantially prejudiced, simply by the use of his ethnic 
name or label. To better clarify this phenomenon, research needs to be 
done to establish what facets of an ethnic person's background do in-
deed prejudice a juror. Both judges and potential jurors need to be 
tested to get better insight into this subtle aspect of racism in our 
society. A Q-sort similar to the one used in this experiment with non-
ethnic and ethnic stories would certainly help to define the parameters 
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of such prejudice. 
The Effects of Prior Record Labeling 
As with the ethnic label, research is desperately needed to deter-
mine the effect of labels, such as "ex-felon," "ex-convict," and 
"former inmate," have on the public's perception of the defendant. 
The aspect of a defendant's prior deviant behavior is more of a 
difficult issue. Often that bizarre behavior has led to the commission 
of the crime and is part of the overall record. It is here that the 
maturity and responsibility of the press is needed. A responsible 
journalist will carefully weigh the effects of dissemination against 
the possible Sixth Amendment infringement. 
The issue is further complicated by the comments raised by several 
judges who believed that some members of the public associate social 
deviancy with being a member of a minority group. This kind of racism 
seems so entrenched that there is little or nothing that can be done, 
except to keep chipping away at it gradually, in hopes that further 
education will destroy it. 
Ultimately, editors and news directors must decide if some aspect 
of social deviancy is vital to the public's welfare and safety. If it 
is not, it probably has little or no relevant use and is therefore best 
left unsaid. The exception to such a rule would be if this social 
deviancy was introduced as evidence during the course of the trial. 
Then it becomes part of the public record and should be disseminated. 
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The Cumulative Effect of Prejudicial 
Publicity 
A number of the judges participating in this study commented that 
many of the stories in the Q deck by themselves would not be prejudi-
cial, but when taken in the context of all 54 they might indeed be 
prejudicial. It has long been thought that the saturation effect, 
especially in a controversial case, tends to prejudice simply. by the 
amount of information laid upon the potential juror. A study with the 
group of potential jurors during a sixty-day period (normal trial lag 
time) would greatly help to ascertain some of the cumulative effects. 
Jury Decision Making 
More work needs to be done in the area of.how a jury reaches a 
verdict. In particular, how do they structure the data adduced in 
court into a coherent whole, and then ultimately into a verdi~t? It 
is the author's belief that such studies would demonstrate that very 
subtle communication factors, both within the courtroom and out, have a 
definite effect on the verdict rendered. 
Recommendations to the Press 
Believing that the media cannot hide behind the skirts of the 
First Amendment for all of its transgressions, the following recommen-
dations are offered. If translated into reality, the media will take a 
great stride forward in terms of maturity. 
Trained Specialists for Crime Reporting 
Usually it is the "cub" reporter who is fresh out of journalism 
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school who is assigned to the police and/or courthouse beat. But with 
the lives of people at stake, such a trend must be stopped. As with 
most other areas, the media must develop specialists in the area of 
crime reporting, journalists who are familiar with the judicial process, 
sensitive to the areas where substantial injustice may be done. Such a 
mature press corps will not be developed short of radical changes in 
journalism school programs, and in'the attitudes of those who head 
media organizations. 
Upgraded Standards Overall for 
Journalism Schools 
Believing that greater education is the only way to improve the 
profession, the overall curriculum and structure of journalism educa-
tion needs to be examined. It is the author's belief that journalism 
schools must adopt the concept of "professional" education. For the 
effect that they can have on potential lives, journalists are required 
to have only a basic education, or none at all. It is important to ask 
oneself, would I want a surgeon to operate on me who only had a Bache-
lor's degr~e? Or a lawyer defend me in court with only a pre-law edu-
cation? Obviously not! Then why do we think journalists, who can have 
an equally important effect on the lives of people, can get by with 
just four years of schooling. It is the author's hope to someday see 
journalism schools adopt a five-year degree program where young people 
could be groomed and polished for their life's work. Such a restruc-
turing would avail the students of an opportunity to develop greater 
specialization within the profession, as well as developing a more 
responsible sense of ethics. 
Greater Policing Power by Professional 
Organizations 
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Here again it seems like journalism is the only profession which 
makes no attempt to bring their wayward members back into line. Teeth 
must be put into codes of ethics and professional creeds. The media as 
a whole needs to censure its members who consistently fuel the flames 
of prejudice. The argument is often heard that such policing power 
would require licensing, and will we permit the state to license journa-
lists? It is the author's contention that this is a smoke screen to 
hide the real issue, which is that the media tend to adopt a "good old 
boy" attitude, that while they are competitors, no one wants to rock 
the boat. 
Joint Bar-Press Councils' 
While these have been used on a national level, they must be de-
veloped in every city. These councils could unite for the purpose of 
monitoring crime reporting coverage in their area, as well as spurring 
a spirit of greater cooperation. Too long journalists and lawyers and 
judges have seen themselves as enemies. This must be replaced with a 
spirit of cooperation even on the lowest levels. Only when that cooper-
ation begins will each profession see its proper role in the operation 
of the criminal justice system. 
Greater Commitment by the Press to 
Public Education 
Over and over, areas have been cited where the press could make a 
substantial contribution in educating the public, if it will change its 
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priorities. Rather than running after the bizarre details, the press 
should take it upon itself to make the public more aware of how the 
judicial system operates, how minorities properly fit into society, and 
how those who have committed crimes in the past can be effectively 
reintegrated into society. 
Agreement to Drop Labels of all Kinds 
We have become a label-oriented society. We desi.re to place every-
one in the right cubbyhole. The press must .take the lead in dropping 
the use of such labels. Otherwise, we will continue to make what a 
person is more important than who the person is. 
Willingness to Suppress Certain Facts 
The people do not have an instantaneous right to know. Holding 
back the details of a defendant's prior·record or aspects of his past 
bizarre behavior not directly linked to public safety, until the trial 
is over or at least until a jury is seated, does not infringe the First 
Amendment, provided it is done on a voluntary basis. If anything, such 
an arrangement strengthens the First Amendment by demonstrating the 
maturity of the press in handling the broad powers given to it. 
Recommendations to the Judicial Community 
Believing that the judicial community also needs to make changes 
to help insure fair trials, the following recommendations are offered. 
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A Clear Understanding of Prejudicial 
Publicity 
Judges need to examine more thoroughly the issue of prejudicial 
publicity in terms of what causes prejudice in the minds of jurors, and 
then relate it to the broad spectrum of case law on the subject. 
Greater Policing Power over Law 
Enforcement Officials 
As stated several times in the analysis of data, judges believed 
that extra-judicial statements made by law enforcement officials were 
wrong, and the basis for possible contempt proceedings. If that is the 
case, then judges need to take such actions consistently. No matter 
how much the media matures, the off-the-cuff statements by police or 
prosecutor will continue to be a factor. The Supreme Court has made it 
abundantly clear that the burden of insuring a fair trial is on the 
judge. Given such responsibility, judges need to exercise it. 
A Re-Examination of the Jury System 
Trial by jury has been a fundamental American right for the past 
two centuries. However, it is also one of the most criticized American 
institutions. F. Lee Bailey stated after Sam Sheppard was acquitted 
of murder in his second trial: 
The jury system is good only because there is no other system, 
in every other respect it is bad. There is a far greater likeli-
hood of an innocent man being convicted because of2'f mistake by a 
jury than because of an error of law by the judge. 
Yet much of the blame lies with defense attorneys like F. Lee 
Bailey, who desire to seat jurors who can be easily swayed by the 
230 
theatrics they employ. Consider the quality of jurors in some famous 
cases in history. The jury that convicted Bruno Richard Hauptmann was 
made up of largely blue collar workers and housewives. 22 The jury 
which convicted Dr. Sam Sheppard had only one college graduate. 23 In 
the case of Wayne Dresbach, a fifteen-year-old who was charged with 
killing his adopted parents, the jury foremen turned out to be totally 
illiterate. This was learned only after the jury deliberated and he 
was unable to read the verdict. 24 The irony of this ca~e was that the 
jury was subjected to hours of complex testimony on the sanity of the 
defendant. How could an illiterate individual wade through all of that 
to reach a verdict? 
Dean Erwin Griswold has therefore concluded: 
Jury trial, at best, is an apothesis of the amateur. Why should 
anyone think that twelve persons brought in from the street, 
selected in various ways, for their lack of general ability, 
should h~~e any special capacity to decide controversies between 
perSOf1:S? 
Therefore, the greatest stride one could make towards significant 
reform of the jury system is to see that more well-educated people 
become jurors. This will not be easy though, for there is an unseen 
bias against professionals such as doctors, lawyers and ministers, and 
even against white collar individuals. 26 In many states, specific 
exemptions exist to keep such people from ever being called. 
However, if these types of people are going to be willing to serve, 
it must be made economically feasible. Once again the words of the 
President's Task Force are still relevant today: 
The juror who comes to court to hear evidence and reach a verdict, 
and then spends most of his time being shuffled about, has good 
reason to feel manipulated, used, and otherwise treated as a pa~7 
in a game, particularly if adequate compensation is not offered. 
Another suggestion to strengthen the jury system is to utilize 
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specialized juries. With the growing complexity of litigation, justice 
can best be served by empaneling jurors familiar with the area in dis-
pute. In other words, if a personal injury case is being tried, 
utilize a panel of doctors, nurses and other medical specialists. If 
it concerns the sanity of an individual, utilize psychiatrists and 
psychologists. The Constitutional term "jury of his peers" is certainly 
still upheld. Such a suggestion would certainly provoke the ire of 
defense attorneys, as Gleisser states: 
Loud opposition to this could be expected among some lawyers, who 
would argue that these people do not come with an open mind; that 
they are prejudiced by their own training. What they really mean 
is that these jurors cannot be influenced by emotional arguments 
which may have no bearing on the case and, since they cannot be 
pressured, are of no valu~8in helping the lawyer win this case, 
however meager its merit. 
There is also strong merit for some kind of pre-trial education 
for jurors. Where this has been implemented, it has taken the form of 
jury handbooks, seminars with judges, and in one of the most highly 
praised efforts, a very well-produced film. The film, The True and the 
Just, was underwritten by the Ford Foundation and is now regularly used 
in the New York City court system. 29 Once again, this may provoke the 
wrath of lawyers, but is in keeping with the principle that the more 
informed the juror is, the better the quality of justice. 
Finally, jurors should be required to set down in the form of an 
opinion the reasons for reaching their verdict. If judges at all levels 
are required to set down their decisions in writing, why shouldn't the 
same be required of jurors? Why can the reasoning behind a judge's 
opinion be appealed to a higher court, yet the reasoning of jurors be 
veiled in secrecy? To the author, the merit of this concept is great. 
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Greater Use of Scientific Inquiry in the 
Criminal Justice System 
While some breakthroughs have been made, the legal community dis-
dains the use of scientific techniques. It would appear that many 
would like to leave this area of life behind the blindfold of justice. 
Sharon Collins has concluded: "The single most important barrier to 
th f . 1 . . d . . . 1130 e use o socia science evi ence is ignorance. Such ignorance 
takes the form of fear, of what might be learned. Thus it is tanta-
mount to playing an ostrich, sticking one's head in the ground and 
hoping the problem will go away. 
An Afterword 
After an extensive study of this type, and the severe changes that 
it indicates are needed, there is a tendency to despair, something akin 
to sitting at the base of a high mountain, looking up and wondering if 
it can ever be climbed. But this should not be the case. Our Consti-
tutional system possesses a resiliency, an ability to make changes. 
These may not come immediately, but with persistence, progress can be 
made. The press has changed, not as much as the author would like, 
but nevertheless, improvements have been made since the Hauptmann trial 
which brought this whole issue into focus. 
The key ingredient to continued improvement is to always remember 
that the system embodied in the Constitution is a continuous experiment 
in the ability of free men to struggle with injustice. We may never 
reach utopia, but on the other hand to give up is not an option. 
The press and judicial communities must move forth with more 
experimentation, more openness to try new ideas and a greater sense of 
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cooperation. The words of Justice Oliver Holmes in his dissent of 
Abrams vs. the United States seem a fitting conclusion: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe more than they believe the very 
foundation of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is 
an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager 
our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. 
While that experiment is part of our system, I think that we 
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expres-
sion of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death, unless they so imminently threaten interference with the 
lawful and pressing purposes of ~qe law that an immediate check 
is required to save the country. 
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APPENDIX A 
STORIES USED IN Q-SORT 
Story Number 1 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/ 
Little·Ethnic 
A killer with an insatiable lust for blood invaded Bidwell Dormi-
tory and strangled or fatally stabbed six coeds at Middleton University. 
A seventh coed was found frozen in terror in a closet where she 
managed to escape the massacre. 
The FBI, with its full investigational and laboratory resources, 
"has had an agent here all day long to assist in any way," a spokesman 
said. 
Police Chief Gerald Smith, when asked to comment on the crimes, 
stated: "I've seen more people killed, but I've never seen anything 
more horrible than this." As to the possible killer, he replied: "We 
have a sub-animal here who took people one at a time and killed them." 
Coroner Edward Drake called it the "crime of the century." He 
reported that three girls were clothed, one was mude, the others had 
on at least their underpants. Preliminary indication is that at least 
one victim was sexually molested. 
Story Number 2 
Morbidity/Normality/Minority 
A knock on their dormitory door at Middleton University disturbed 
Nancy Wilson and Phyllis Duvall as they prepared for the following 
day's final examinations. It began a night of macabre and horror, 
which ended when Ms. Wilson hung out the window of the room and 
screamed: "They are all dead! My friends are all dead! Oh, God, 
I'm the only one alive." 
To this horrific scream police could add little. Inside the west 
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wing of Bidwell Hall on the second floor lay six young female students, 
some bound, some gagged, some strangled, some stabbed--all dead. "It 
is the crime of the century," pronounced Middleton Police Chief Gerald 
Smith. 
The grisly dimensions were plain to see. In a lounge area lay 
one of the victims with a strip of bedsheet around her neck. In a 
bathroom in the west wing two more bodies and in room f/202 where it 
all began, three others. Officer Vincent Simmons, first at the scene, 
said: "They were strewn all over the place, and blood everywhere. 
I've never seen anything like it." 
Police stated that Nancy Wilson escaped being the seventh victim 
by hiding in a hallway broom closet of the dorm while the murderer 
had taken one of the girls away to kill her. She described the killer 
as being approximately six feet tall, of Hispanic origin, with shortly 
cropped hair and wearing a blue sport coat. 
Story Number 3 
Morbidity/Normality/Little Ethnic 
Much is buried in the litter of crime. The murderer, the setting, 
the act itself and especially the character of the killer, take pre-
cedence over everything else in the horrified public mind. 
Yet let us not forget the victims, who, until yesterday, were 
happy and intelligent college students. 
Phyllis Duvall, 22, would have graduated at semester's end. An 
honor student, active in student government, she was considered a 
leader in her class. She was strangled to death. 
Patricia Fisher, 20, a perfectionist known for her desire to 
always look her best, would take buttons off her clothes periodically 
and replace them with new ones. She was stabbed; her throat was 
slashed. 
et al 
Story Number 4 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Minority 
A nationwide manhunt began Saturday for a tatooed ex-convict 
named in a murder warrant as the slayer of six coeds in Middleton 
University's Bidwell Dorm. 
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Police Chief Gerald Smith said fingerprints lifted from the blood 
spattered dorm rooms matched those of Jose Martinez, a migrant worker 
and ex-convict. 
The fugitive was described as Mexican American, 24 years old, 
6' 1" tall, weighing 160 pounds, with blue eyes, and dark black hair. 
Martinez has a long police record in Texas where he served two 
terms in the penitentiary. While on parole after his first term, 
Martinez was found guilty of threatening a 26-year-old woman with a 
butcher knife. 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, authorities said Martinez also is wanted 
for questioning in the murder of a barmaid last April. Martinez's 
older brother also has been convicted on a number of burglary charges 
and is serving time in California prison. 
Story Number 5 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/ 
Little Ethnic 
The slaying of six young coeds at Middleton University by a 
mysterious intruder was another chapter in the long history of mass 
murders stretching back to Greek legend. Some crimes were so horrible 
that they created new legends through books, film and even ballet. 
One of the worst in American history occured September 6, 1949, 
when Howard Unruh, a World War II veteran, went beserk in Camden, 
New Jersey, killing the first 13 persons he encountered on the street. 
Boston's phantom strangler managed to garrot 11 women, and perhaps 
13, between 1962 and 1964. A 33-year-old handyman who confessed the 
killings is confined to a state mental hospital. Authorities said he 
told stories of attacking 600 other women. 
Story Number 6 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/ 
Little Ethnic 
Somewhere in Middleton may lurk a man--tortured by fantasy and 
driven to act out the most gruesome details of his macabre imagina-
tion--who brutally murders young women and doesn't know it. 
Such is the opinion of Dr. Barton Framm, professor of psychology 
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at Middleton University, in corrnnenting on the Bidwell Dorm killings. 
On the basis of what he has found out, he has constructed a personality 
sketch of the killer. 
"Everything he did to those women, he did in his mind before he 
ever saw them," Dr. Frarrnn stated. This type of person will go over 
everything in his fantasy world before he acts. For a while this 
fantasy killing will satisfy a need to express hatred for women. 
But after this builds up, he is compelled to act. 
Dr. Frarrnn's conclusion? The man, if not stopped, will murder 
again. 
Story Number 7 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/ 
Little Ethnic 
Police officials expressed today they have no solid reason why 
six young coeds were brutally murdered in their dormitory suite at 
Middleton University. The:re was no evidence anything had been taken. 
"There just is no reason for violence of this kind," one inves-
tigator said. Police seem to agree the murders were the work of a 
"sick and mentally deranged person," said Coroner's Assistant Richard 
Lacosta. 
Story Number 8 
Morbidity/Normality/Minority 
Acting on the description of a girl who sat in a closet frightened 
while six of her classmates were methodically slaughtered, police 
issued a sketch of the killer. 
Dark curly hair with narrow set eyes, thin lips, and dark comple-
xion characterize the wanted man. His height is believed about six 
feet and weight about 170 pounds. He is believed to be of Mexican 
origin. 
Meanwhile Coroner Edward Drake's findings revealed that four 
coeds had been sexually assaulted. In addition, all six had numerous 
wounds. 
Drake characterized the killer "ruthless and brutal." He also 
indicated that this was the hardest case emotionally he's ever had 
to investigate. "I have a daughter the same age as these girls, and 
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the prospect of this kind of man on the loose frightens me." 
Story Number 9 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/ 
Little Ethnic 
To Dr. Frederick Wertham, regarded by American psychiatry as an 
authority on criminal violence, said today that a key aspect of the 
slaughter of six coeds at Middleton University is the "very compla-
cent attitude in our society toward violence of all kinds." 
"We're not really appalled by it. Our sympathy for the victims 
is short-lived and may last for a week to ten days," he said. 
"In the end, we usually wind up sympathizing with the perpe-
trators of violence. Victims are forgotten. Our children learn to 
dote on violence; we're brought up on violence; violence is nothing." 
Story Number 10 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Criminal 
Interaction/Minority 
Carefully delineated procedures set out only three days ago were 
followed to the letter today, and will be followed, police said, in 
questioning anyone in connection with the murder of six coeds at 
Middleton University. 
The suspect is described as 6 feet tall, 170 pounds, about 25 
years old and of Hispanic or Mexican origin. 
Under the new rules, a suspect must be advised of his right to 
refuse to answer, his right to consult an attorney of his choosing 
or a court-appointed one, and to have such an attorney present 
during questioning. 
Many law enforcement officials believe such rules impede their 
investigations. 
Story Number 11 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/ 
Little Ethnic 
The nude body of a 16-year~old girl missing more than a month 
was found floating in Wilborn Lake today. She had been bludgeoned 
to death and possibly raped. Police believe that the same person 
responsible for the Bidwell murders four.days ago is the prime 
suspect. 
The pattern is exactly the same, Coroner Edward Drake stated. 
He also indicated that although the body was badly decomposed, 
chemical tests would be able to establish conclusively any possible 
connection. 
Meanwhile the,prime suspect, Jose Martinez, is the subject of 
a nationwide manhunt. Authorities in several other states are 
cooperating with Middleton officials because they believe him to be 
the prime suspect in several brutal sex murders in their states. 
Story Number 12 
Morbidity/Normality/Little Ethnic 
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Despite the fact that Middleton University has offered a $10,000 
reward for information leading to the arrest of the brutal slayer of 
six coeds in Bidwell Hall two days ago, the father of Phyllis Duvall 
has decided to offer his own reward. 
George Duvall is offering $5,000 to anyone who provides police 
with a lead to the murderer. "He's hurt my family and.me so bad, 
I'll pay just about anything to see him brought in," he said. 
He added that if this had been the Old West, he would have paid 
the $5,000 to a bounty hunter. 1iit woulct be worth it to see him 
meet his own brutal end," he said. 
Miss Duvall, who would have graduated at semester's end, answered 
the knock at the door that allowed the killer into the dormitory room. 
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Story Number 13 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority 
A preliminary report by Washington County Coroner Edward Drake 
revealed that at least three of the students in the Bidwell Dormitory 
murders were sexually assaulted before being killed. However, he 
declined to name which ones were involved. 
Three of the girls were stabbed or had their throats slashed, 
while the other three were strangled. Commenting on findings, he 
stated: . "This is without a doubt the most grisly murder case I have 
ever investigated. It had to be the work of a psychopath." 
Meanwhile, a nationwide manhunt continues for a man 6 feet tall, 
weighing 170 pounds and of Hispanic or Mexican origin. The description 
is based on the testimony of Nancy Wilson, the sole survivor, who hid 
in a hall closet. 
Story Number 14 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Non-
Criminal Deviance/Custom 
"I moistened my finger and began to rub the blood off his elbow 
and the tattoo appeared." This confirmed a young doctor's hunch that 
his patient was Jose Martinez, accused killer of six coeds. 
The lettering "huelga" became visible as the doctor dabbed away 
blood that covered Martinez's upper left arm. Police said Martinez 
had slashed veins in his arm in an apparent suicide try. 
The tattoo is a common symbol among migrant workers, indicating 
solidarity with Caesar Chavez's migrant workers union. The word 
itself means "strike." 
Story Number 15 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority 
Jose Martinez, recognized on an operating table by a young surgeon 
as the man sought in the massacre of six young coeds, lay under heavy 
sedation behind a guarded door at Middleton Hospital. 
Martinez, a 24-year-old Mexican migrant worker, apparently 
attempted to commit suicide in a flophouse motel on the city's west 
side, was rushed to the hospital by police who didn't realize that 
the man coated with blood was the suspect. 
A young doctor subsequently recognized him by the prominent 
tatoo on his left arm. 
Dr. Smith, a spokesman for the hospital, said Martinez had a 
deep gash in the crook of his left arm where an artery was severed, 
and a superficial cut on his right wrist. He required two pints of 
blood. 
Story Number 16 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Normality/ 
Minority 
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Jose Martinez, Mexican-American migrant worker, arrested in the 
murders of six young coeds, may have suffered a heart attack during 
the night. He was to have been confronted today by the only eye-
witness to the tragedy. 
"There is an 80% chance that Martinez suffered a coronary throm-
bosis," a hospital spokesman reported. Complete rest has been ordered 
for the next 48 hours. 
Story Number 17 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority 
The girl who lived through the bloody horror of the Bidwell Dorm 
massacre was brought to Middleton Hospital to confront the man accused. 
But their face-to-face meeting did not come off. 
The survivor, Nancy Wilson, who listened as each of her six 
friends were taken into other rooms and brutally murdered, had a 
"setback" as a result of the experience of waiting 2! hours for the 
confrontation. "Just bringing her out was a great ordeal," a hospital 
source said. 
Jose Martinez, the dark complexioned migrant worker, is in 
Middleton Hospital under a 24-hour guard after attempting to commit 
suicide prior to his arrest. Doctors described him as "somewhat 
anemic" and indicated further blood transfusions might be necessary. 
Martinez was administered two pints of blood upon admission. 
A hospital spokesman said Martinez "is not in full possession of 
254 
his mental faculties because he is in a state of extreme phy$ical and 
emotional fatigue." 
Story Number 18 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Normality/ 
Little Ethnic. 
The President of Middleton University, James Howard, said today 
that the mass killings of six students may become a serious setback 
to University recruitment efforts. · 
"I do not think that this crime will cause many of our present 
students to leave, but I feel it will have a serious deterring effect 
on recruitment of new students. Parents will think twice before 
they allow their children, particularly their girls, to come here." 
Howard indicated that the university will shortly mount an 
intensive public relations effort to play down the role of the crimes. 
One spokesman said: "We want to make it clear that this was simply 
a one-in-a-million kind of thing and will probably never happen again." 
Story Number 19 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Custom 
New evidence found in the flophouse room of accused mass slayer 
Jose Martinez indicates that he had carefully and methodically planned 
the Bidwell murders, police reported today. 
While police spokesman refused to give specific details, they 
did indicate that floor plans, names of the women who were slain, had 
been found, as well as notes to his wife. These notes apparently 
indicated marital difficulties. 
Migrant workers have a high incidence of divorce because of the 
extended time away from home. 
Story Number 20 
Inducement/Normality/Minority· 
The slim, dark girl slipped wordlessly past the door of the tiny 
room in Middleton Hospital's criminal ward. For five minutes she 
stood silently behind the doctor examining the pale, gaunt patient 
in the bed and then told police, "That is the man." 
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Nany Wilson, the sole survivor of the Bidwell Dormitory massacre, 
had positively identified Jose Martinez as the man who brutally 
murdered six of her fellow classmates on the sixth floor of the dorm 
at Middleton University. 
Martinez, a Mexican migrant worker, was tracked down by finger-
prints found in the death room. He has been in prison at least two 
previous times, serving time fbr rape and armed robbery. 
Police Chief Gerald Smith said after the identification by Miss 
Wilson, that the state has a conclusive case against Martinez. "We 
have fingerprints at the scene, eyewitness identification, and the 
murder weapon." 
Story Number 21 
Morbidity/Non-Criminal Deviance/Custom 
Police allowed reporters into the one room flophouse apartment 
of Jose Martinez for the first time today. There were no big surprises 
except the enormous number of pop bottles strewn throughout the room. 
One reporter estimated there were between 250 and 300 bottles 
in the 8' by 12' room. "There are enough bottles here to open a 
recycling center," one policeman commented. 
One source said soda pop is considered a staple in the migrant 
worker's diet, adding that they can afford only cheap wine or soda 
pop. 
Meanwhile, the accused sex slayer of six coeds remains under 
heavy guard in Middleton hospital. He is charged with stabbing three 
of the girls, strangling the other three, and sexually assaulting 
all of them. 
Story Number 22 
Morbidity /Non-Crimin.al Deviance/Custom . . 
A leading sociologist, considered an expert on migrant workers' 
problems, said today the brutal sex murders are a manifestation of a 
deep need for sexual expression among the nomads of America. Dr. 
Milton Dunbar, in commenting on the Middleton murders, indicated that 
migrant workers tend to have highly charged sexual feelings, but 
because of the lack of fixed relationships, often expresses itself in 
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bizarre ways such as the recent murders. 
"This lack of fixed relationships is compensated for by tolera-
tion of deviant sexuality," he said. He indicated that there are 
very few taboos among the migrants. In fact, he said in many cases, 
homosexuality is considered the norm. 
Story Number 23 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Non-
Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
The court baliff called, "Jose Martinez," and the lean looking 
man accused of murdering six coeds stood motionless and heard his 
counsel enter pleas of innocent today at the Washington County 
Courthouse. 
Judge Harold Roberts set preliminary hearing for August 18. 
In his first appearance since being arrested, Martinez stood 
with his head bowed, his hands limp, spoke "yes" and "no" in barefly 
audible murmurs and had his gaze on the asphalt tile floors of the 
county courtroom. 
Then he appeared before Judge Warren Alexander, Chief Judge of 
the Criminal Courts Division. Martinez stuffed both hands in his 
pockets and had to be prompted to speak louder during questioning 
regarding financial status. 
After brief questioning, Judge Alexander ruledMartinez indigent. 
Gerald Franklin was appointed to be his counsel. 
Story Number 24 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Minority 
Jose Martinez's lawyer said today that "the defense will defi-
nitely be insanity," if the 24-year-old migrant worker is brought to 
trial for the slaughter of six young coeds at Middleton University. 
Public Defender Gerald Franklin also said he would enter a plea of 
innocent and demand a jury trial. "We can't plead guilty to anything 
as I project the strategy," Franklin said. 
Franklin raised the possibility that Martinez, ill in Middleton 
Hospital, might not live to go to trial. "We might lose him," he 
said. 
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However, hospital spokesmen discounted this. "I do not believe 
there is any danger to Jose Martinez," a doctor stated. District 
Attorney William Simpson also discounted such claims. "His condition 
is fair--nothing alarming." He went on to add that this "is a ploy 
by the defense to gain sympathy for him." 
Story Number 25 
Inducement/Normality/Custom 
Jose Martinez, 24-year-old migrant worker accused of the murder 
of six university coeds, is "concerned about his relationship with 
God," a minister said today. 
The Rev. Donald Peterson spent a half-hour with Martinez, but 
was reluctant to talk with reporters. "It was a very personal con-
versation," he stated. 
Peterson said he and Martinez didn't talk about the murders 
themselves, but did indicate he was concerned about what this would 
do to his family. "The migrant worker has no one else but his family, 
and he's upset about what will happen to them." He also indicated 
his family is very close knit. 
When questioned about motive, Peterson refused to comment, 
stating this might prejudice the case. Instead he stated that Mar-
tinez is "naturally remorseful about what has happened." He later 
retracted that statement. 
Story Number 26 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/ 
Little Ethnic 
Authorities moved with extreme caution today in their efforts to 
construct an air-tight case against Jose Martinez, accused killer of 
six Middleton University coeds. 
Mindful of the recent broad ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court 
concerning in-custody questioning of suspects, police and prosecutors 
tread carefully to avoid a later reversal in the event they obtain 
conviction of the accused mass slayer. 
It has been learned, however, that at a strategy session in the 
Washington County Courthouse building, a firm case is being built. 
Prosecutors feel the fingerprint evidence and eyewitness testimony 
will insure conviction. 
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. When asked about a possible motive for the slayings, one prose-
cution source who asked not to be identified stated: "The motive is 
plain and simple, one man wished to vent his personal frustrations 
through cold blooded murder." 
Story Number 27 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Minority 
District Attorney William Simpson formally charged Jose Martinez 
with the murder of Karen Shields, a 16-year-old whose body was found 
four days after the Bidwell Dormitory massacre. Simpson said the 
evidence was "once again overwhelming." 
Shields' body was found in Wilborn Lake last week. She had been 
bludgeoned to death and raped. Her clothing was found buried in a 
shallow mound near the body. She had been missing from home about a 
month. 
Martinez, a Mexican-American drifter and migrant worker, already 
has been charged with the murder of six coeds at Middleton University's 
Bidwell Dormitory. 
Story Number 28 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Criminal 
Interaction/Custom 
A Texas law enforcement official interrogated Jose Martinez today 
in connection with several crimes that have occurred in the past four 
months. The official stated that there "seemed to be a strong connec-
tion between the crimes here in Middleton and several unsolved murders 
in the Brownsville, Texas, area." 
When asked if migrant workers tend to get into more trouble than 
other kinds of workers, he stated: "Only when they have time on 
their hands, when we get bad weather, and they can't work for a day. 
It's nothing to have six or seven of them locked up by evening." 
He added that these cases are just the ones where the police are 
called. In many more cases the police are never called because the 
owners don't want to get involved. 
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Story Number 29 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Custom 
An official of Caesar Chavez's United Farm Workers said today 
that people "should not be afraid of the migrant farm worker. We 
are not all crazed murderers," Ventustiano Olquin, an organizer for 
the union, stated. He decried the bad wave of publicity resulting 
from the Middleton murders. 
When Olquin was asked concerning Jose Martinez's extensive 
criminal record, he commented: "Poor working conditions and pay 
have driven many migrant workers to acts of crime." However, he 
emphasized that non-violence is the foundation of the UFW's effort 
to improve conditions in migrant camps. 
Martinez has served two jail terms in Texas for rape and armed 
robbery; and is also being questioned by New Mexico and California 
officials concerning a string of brutal sex crimes in their states. 
The Bidwell dormitory murders have been labeled as the "most 
vicious killings'' in the state's history, by law enforcement officials. 
Martinez has been charged with stabbing and strangling six coeds and 
sexually molesting all of them. 
Story Number 30 
Morbidity/Normality/Cytstom 
Victor Martinez, the 31-year-old brother of accused mass slayer 
Jose Martinez, arrived in Middleton today, but was denied permission 
to see his brother in the hospital recuperating from an apparent heart 
attack. City officials declined comment. 
The elder Martinez said he would try again with an attorney. 
"No matter what they say he did, he's my brother and he's sick and I 
want to see him," he commented. Jose Martinez has been charged with 
the brutal slayings and sexual assaults on six coeds at Middleton 
University. 
When asked why it took a week for him to arrive, he responded, 
"We are always traveling, and don't have access to newspapers or 
TV. II 
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Story Number 31 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Custom 
William H. Friedland, an outstanding sociologist and author of 
several books on migrant workers, said today that claims that workers 
are "peace loving" are a 11farce." Ventustiano O~quin, an official 
of the United Farm Workers, had stated yesterday that accused mass 
slayer Jose Martinez does not represent the majority of such workers. 
Friedland contends he has documented numerous claims of migrant 
violence. "Most fights start spontaneously, like brief explosions 
often sparked by intense competition for women," he said. Deviant 
sexual behavior also accounts for much of the violence, he stated. 
When asked why so few incidents are reported, he said: "The 
workers choose to settle disputes among themselves." 
Martinez, charged with seven brutal murders and sexual assaults 
in two separate incidents, was moved today from Middleton Hospital 
to the county jail. Meanwhile authorities from New Mexico said they 
have plans to file charges against him in a macabre murder case in-
volving a barmaid who was bludgeoned to death and sexually mutilated. 
Story Number 32 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Custom 
A former cell mate of Jose Martinez, interviewed in his Texas 
prison cell, said today that Martinez was capable·of committing the 
brutal Bidwell Dorm murders. 
Jim Waldecker, who is still serving time for armed robbery, 
indicated that Martinez would brag about what he could do to people. 
"He treated rape and robbery as a boy scout would treat getting·a 
badge. They were status symbols to him." 
Waldecker also indicated that some migrant workers he's known 
have to brag about their exploits to build themselves up. "Most 
migrants I've known have poor self-images, so they often stretch 
the truth to elevate that image." 
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Story Number 33 
Morbidity/Normality/Custom 
Less. than two weeks since his arrest, Jose Martinez, charged 
with the brutal stabbing and strangulation of six young coeds, asked 
for a visit by a local priest. Martinez is Catholic. 
Police said they probably would grant the request, despite the 
fact that just yesterday they denied Martinez's older brother a 
visit. Police also believe that Martinez is the slayer of a 16-year-
old whose bludgeoned body was found at Wilborn Lake. 
When reached for comment, Victor Martinez said it's only natural 
for his brother to want a visit'from the priest. "My brother, my 
whole family is deeply spiritual, very much involved in the church." 
Meanwhile the last of the six murdered coeds was buried today 
in Canton. 
Story Number 34 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Non-
Criminal Deviance/Little Ethnic 
District Attorney William Simpson says he will present evidence 
to a Washington County Grand Jury tomorrow in the case of Jose 
Martinez, the accused slayer of six coeds who were strangled and 
stabbed in their Middleton University dormitory rooms. 
Meanwhile Martinez's condition was reported satisfactory by 
Middleton hospital. "His temperature and pulse remain stable and 
sutures from the self-inflicted wounds have been removed," they 
said. Martinez had attempted to commit suicide prior to his arrest. 
Doctors reported he is suffering from pericarditis, an inflam-
mation of the membranous sac that encases the heart. He remains 
heavily sedated. 
Story Number 35 
Inducement/Non-Criminal Deviance/Custom 
Middleton police officials said today that "psychological revenge" 
was apparently the motive in the brutal sex slaying of six coeds at 
Middleton University. This announcement came at a press conference 
called to discuss the initial findings of a panel of psychiatrists 
who examined accused slayer Jose Martinez. 
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"He wanted to get even for bad treatment from women in the past," 
Police Chief Gerald Smith said. "However, tests indicate he was 
fully competent and acted with premeditation," he added. 
Smith said such "revenge type" violence is common among migrant 
workers. "There are no police out in the fields, so they settle 
things for themselves in their own peculiar way." 
Story Number 36 
Morbidity/Criminal Interaction/Minority 
A Washington County Grand Jury, which convened only yesterday, 
returned six indictments today against accused slayer Jose Martinez 
for the sex-related Bidwell murders. 
The indictment reads as follows: "Jose Martinez intentionally 
and knowingly strangled and killed Phyllis Duvall, Patricia Fisher, 
and Gloria Wilkinson, and intentionally and knowingly stabbed and 
killed Nina Williams, Mary Ann Philipps, and Pam Hinkle, and sexually 
molested all of them." 
The 25-year-old ex-convict, and Mexican migrant worker, is still 
in Middleton Hospital recovering from a probable heart attack and 
self-inflicted wounds. Police from New Mexico, Texas, and California 
are waiting to question him concerning similar murders in their 
respective states. 
Martinez has served time in Texas on charges of rape and armed 
robbery. 
Story Number 37 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Non-
Criminal Deviance/Minority 
A defense attorney today asked that an impartial panel of psychia-
trists representing both sides be named to examine accused mass slayer 
Jose Martinez "to avoid a spectacle of psychiatrists battling psychia-
trists." 
The request from Public Defender Gerald Franklin was among six 
motions filed before Judge Harold Roberts. It was Martinez's second 
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court appearance since his arrest. Martinez, a migrant farm worker, 
has been hospitalized for heart inflammation after an apparent suicide 
attempt. He sat during the hearing, looking glum and thin. 
Story Number 38 
Little Morbidity .or Inducement/Non-
Criminal Deviance/Minority 
An expert on criminal law said today Jose Martinez, indicted for 
the murder of six coeds, could go free on an insanity plea even if he 
confessed an "act" of murder. 
There is even a possibility that Martinez, a 24-year-old Mexican 
migrant farm worker, could avoid trial entirely, Professor Richard 
Witmer of Middleton University said. 
Witmer said if Martinez fits the definition of legal insanity, 
he would be freed of criminal responsibility for the dormitory 
killings of six young women. Even if Martinez admitted the "acts" 
of murder, Witmer said, he would not under law be admitting guilt. 
Story Number 39 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Criminal 
Interaction/Minority 
A possible flaw--a wrong middle name--was uncovered today in the 
indictment charging Mexican migrant worker Jose Martinez with the 
murder of six coeds. 
The indictments returned by a Washington County grand jury listed 
the 24-year-old accused killer as "Jose Philip Martinez." However, 
records in his home town of Williamsville, California, list his name 
as "Jose Felipe Martinez." 
The District Attorney's office said it wasn't worried about the 
discrepancy. Martinez's lawyer, Public Defender Gerald Franklin, 
told newsmen the name discrepancy would be made part of the defense 
record. 
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Story Number 40 
Inducement/Normality/Custom 
Gerald Franklin, defense attorney for Jose Martinez accused of 
committing the murder of six coeds, said today that his client is being 
"tried by newspaper" and will therefore seek a lengthy continuance. 
"The press has been allowing anyone to comment on the case, 
whether they are directly involved or not," he said. Franklin went 
on to say that the media had done everything but execute Martinez. 
In addition he said that migrant workers in general have been 
tried. "No one in this area of the county will hire a migrant worker 
for a long time. They've forgotten to indicate that 99% of the 
traveling nomads are good employees." 
Story Number 41 
Inducement/Normality/Little Ethnic 
There will be restrictions on newsmen and photographers covering 
the trial of Jose Martinez according to Judge Harold Roberts, who will 
try the case. The judge indicated that this is to make later pleas 
of "prejudicial publicity" by the defense a "moot point." 
Specific guidelines will not be formulated until it is known 
how many newsmen will cover the trial. 
Defense Counsel Gerald Franklin was granted a change of venue 
for the trial which will begin next month. Such a change in location 
is to insure a fair trial in an area that has not been saturated 
with prejudicial publicity. 
Story Number 42 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Non-
Criminal Deviance/Custom 
Accused slayer Jose Martinez apparently had two "wives," one 
whom he was officially married to, who still resides in California. 
The other is a woman who traveled with him on the harvest journey 
each year. It was his traveling wife that told members of the media 
concerning his "dual" relationship. 
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"Such a relationship is not unusual," she said. "Many men whose 
wives don't travel with them need the friendship." In addition she 
confirmed that Martinez had been missing several months prior to the 
murders. 
When asked what kind of a man Martinez was, "He's a sweet man," 
she replied. 
Story Number 43 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Criminal 
Interaction/Custom 
A spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union indicated 
today that it was making its services available to defense counsel 
Gerald Franklin. "The plight of Jose Martinez is the plight of all 
migrant workers," Mario Obledo said. 
"Migrant workers rarely accept help from the system, instead they 
are just resigned to accepting from the system whatever comes." 
She added that the ACLU does not question the competency of 
court-appointed public defender Gerald Franklin, but simply wishes 
to help him in any way possible. 
Story Number 44 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Custa~ 
Gerald Franklin, defense attorney for accused mass slayer Jose 
Martinez, said today he had irrefutable evidence that would prove 
that Martinez couldn't have been in the dormitory the night six coeds 
were brutally murdered. 
Franklin stated that he had obtained affadavits from several 
people establishing his client's whereabouts that evening. He also 
attacked the publication of his client's prior record. "People assume 
that once a man has been in trouble, he's always in trouble." 
He stated his client's efforts at improving the lot of migrant 
workers has not been mentioned. '·'They are hard workers, people who 
work from dawn to dusk. They have no time to get into trouble." 
Story Number 45 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/ 
Normality/Custom 
Many may wonder what is Jose Martinez doing in jail while he 
awaits trial on charges of murdering six coeds at Middleton Univer-
sity? The inside word is that he plays cards, almost constantly. 
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Although no reporters have been allowed to see Martinez, Washing-
ton County jailer Lewis. Ross says that the defendant plays game after 
game of solitaire with himself. 
Ross said he learned from Martinez that this is the only means 
of relaxation for migrant workers. "He told me at night in the camps, 
when the work is all done, they play cards for hours. 
Story Number 46 
Inducement/Normality/Little Ethnic 
A set of guidelines for news coverage of the prosecution of Jose 
Martinez was drawn up today by the Middleton District Attorney and 
counsel for the man accused of murdering six coeds in their dormitory. 
Presented to Judge Harold Roberts, the proposed rules stem from 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning "prejudicial publi-
city." 
The proposed ground rules came as Judge Roberts criticized 
published reports that a panel of psychiatrists had determined that 
Martinez is mentally capable of standing trial on the murder charges. 
The proposed guidelines would provide that: 
--The news media report only matters on record. 
--They not seek out witnesses before their appearance in court. 
--The names of persons selected as jurors should not be published 
or broadcast until they are sequestered. 
Story Number 47 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/ 
Normality/Custom 
Defense attorneys asked today that a tailor be admitted to the 
cell of accused mass slayer Jose Martinez so a suit can be fitted 
for his trial. "He just wants to look decent at the trial," Gerald 
Franklin said. 
The Washington County prosecutors office said they would not 
object to the request. 
When asked if this was not a bit unusual, he replied, "No, from 
what he's told me, most migrant wor>kers when out in public like to 
look their very best." In addition Franklin said that because he 
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has lost so much weight, his clothing at home in California no longer 
fits him. 
Story Number 48 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/Minority 
The attorney for Jose Martinez asked again today that the 24-year-
old Mexican migrant worker's trial on charges of murdering six coeds 
at Middleton University be transferred to another county. 
Gerald Franklin, the public defender assigned to the Martinez 
case, argued that news coverage of the crime in Lawrence County would 
make it impossible to receive a fair trial. 
When asked by Judge Harold Roberts what kind of publicity made 
Lawrence County unsuitable, Franklin replied: "His past criminal 
record has been published numerous times, as well as a rather macabre 
article in a Sunday paper having to do with the crime." Franklin 
submitted copies of the articles in his motion for a ~hange of venue. 
Judge Roberts took the motion under advisement. 
Story Number 49 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Normality/ 
Little Ethnic 
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Guards armed with machine guns and shotguns secretly moved Jose 
Martinez from Middleton Hospital to the Lawrence County jail today 
to face trial in the brutal slaying of six young coeds .• 
Story Number 50 
Inducement/Criminal Interaction/ 
Little Ethnic 
Judge Harold Roberts declared today that a suit charging him 
with illegally restraining the press was a thinly veiled attempt to 
force him to permit media to have free reign at the trial of Jose 
Martinez, accused slayer of six coeds at Middleton University. 
In a formal answer to the State Supreme Court, Judge Roberts 
asserted "the issue is not freedom of the press, but the accused's 
right toa fair trial." 
He said his order restraining newsmen "simply sought to assure 
the trial will be conducted with appropriate judicial, calm, solemnity 
and dignity, and be free from any kind of carnival atmosphere." 
Story Number 51 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Criminal 
Interaction/Little Ethnic 
Judge Harold Roberts rejected today as "untimely" a defense 
motion that he withdraw as the judge who will try Martinez on charges 
of murdering six coeds. 
District Attorney William Simpson protested the motion, calling 
it "indulgence in fantasy" and "Alice in Wonderland." 
Defense attorneys had claimed prejudice on the part of Judge 
Roberts, but refused to cite any examples in open court. 
Story Number 52 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/ 
Normality/Minority 
The State'Supreme Court ordered Judge Harold Roberts today to 
modify his press guidelines in the trial of Mexican migrant worker 
Jose Martinez for murder~ng six .coeds. 
In a 5-to-1 decision, the state's highest court ordered the 
trial judge to perrni t "the reporting of·· all events and happenings 
in open court with one exception. Prospective jurors may not be 
named until they are excused or sworn and sequestered." 
The court also ordered Judge Roberts to permit reporters to 
buy transcripts of the trial record at any time. 
'· 
Story Number 53 
Inducement/Normality/Minority 
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Jose Martinez charged with murde~ing six young coeds last summer 
went on trial for his life today. 
The tall 25-year-old migrant farm worker moved his big hands 
nervously from mouth to cheeks to nose to;ears and back and forth· 
from legs to face as the long process of jury selection began. 
By the day's end, he seemed calmer. He leaned back in his swivel 
chair and even smiled occasionally despite a repeated statement to 
prospective jurors by District Attorney William Simpson that the 
prosecution would ask the jury to find him guilty with a recommenda-
tion that he be put to death. · 
Story Number 54 . · 
Little Morbidity or Inducement/Criminal. 
Interaction/Little Ethnic 
The second day of jury selection in the Martinez murder trial 
ended today with the first juror yet to be empaneled. 
Fifty-five prospective jurors have been closely interrogated 
by prosecution and defense counsel. All but three were excused 
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because they oppose capital punishment, or had predetermined opinions 
about the guilt or innocence of the 25-year-old defendant. 
Martinez's Defense Attorney Gerald Franklin said later that this 
proved his point that "he cannot receive a fair trial because of 
adverse publicity." 
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